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The term "food security" and "food insecurity" are widely used by scientist 
and policy makers. These terms have been variously defined and interpreted 
across the world. Howevei", the underlined fact is that the concept of food 
security is wider, larger and nnore comprehensive than mere banishing of the 
hunger. In a crude sense, the term food security refers to the ability of a 
country to provide amounts of food for its population. Thus, physical and 
economic access to food at the household level, at all times, to ensure healthy 
and active life is the crux of food security at macro level. In other words it can 
be said that the term food security covers adequate production and 
availability of food at national as well as individual level and it is also 
associated with peoples' ability to buy such food, which is necessary for them 
to live a healthy life. 
During early discoiirse, food security implied an arrangement for 
providing minimum level of foodgrains for the population during years of 
normal as well as poor harvests. Later on it was realised that physical 
availability alone would not ensure food security for all population. 
Accordingly, it was emphasised that production and availability in supplies 
should match efforts in poverty eradication and creating effective demand to 
ensure economic and physical access to food for the poor. Even further later^  
three stages for food security were recognised as; food self-sufficiency; food 
security; and nutritional security. Food self-sufficiency is merely a statistical 
concept for measuring, quantitative adeauacy of food available in the market 
within a country either through indigenous production or through imports. 
Food security on the other hand is defined in terms of the capacity of an 
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individual to have physical and economic access to food all times. Nutritional 
security is the advance stage where people have physical and economic 
access to balance nutrition and clean drinking water. 
Agriculture is the mainstay of India, in which about 66 percent people 
of the country are engaged for their livelihood. Droughts and other natural 
calamities have been part and parcel of India's rural life since time 
immemorial of which agriculture has been one of the main victims. Therefore 
after independence agricultural development has been accorded one of the 
top most priorities in country's five-year plans. Initially, India had to resort to 
large-scale food import to fill the gap between domestic demand and supply 
and also to build a sufficient food stock for unforeseen circumstances. But 
ensuring food security for a fast growing population was not an easy task as 
deficits in food security stemmed from the combined effects of factors such as 
low levels of food production, poverty and diminishing environmental quality. 
In this thesis the concern to food security in India is analysed on three 
grounds i.e. (i) availability of food; (ii) access to food; and (iii) absorption of 
food. In other words growth, equity and sustainability are the three crucial 
yardsticks through which the case of food security in India is compared during 
the period of pre and post economic reforms. By growth it is simply meant 
rise in output percapita as well as in absolute terms while the equity 
considerations are evaluated in terms of the distribution benefits to the overall 
sections of the society particularly poor. And sustainability is considered in 
terms of the use of methods and technology that are environment friendly. 
Since Independence India made commendable progress in improving 
the food and nutrition security. Growth in foodgrain production exceeded the 
population growth rate and thus contributed to substantial increase in 
percapita availability of foodgrains from 429 grams percapita per day in 
1950s to 470 grams percapita per day in 1990s. Rice and wheat output 
growth primarily buttressed the increased availability of foodgrains. Rice and 
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wheat percapita availability jumped from 158 and 65 grams per day to 227 
and 164 grams respectively during the same period. 
Following the new economic policy and establishment of World Trade 
Organisation in nineties Indian agriculture has witnessed some everlasting 
changes. These developments have cast a shadow on the basic national 
concern i.e. food security. Increase in food prices, shrinking area under 
foodgrains, lowering offtake and increasing cost of food stocks have emerged 
as major concerns with regard to food security. India at present finds itself in 
the midst of a paradoxical situation: endemic mass-hunger coexisting with the 
mounting foodgrain stocks. The foodgrain stocks available with the 
government stand as high as over three times of the minimum buffer norms 
for ensuring food security. Still, an estimated 200 million people are underfed 
and 50 million on the brink of starvation. 
Trade liberalisation and policies of globalisation were supposed to 
increase food production through enhancement in efficiency, ameliorate the 
economic situation of farmers and improve patterns of consumption. But, in 
fact trade liberalisation has led to a decline in food production, food 
productivity and deterioration in the conditions of farmers not to mention 
hampering food security in the country. The latest official estimates suggest 
that still more than a quarter of our population lives below the poverty line. 
This implies that despite the availability of foodgrains for meeting the 
requirements of the entire population, the country is still far behind generating 
the necessary purchasing power or effective demand from the poor to satisfy 
their needs. Consequently, a large section of our population is suffering from 
food insecurity. As a whole the post new economic policy or structural 
adjustment programme period is seen as a major disappointment in tenns of 
aggregate growth performance in agriculture caused by continuing slackness 
in public investment, rural infrastructure and employment generation. 
Undermining of the Indian agriculture after the economic reform could 
be gauged from the fact that growth of food output had decelerated to 1.15 
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percent compound every year, whereas, during the same period population 
growth has been recorded an increase at 1.94 percent compound every year. 
The thrust on exports of agricultural produce has resulted in a significant 
change in cropping patterns. Indian producers have been diverting more and 
more cultivable land from foodgrains and pulses to the production of oilseeds, 
cotton, horticultural crops, prawn culture, animal husbandry etc. Area under 
foodgrain cultivation in 2002-03 was 14 million hectares less than in 1990-91. 
The most severe decline has been in coarse grains and pulses, which are the 
main foodgrains of the poor. Area under coarse cereals fell by 10 million 
hectares between 1990-91 and 2002-03. For pulses the area fell by 3 million 
hectares. Even area under rice in 2002-03 was 2 million hectares less than in 
1990-91. In major foodgrains only the area under wheat registered some 
increase. The irony is that even the perfomiance of non-foodgrains is not 
much better. The index of area under non-foodgrains shows a marginal 
decline in area. Thus, the overall performance of agriculture during the 
structural adjustment programme has found to be deteriorated. The fall in 
production was further accentuated by the collapse of yield growth of all the 
major crops like wheat, rice, coarse cereals, pulses, cotton, sugarcane and 
even oil seeds. The index of agriculture production shows that the yield of 
foodgrains has declined from 2.74 percent in eighties to just 1.17 percent in 
the post reform period. Similarly the yield of non-foodgrains decelerated from 
2.31 percent in eighties to 0.47 percent in nineties. Thus, the yield of all 
principle crops taken together registered a sharp decline from 2.56 percent in 
the pre-reform decade to 0.86 percent in the post refonn period. 
The PDS entitlement meets only a quarter of the total foodgrain 
requirements of a BPL family, which means it has to depend more on the 
market for meeting its total requirements. On the other hand raising central 
issue prices for APL families have forced them too opting for market 
purchases. Consequently, the market demand for food has risen. But, the 
massive foodgrain procurement by government has diverted out the market 
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supplies to FCI's godowns resulting even further increase in food prices. Thus, 
effective reach of PDS has shrunken alarmingly during the post reform 
compared to eighties. Despite bulging stocks and a poor harvest, distribution 
of foodgrains in 2000 was the lowest since 1980. Consequently percapita 
cereals availability in 2001 fell to its lowest level in over two decades. High 
increase in the food stod^ mounted the foods subsidy bill whereas decline in 
the consumer subsidy in the nineties deteriorated the food security situation of 
the poor. 
Hypothetical division of people into categories like, below poverty Jine 
(BPL) and above poverty line (APL) with the issue prices being different for 
each category, is not the best tool to increase food security. This division has 
left a whole lot of deserving poor out side the PDS net. Further, the poverty 
line has proven to be an unsatisfactory and a weak criterion. For example, if 
one goes by the intake of calories, then around 53 percent of the population is 
deficient in terms of calorie intake. If one goes by the nutritional status of the 
children then again more than half the population is nutritionally poor. In fact, 
the economic bi-partition of people on hypothetical considerations is always 
prone to faults, which has quite remarkably been proven in government's 
various schemes launched during the structural adjustment programme. 
The existing food management system has basically evolved in 
response to severe food shortages and lack of proper distribution. Thus, the 
prime objective of the food management system was to increase the domestic 
foodgrains production, procurement and storage through various means. So 
that any supply shortages are met on time. As long as the problem of food 
scarcity and inadequate supply persisted the food policy moved satisfactorily 
ensuring food security for the population, protecting the interest of the 
consumers and restraining the rise in foodgrain prices. It encouraged the 
domestic foodgrains production besides succeeding in safeguarding the 
interest of the consumers and bringing relative stability in foodgrain prices. 
But the continuance of the old objectives even after India achieved near self-
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sufficiency in food production and piling a huge food stocks has rendered the 
present food policy obsolete. 
Incessant rise in Minimum Support Prices and committed FCI 
purchases have distorted the cropping pattern in favour of the crops that fetch 
more MSPs. This has also led to a serious imbalance in inter-crop parities, 
besides spoiling the ecological balance in the form of water logging, salinity, 
depletion of vital micronutrients in the soil, and reduced fertility etc. Thus, 
India's present food policy is more to blame for the mismanagement in the 
sector. The government is pegging the price of food and raising it from year to 
year at a rate higher than the inflation rate. And because there is a 
procurement policy where the government will take up whatever is given to it 
at the MSP. Throughout the economic reforms, the relative price of food has 
risen, which is certainly a dangerous trend, particularly for the poor whose 
incomes are fixed or not rising as fast as the rest of the economy. 
Simultaneously, ever-rising food subsidy is not being spent on food 
distribution but on food stocks. Thus, the present food security system reflects 
the basic flaw in our policy-making for agriculture and rural development. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
The concern v«th food security can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, which recognized the right to food as a core element of an 
adequate level of living. However, the specific term "food security" was coined 
during the World Food Conference in 1974 organised by the United Nation's Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) at Rome. The Conference pointed attention of 
the world leaders to the need for devising ways and means for ensuring food security 
to the millions of poor who could not afford even one square meal a day. The concern 
highlighted at the Conference succeeded in putting into sharp focus the challenges 
before the policy makers in ensuring food security to all. 
In a country of the size and complexities like India, having low percapita 
incomes with around 260 million (193 million in rural areas) people living below the 
poverty line (defined in terms of certain minimum calorie intake) . It has been a major 
priority of the Central and State governments to ensure food and nutritional security. 
Threats of famines and acute starvation have been a cause of major concern since the 
early years of independence. Mass level pervasive chronic energy deficiency and 
malnutrition, low literacy levels, limited access to safe water, sanitation and health 
care issues shaped the Government of India's multi-pronged and multi-sectoral 
strategy to ensure the food and nutrition security of its countrymen. The major thrusts 
of the policy relied on; 
Promoting rapid domestic foodgrain output and income growth at the national 
level through rural infrastructure investments, agricultural production 
enhancement and price support programmes; 
Strengthening household capacity to access food through public food 
distribution, food price stabilization, and food-for-work programs; 
Improving intra-household food utilization by implementing nutrition, health, 
water supply, sanitation, and educational programs. 
Government of India (2004) Economic Survey 2003-0-1, Ministry of Finance, p.204. 
After independence India made commendable progress in improving the food 
and nutrition security. Growth in foodgrain productivity exceeded the population 
growth rate and thus contributed to increase in percapita availability of foodgrains 
from 394 in 1951 to 491 grams per day in 2002. Rice and wheat output growth 
primarily buttressed the increased availability of foodgrains. Rice and wheat percapita 
availability jumped from 159 and 66 grams per day to 227 and 164 grams respectively 
during the same period, hicreased food availability and better early warning systems 
facilitated more rapid transport of foodgrains to needy areas thus; preventing the 
occurrence of large-scale famines. Rising incomes and reduction in poverty levels ~ a 
major determinant of households' capacity to access food ~ from 51 percent in 1977-
78 to about 26 percent in 1999-2000 have been instrumental in improving food and 
nutrition security at the household level. The nutritional well being of households was 
further aided by increasing literacy rates from 24 percent in 1961 to above 75 percent 
in 2002. Access to safe water (the percentage of the population with access to safe 
water) increased from 17 percent in seventies to over 85 percent at the turn of the 
century. Further, access to sanitation facilities had encompassed over 3U percent of 
the population during the same period. Access to health care had also reached over 90 
percent of the population. Progress in these areas has contributed tremendously in 
reducing the mortality rate from 236 to 68 per 1000 live birth between 1960 and 2000. 
Thus increasing the life expectancy at birth from 41 in 1961 to above 65 years in 
2001. 
Besides the universal Public Distribution System (PDS), number of 
programmes have been initiated by government with the strategic objective to 
increase the access to food on the one hand and increase the purchasing power 
through a number of wage employment and income generation programs on the other. 
In fact it was the first five-year plan in 1951 when the government had shown its clear 
concern for poverty alleviation. But the real headway could be made during the green 
revolution in late sixties. Thereafter, In mid seventies two important poverty 
alleviation schemes namely, Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) and Desert 
Development Programme were started. Then in 1979 an scheme entitled Training of 
Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSEM) was initiated to impart training and up 
grading technical skills of the rural youth In 1980 National Rural Employment 
Programme (NREP) and Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) were 
launched with a view to address the rural poverty. Development of Women and 
Children in Rural Areas (DWACRA) was launched in 1982-83 with special focus on 
improving the living condition of women and thereby of children through the 
provision of opportunities of self-employment and access to basic social services. 
Another scheme called Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) 
was introduced in 1983 with an aim to assure 100 days of guaranteed employment to 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) families belonging to landless category. Jawahar Rozgar 
Yojna (JRY) 1989, was the result of the merger of two earlier schemes called NREP 
and RLEGP. The main thrust of the new scheme was to generate additional gainful 
employment for the unemployed and under employed persons in rural areas. Million 
Well Scheme (MWS), a part of the JRY, aimed at providing irrigation facilities to 
small and marginal farmers having land yet living below the poverty line. Launched 
in 1993 Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) targeted 1775 blocks in drought prone, 
desert and hilly areas to generate 100 days of assured employment to casual labours 
during the off agricultural season. Since April 1, 1999, IRDP and MWS are merged 
into a single programme called Swaran Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna (SGSY) to 
help develop micro-enterprise in rural areas with major emphasis on organizing rural 
poor into self-help groups, capacity building, infrastructure support, technology credit 
and market linkages. In the same year JRY was re-launched as Jawahar Gram 
Samridhi Yojna (JGSY). Food for Work Programme was started in 2000 as a 
component of EAS in notified drought prone areas in eight states with an aim to 
augment food security through wage employment. Since September 2001, JGSY, 
EAS and Food for Work Programme were merged under a new scheme called 
Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojna (SGRY) with the same aim as that of the merged 
schemes. 
Public Distribution System (PDS), which evolved out of British policy of 
rationing introduced in 1939 in Bombay, spread to other parts of the countr)' after 
Bengal famine of 1943. Various foodgrain policy committees during pre and post-
independent India emphasised the need and continuance of the PDS with minor 
modifications from time to time. However, it was the launch of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) or the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1991, from where we 
find a newly structured Public Distribution System. First it was the Revamped Public 
Distribution (RPDS) in 1992, which specially targeted the disadvantaged areas like 
tribal, hilly and drought prone and then the Targeted Public Distribution System 
(TPDS) in 1997, which specially focused on the people living below the poverty line. 
The TPDS was further supplemented by two schemes called Antyodaya Anna Yojana 
(AAY) and Annapurna in the year 2000. The AAY targeted poorest of the poor while 
Annapurna targeted indigent senior citizens. 
1.1 Basic Issues: 
Despite large scale expenditures on mitigating household food and nutritional gaps 
especially for poor and vulnerable households, current indicators show that many of 
these programs are not effectively fulfilling their intended goals. For example, a 
World Bank study on TPDS implementation in Uttar Pradesh during 1997-98, found 
that cash constraints among the poor and problems of unreliability of supplies in the 
I'air price shops contribute to lower ofrtake levels. With further raise in the BPL 
allocations to 20 kgs per month per household, liquidity problems could exacerbate 
access difficulties by poorer households unless they are allowed to obtain smaller 
quantities per purchase, hnplementation problems identified in previous studies of 
PDS are unresolved under the TPDS, undermining the effectiveness of the program. 
These include reports of: (i) alleged illegal diversions of foodgrains to other uses at 
various levels of the supply chain: (ii) prices charged at fair price shop exceeding the 
official price, on average by as much as 10 percent to 14 percent; (iii) low quality of 
foodgrains, some below established standards for human consumption; and (iv) weak 
monitoring, lack of transparency, and inadequate accountability of officials 
implementing the program. There are also reports of leakages of grain of up to 40 
percent. Since 1993-94, actual buffer stockholdings consistently exceeded the 
required buffer stock norms, leading to depletion of scarce fiscal resources. By the 
year 2002, stock levels had reached to 58 million tones, which is almost three times of 
the required buffer norms. 
The total number of workdays genciated by, and the level foodgrain offtake 
from, the JRY/JGSY and EAS have been declining since the mid-1990s. The decline 
in budget allocation to employment schemes since the mid-1990s, and the increasing 
average wage rate under JRY, led to the large decline in total number of workdays 
generated by these schemes. The offtake of food distributed under the EAS and JRY 
also declined dramatically after 1994-95. The JRY, JGSY and EAS continued to 
suffer from weak targeting, with JRY, JGSY displaying further deterioration after the 
economic reforms. The participation of target groups like the SC/STs and landless 
workers on an average has declined significantly, with great variation in pace of 
decline across states. Even women participation still remains well below the target of 
30 percent. 
The green revolution strategy has led to the concentration of incremental 
increases in wheat and rice output and marketed surplus in few states, which 
consequently has also resulted in the concentration of price support operations in 
these states. Political pressure from the fanners from these surplus producing states 
have pushed producers price at the cost of excessive stocks, and persistently rising 
outlays on subsidies. On the other hand negligence to agriculturally lagging regions, 
has resulted in stagnation or declining percapita food production in the states outsides 
the green revolution belt. In such situations weakening of PDS over the years has 
rendered the deficit states with a high incidence of food insecurity. 
The globalization of corporate agriculture is aggravating all the problems 
linked with the centralized system of food production and distribution. Increasing 
chemical use, through the conventional methods as well as genetic engineering and 
promoting the mining of water and soil fertility by putting profitability above 
sustainability is fueling food insecurity through climatic changes. Higher primacy to 
trade b)' putting exports above the food entitlements is undermining the domestic 
production. Thus putting the poor and vulnerable at more risk. 
The causes of hunger and food insecurity are complex and multidimensional. 
They could be environmental, economic, political or social. In this regard, recently 
introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the World Bank and IMF 
have generated a lot of controversies. For example, they are alleged to be promoting 
the interest of a handful of developed countries at the costs of millions of poor of the 
Third World and least developing countries. These adjustment programmes typically 
include: currency devaluation, trade liberalization, cuts in social spending, with 
women and children being the chief victims, privatization of government-held 
enterprises, layoff in the public sector and wage suppression, high interest rates and 
credit restrictions. Export earnings, which could have been directed towards 
agricultural support, are diverted to service the debt. A number of researches 
including those of IMF and World Bank have found that adjustment process resulted 
in a sharp fall in the real purchasing power of a number of developing countries and 
thus limiting Iheir ability to purchase food and other essential items. At the same time, 
the expected growth, which had been argued for implementing the SAP, has so far not 
materialized in many countries. Even the FAO (1995) had to acknowledge, "It is now 
well accepted that a new class of poor has been created by adjustment". 
There are certain major issues associated with structural adjustment programs 
that are said to be a threat to the food security of the poor; firstly, SAP induced 
policies promote and encourage cash crops for export on the world market. This, 
however, increases dependence on food imports. Simultaneously, SAP imposed 
currency devaluation makes imports more expensive, which increases the 
vulnerability of the poor countries. Furthermore, cash crop promotion, which involves 
mechanized farming and high use of agro-chemicals, damages the resource base (soil, 
water etc.) which is essential for sustainability of agriculture and food security. And 
finally, by promoting cash crops, and cutting back on public expenditure, SAPs 
favour large mono-cropping farmers to the detriment of small subsistence farmers. 
W'ho increasingly find thcmseh'es displaced to marginal lands with negative 
en\'ironmenta! consequences leading to e\en greater food insecurity. After SAP In 
India a large number of the starvation deaths are reported owing to commercialization 
of the agriculture. Peasants in many states particularly small and marginal are in the 
grip of predatory commercialization of agriculture. In the hope of earning foreign 
exchange these farmers left Iheir traditional crops to grow the crops that carry high 
value in the international market. Unaware of the international politics, these farmers 
took heavy loans to boost their export prospects. But rapid fall in international prices 
of a number of crops left these farmers in lurch. 
Withdrawal of state as a facilitator of input extension services and credits 
pla>cd havoc with the gullible farmers who by now had fallen into the firm grip of 
local moneylenders cnarging thrice and four times higher interest than charged by a 
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commercial bank. Increasing rural indebtedness and farmers suicides from various 
parts of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Tamil Nadu is a mule 
testimony to government's SAP laden economic policies. Farmers after mortgaging 
their land to local moneylenders arc cither forced to work as laborers in their own 
fields or move to cities in search an alternate lo end their miseries and alienation. 
Withdrawal of subsidies on the other hand has caused a quantum jump in the cost of 
inputs like power, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides etc which has increased the cost of 
cultivation and so the prices of final produce. On the other hand removal of food 
subsidies has put the poor in further dock, as the cost of purchasing food has gone up. 
Consequently, household diet has changed less is eaten per meal and less meals per 
day is eaten leaving more and more people food insecure and irretrievable future 
consequences. 
1.2 Objective of the Study: 
The first and foremost objective of the slud\- is lo analyse the food security situation 
in the country after the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programme in 1991. 
Some other objectives of the study may be summarised as follows. 
> To compare the agricultural performance of the country during the pre and 
post Structural Adjustment Programme decades. 
r To assess the level of public utilities during the pre and post Structural 
Adjustment periods with special reference lo food based poverty alleviation 
schemes and public distribution system. 
> To assess the likely impacts of liberalisation, privatization, and globalization 
on Indian economy in general and Indian agriculture in particular. 
> To assess the performance of country's Public Distribution System with a 
view to make suggestion that could help improve the effectiveness and reach 
of the public delivery system. 
1.3 Review of the Literature: 
The new economic policy introduced in June 1991 consisted two components; the 
short-term stabilization measures and the long term Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Structural adjustment refers to the liberalization implying strengthening 
of the role of the market and forces of the demand and supply, export promotion and 
import liberalization. In sum, structural adjustment means reduction in the role of 
state and use of market and price mechanism for achieving various objectives. The 
short-term stabilization objective was sought to be attained through devaluation of 
rupee, reduction in fiscal deficits and dismantling of barriers to foreign capital. 
Whereas the long term objective was targeted through the measures that included 
long-term fiscal and trade reforms, bringing overall policy changes in the area of 
industrial, financial and public sector in the economy. There was no specific reference 
to agriculture in the new economic policy but agriculture was certainly not going to 
remain aloof from the overall policy changes in the two crucial sectors of the 
economy namely industry and trade. Shortly after, the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture exposed the Indian agriculture to the global trade. These developments 
changed the overall emphasis of Indian agriculture from the earlier objective of self-
sufficiency to the enhancement of production and marketing capabilities in order to 
survive in the multilateral trade regime. 
Within thirty years of its independence India progressed remarkably from 
being a net importer of foodgrain to being nearly self-sufficient in foodgrain 
production. However when India commenced the new economic policy, certain issues 
had been plaguing the Indian agriculture for quite some time. We shall begin with a 
brief review of the agricultural situation at the time of the launching of new economic 
policy in 1991. It was argued by several experts that heavy protection to industrial 
sector had created an inbuilt incentive in favor of industrial products that had resulted 
in shifting of resources from agriculture to industry. It was further pointed out that 
state protection accorded to industrial sector had pushed the agricultural input costs 
beyond a limit. In these circumstances, artificially overvalued exchange rate had 
adversely affected the export potentials of Indian agricultural produce, which had 
been exacerbated by restrictions on export and even freer movements of foodgrains 
within the country. This all had depressed the domestic agriculture prices leading to 
overall dis-protection of the agriculture sector. This dis-protection to the agriculture 
was countered through input subsidies in the form of irrigation, credit, fertilizer and 
power and through output support prices in the form of minimum support prices to 
producers and food subsidies to consumers. Economic reforms following debacle at 
the fiscal front, however, forced the government to withdraw part of these subsidies, 
which led to an increase in food prices and decline in public investments in 
agriculture. A major problem encountered during literature review is that 
impassionate analysis of the issues involved is seldom found. Arguments are made 
around the ideological grounds. There are people who are favoring liberalization, 
privatization and globalization and therefore making tall claims of the virtues of free 
trade basing their arguments on comparative advantage theoiy, on the other hand 
there are people who are stoutly opposed to any such policies on the ground that 
comparative advantage theory is biased in favour of developed countries, as the forces 
of demand and supply are never free of states' influence. Major points highlighted by 
both the groups could be summarised as below. 
i. The advocates of liberalization; based on the economics of comparative 
advantage, argue that trade liberalization and market deregulation lead to an 
efficient allocation of resources. 
ii. Those not agreeing to the above argument point out that the policy of 
comparative advantage holds good only where rules of the game are equal for 
every body. In the absence of such level playing field, the comparative 
advantage in resource endowments is of little use for driving trade benefits, 
particularly for the poor. Thus, they call for re-examination of the current 
stream of trade liberalisation model. 
iii. Proponents of the reforms argued that economic growth in India was being 
stifled by the intrusive role of the stale as both regulator and participant; that 
large fiscal deficits crowded out priA'ate investment and undermined investors' 
confidence. They argued that the excessive protection provided to Indian 
industry by the imposition of import restrictions and tariffs prevented the 
development of an efficient, and competitive economy which would have 
enabled India to benefit from integration with the world economy. Regarding 
agriculture, they proposed that trade liberalisation in the agriculture will 
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remove trade distortions, both in the international and domestic markets, and 
reward efficient producers, thus making the available food cheaper and 
thereby increasing food security of the people. 
iv. Contrary to the argument, several studies found that agricultural trade 
liberalisation has not benefited as promised. Further, the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) was also found disappointing as it failed to materialize the 
benefits it promised. It also eroded the policy options available to many 
developing countries in safeguarding their food security goals. 
V. According to the reformers, liberalization enhances growth. And growth with 
the external opening and domestic deregulation makes an economy more 
competitive leading to surge in exports and greater employment opportunities 
which results decline in poverty. Proponents of liberalisation while criticizing 
the planned economy point out that planning generally results in the 
misallocation of resources as the decisions of resources allocation largely 
depends on the whims of policy makers who are unable to gauge the 
appropriate signals for resources to move in the right direction. 
vi. Those criticizing the liberalization, citing other case studies, argued that 
greater openness to trade has "correlated negatively" with income growth 
among the poorest 40 percent of the population. For example, A study by 
World Bank (1999)^ contends that the costs of adjusting to greater openness of 
trade "are borne exclusively by the poor, regardless of how long the 
adjustment takes", "the poor are far more vulnerable to shifts in relative 
international prices, and this vulnerability is magnified by the country's 
openness to trade. A brief review of some of the important literatures on the 
issue is as follows. 
World Bank (2000) seeks to point out that international trade "raises income 
of the poor by raising overall income, with insignificant effects on the distribution of 
income. It shows that standard pro-growth macroeconomic policies are good for the 
poor in raising their income without significantly affecfing the distribution of income. 
Manias Lundberg and Lyn Squire (1999): The Sinmltaneous Evolution of Growth and 
Ineqiiahty. The World Bank. 
Dollar, David and Kraay, Art (2000): GroM'th is Good for the Poor, Tiie World Bank, 
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A WTO (2000)'' study proclaims that trade liberalisation helps poor countries 
to catch up with rich ones and that this faster economic growth helps to alleviate 
poverty. It concludes that trade liberaHsation is generally a strongly positive 
contributor to poverty alleviation as it allows people to exploit their productive 
potentials, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to 
insulate against shocks. 
FAO (1999)^ while looking at the experience of 16 developing countries 
including India in implementing the WTO Agreement on Agriculture finds that the 
AoA has led to a surge of food imports into the countries but not to an increase in 
their exports, which is forcing local farmers out of business and into the urban areas. 
On the economic reforms, Jo.shi and Little (1996)^ point out that present 
agricultural incentives are counterproductive. The controls on the export of 
agricultural commodities reduce their price. India's trade regime is biased against 
agriculture and the present input subsidizes favour water sensitive crops, leads to 
wastage of water and causes the inappropriate use of fertilizers. Thus present 
agriculture policy favors richer farmers relative to poor farmers. 
7 • . . . . 
Jalan, (1996) while favouring the ongomg economic liberalization in the 
guise of reforms, argues that increasing the growth rate will ultimately reduce and 
eradicate mass poverty, improve the standard of living for the majority, and develop 
the country's infrastructure and thus increase production of agriculture. On the issue 
of food security, Jalan asks for the continuance of the public distribution system and 
financial support to the poor to raise their purchasing capacity of food. 
Asthana and Madrano (2001) cover a wide spectrum of issues related to 
hunger and food security. They begin with supply side issues of availability and move 
on to demand side issues of economic access, nutrition and absorption and finally to 
David, Dan Ben, and Winters, L. Alan (2000): Trade, Income Disparity and Povern', WTO 
Secretariat Study, World Trade Organization. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); (1999): "Syinposium on Agriculture, Trade and 
Food Security, Synthesis of Case Studies"". X3065/E., September 1999. 
Joshi, Vijay and Little, 1. M. D. (1996): India's Economic Reforms 1991-2001, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi. 
Jalan, Bimal, (1996): India's Economic Policy: Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, 
Penguin Books, New Delhi. 
Asthana, M D and Madrano, Pedro (edits.). (2001): Towards Hunger Free India: Agenda and 
Imperatives, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi. 
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policy choices in the current global economic environment. One section is exclusively 
devoted to PDS and its related problems such as ineffective targeting, leakage, 
exclusion of intended and inclusion of unintended beneficiaries, rent-seeking, high 
administrative costs, lack of political will and commitment, poor accountability and 
lack of beneficiary participation. The authors ask for localised solutions to impeding 
problems with an emphasis on long-term policies to cope with hunger. 
Chaddah and Sharma (1997)^ while analyzing the impact of the structural 
adjustment on the rural sector both through changes in the macro-economic policy 
framework as well as policy changes, argue that the short and medium term, SAP may 
have several negative consequences for Indian agriculture such as: 
Decline in public investment. 
Rising in prices of foodgrains. 
Rise in the price of agricultural inputs. 
Likelihood of an increase in regional inequalities; 
Possible escalation in the cost of maintaining a safety net. 
Food Insecurity: Atlas oj Rural India (2001)' aims to identity the food 
insecure states both in the short and the long-term time dimensions, highlight the 
interacting factors that lead to hunger and malnourishment and suggest an action plan 
to help India become substantially food secure by the year 2007. It provides an 
analysis of the causes of food insecurity at the individual level in the different states 
with reference to parameters such as food availability, food accesses and food 
absorption. An important aspect of the study is that it defines food availability in 
terms of food and nutrition security based on the accesses to a diet of high nutritional 
quality. 
Food Insecurity: Atlas of Urban India (2002) ' followed by the previous 
report indicates that more than 38 percent of children under the age of three in cities 
Chaddha, G. K and Sharma, Alakh Narain (eds.); (1997)- Growth, Employment and Poverty: 
Cluinge and Continuity in Rural India, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi. 
M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (2001): Food Insecurity. Alias of Rural India, 
Chcnnai, and the World Food Programme. 
M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, (2002): Food Insecurity: Atlas of Urt^an India. 
Chennai and the World Food Programme, 
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and towns are underweight and more than 35 percent of children in urban areas are 
stunted. The report states that the poor in urban areas do not get the requisite amount 
of calories or nutrients specified by accepted Indian Council of Medical Research 
(ICMR) norms and also suggests that absorption and assimilation of food by the urban 
poor is further impaired by non-food factors such as inadequate sanitation facilities, 
insufficient housing and woeful access to clean drinking water. The report identifies 
17 key indicators falling into six categories (food affordability and availability, 
livelihood access, access to housing, discrimination in livelihood access, access to 
sanitation, and health and nutritional outcome) that in turn can be grouped under the 
classifications of availability, access, and absorption of food. Indices and maps of 
food insecurity are created and food insecurity "hotspots" are identified from the 20 
States studied. 
Regarding the possible impacts of WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 
extreme views are found expressed starting from the detrimental impact to possible 
opportunity of growth. Those opposing the WTO agreement argue that the WTO 
agreement may hamper the agriculture growth in the country. Ai. the same time one 
can also find the optimistic opinions about the WTO and its fallout on Indian 
agriculture. IIM Amedabad 2001'^ attempts to synthesise most of the important 
aspects concerning the impact of WTO on Indian agriculture but with a limitation of 
the material available up to 1998. 
Loaded with ideological affiliation the measurement of poverty is another area 
of heated debate and extreme views. Datta and Sharma (2002) study estimates the 
poverty by occupation, socio economic groups, gender and religion. It also provides 
sub state level estimates of consumption and inequality of consumption in rural and 
urban areas for the NSS regions. 
Singh and Singh compare the two periods: viz pre-liberalization and the post 
liberalization (1980-81 to 1990-91 and 1991-92 to 2000). They point out that the 
Indian Institute of Management. Aiiniedabad, (2001); Implications fur IVTO Agreemenis for 
Indian Agriculture. Centre for Management in Agriculture, Oxford and IBH Publishinsj Co. 
Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. 
Datta, K.L and Sharma, Savila (2002): Facets of Indian Poverty, Concept Publishing 
Company, New Delhi. 
Singh, R. P and Singh, N.K. (2003): '•Agriculture Growth during Era of Liberalization: An 
Economic Analysis", Indian .Journal of Agriculture Economics, Vol. .'^ 8, No. 3 p. 399. 
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growth rate of foodgrains production was lower during the post liberalization period. 
Similarly growth rate in productivity of rice, wheat, oil seeds, pulses and coarse 
cereals was also observed to be less during the post liberalized period than the pre 
one. The study also shows that the quantities procured during post-liberalized era 
increased as against a decline in food distribution after the economic liberalization as 
compared to the pre-liberalization period. 
Vyas's study (2000)'^ ^ traces the changes in agriculture along five dimensions: 
(i) growth and diversification in production; (ii) changing access to land; (iii) status of 
land and water resources; (iv) shifting input infrastructure and (v) changes in crop 
pattern. The author's findings include; 
1) Acceleration in agriculture growth during eighties which slackened in nineties. 
2) Increase in the number of small and marginal farmers with decline in average 
size holding. 
3) Land is progressively getting less fertile while the pace of irrigation expansion 
has slowed down due to decline in public investment in agriculture. 
4) Changes in cropping patter reveal three major trends: within cereals from 
coarse to superior cereals; within food crops, from foodgrains to non-
foodgrains; and within all crops, from food to commercial crops. 
The paradox of Indian food policy is that food stocks with FCI are bulging 
whereas offtake from the PDS is slackening leading to large scale of grain rotting and 
wastage. Simultaneously, over the years government's policy of raising the issue 
prices of foodgrains and excluding (non) poor through ^'arious targeted schemes has 
nullified governments' efforts in reducing the food subsidy. Instead it has lowered 
offtake leading to higher storage and wastage costs. On the other hand indirect 
exclusion of poor through various speciall}' targeted schemes based on area and 
income has proved too decisive for the population at large. Krishnaji and T.N. 
Krishnan (2000) '^ seek to argue that the present food policy in the country is 
inappropriate and therefore, needs o\erhauHng. 
Vyas, V.S. (2000): Changing Connmrs of Indiati Agricidlwc, National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi. 
Krishnaji, N and Krishnan. T.N. (edits.) (2000): Public Support for Food Security: The Public 
Distribution System in India. Vokirne 1, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi. 
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Krishna and Rao (1997)''^ focus on the welfare gains of PDS to the poor and 
its fiscal cost to the economy and also to compare the benefits of transfers from the 
PDS with other programmes for the welfare of the poor. While examining the efficacy 
of PDS vis a vis other poverty alleviation schemes like the hitegrated Child 
Development Scheme (ICDS), the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) and Employment 
Assurance Scheme (HAS), they concluded that. 
i. Poor have limited access to PDS. 
ii. The cost of operation of the PDS is too high. 
iii. The welfare gain from PDS is negligible. 
Moij (1999)'^ provides an empirical analysis of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) since its beginning. It explores the possibility of down sizing the PDS in view 
of its spiraling public expenditure through various subsidies. Relying the case study of 
the two south Indian states i.e. Karnataka and Kerala this book explores tliree main 
objectives of the PDS; (i) promote welfare of the needy poor by providing subsidized 
foodgrains; (ii) stabilize foodgrains prices by regulating the market; and (iii) promote 
foodgrain production. The author mentions three important dimensions of food, i.e. (i) 
food as nutritional commodity; (ii) food as economic commodity; (iii) food as 
political commodity. 
Gulati and Kelley (1999)'^ provide an analysis on the impact of agriculture 
trade liberalization on cropping patterns and resource use efficiency in different 
regions of the country. The authors assessed the likelihood of increase in prices of 
fertilizer and irrigation in the event of withdrawal of subsidies but argued that overall 
the agriculture trade balance will improve after the liberalization and its benefits will 
encompass all the losses of the consumer. 
Krislma. R Radlia and Rao, Subba (i997): India's Public Distribution System: A National and 
Inlernaiioiial Perspeciire. The World Bank, Washington, D C. 
Mooij, Jos (! 999): Food Policy and the Indian Slate: The Public Distribution System in Soulli 
India, Oxford University Press, Dcliii. 
Gulati, Ashok and Kelley, Tim (1999): Trade Liberalizalion and Indian Agriculture: 
Cropping Pattern Changes and Efficiency Gains in Semi Arid Tropics, Oxford University 
Press, New IDellii. 
Swaminathan (2000)^" looks at issue of food security and the public 
distribution of food in the context of Structural Adjustment Programme and the 
establishment of WTO. The author finds that PDS has low utilization, limited access 
to poor, high costs and leakages from the system. He further points out that one of the 
major consequences of the poor functioning of the PDS has been the rise in foodgrain 
prices during nineties. The author is of the view that narrowing down of the PDS 
through retargeting or revamping is a dangerous precedent. The author wants 
reinstatement of the universal PDS. The author also asks for more food in the system 
to ensure adequate availability of nutrition and control of food prices so they bear a 
relationship with wages, incomes and levels of poverty in the society. 
Jha's (2001)^' specially focuses on the issue of developing long-term 
competitiveness in Indian agriculture. He suggested corporate farming and tax on 
agriculture and an appropriate marketing strategy in order to attain the long-term 
objective of the agriculture. 
Bhalla (1994)^^ reviews agricultural policy and its impact since independence. 
He shows that there has been a slow-down in the agricultural groMh rate in the first 
half of the 1990s. However, he points out that a clear relationship between economic 
reforms and deceleration in agricultural growth has not yet established but the sure 
negative impacts of the reforms are quite discernible in the area of public investment 
and capital formation, and impact on fertiliser use and composition. Analysing the 
new GATT agreement (TRIPS. TRIN4S, etc), Bhalla concludes that these are likely to 
be harmful for the development of low cost innovations within the country. According 
to him exploiting the agricultural exports potential would require the generation of 
large surpluses and large in\estmenls in infrastructure which is not feasible due to 
large subsidies on irrigation and power on the one hand and fiscal compression of the 
state on the other. According to the author the current agriculture policy framework 
has been discriminating to tradable agriculture because of high protection accorded to 
industry and over valued exchange rate and low procurement prices and excessive 
Swaminathan, Madluira (2000): Weakening Welfare: The Public Distribution of Food in 
India, Left Word Books, New Delhi. 
Jha, Brajesh (200!): Indian Agriculture and the Multilateral Trading System, Bookweli New 
Delhi. 
Bhalla, G.S. (ed.): (1994): Economic Liberalization and Indian Agriculture, Institute for 
Studies in industrial Development. New Delhi. 
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administrative interventions only add to the problems. He says, "The distribution 
system has been run inefficiently and the cultivators have been made to bear the 
burden of providing cheaper foodgrains to the consumer" (p. 15). On the issue of the 
Public Distribution System, Bhalla says that the PDS has not been able to cover a 
large section of the poor, particularly in rural areas. 
Alagh (1994)^"' highlights the significant changes that have taken place in the 
Indian agriculture during eighties mainly in terms of the diversification. He also 
highlights the concern of low capital formation in agriculture during the eighties and 
early nineties. 
Nayyar and Sen (1994)^'' analyse the likely implications of trade liberalization 
for the hidian agriculture. They found that the world commodity market is more 
instable in comparison to domestic market in India. Moreover, they pointed out that 
after the devaluation of Rs. in 1991 the Indian prices for most of the commodities 
including wheat had become lower and in such a situation withdrawal of subsidies on 
fertilizer and other input had further deteriorated the agricultural term.s of trade. 
The issue of agriculture price policy is discussed by Vyas who argued that 
India's agriculture price policy, which revolves around input subsidies, minimum 
support prices, procurement prices and issue prices should be reformulated in the 
context of new circumstances. He highlighted that high subsidy on fertilizer, 
irrigation, credit and power besides large-scale subsidies on the operations of PDS 
result in misallocation of resources. 
Damodrana (2000) "^  examines agricultural policy by taking two case studies, 
one from a semi-arid agricultural ecosystem and the other from a plantation 
ecosystem. The author asserts that the present agriculture policy is faced with internal 
challenges like depletion of natural resources and external on the front of external 
trade. 
Alagh, Y. K. (1994): "Macro Policies for Indian Agriculture", in: Bhalla, G.S., (ed.) (1994): 
Economic Liberalizalion and Indian Agricvllure, Institute for Studies in Indusd-Jal 
Development, New Delhi. 
Nayyar, Deepak and Abhijit Sen (1994). "International Trade and Agricultural Sector in 
India", in: Bhalla, G. S (ed: 1994): Economic Liberalisation and Indian Agriculture, Institute 
for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi. 
Damodaran, A.; (2000): Towards an Agro-Ecosystem Policy for India— Lessons from Two 
Case Studies, Tata-McGraw Hill. 
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002)^ '^ are of the view that the portrayal of the 
poHcies of HberaHzation, privatization and globalization (LPG) as inevitable and 
desirable is entirely inaccurate and unwarranted. I'he authors demonstrated that in 
terms of the indicators of growth, employment and poverty, the performance during 
the reform decade of the 1990s has been no better, and in some respects distinctly 
worse than in the decade of the 1980s. They highlighted the fact that a decade after 
the reforms, the country faces the paradoxical situation of increased incidence of 
hunger and food insecurity among a sizeable proportion of the population. The decade 
of reforms has led to a crisis in agriculture, where "... agricultural investment and 
output, as well as food security were adversely affected". Also "...some important 
aspects of the reform process, such as the reduction of public investment in rural areas 
and the attempts to cut subsidies leading to higher input costs, actually worsened the 
conditions of cultivation." Unemployment situation was precarious with little or no 
protection for working people by way of social security or unemployment 
compensation. Reduction in public investment, removal of quantitative restrictions on 
imports, squeeze on rural credit, sharply reduced expenditures on rural development 
and employment schemes. As for poverty the authors suggested that "...the trend in 
aggregate poverty incidence... was strongly related to neo-liberal economic policies, 
and consequent macrocconomic processes of the 1990s... these policies involved 
neglect of rural investment and of the food security system, resulting in slow 
agricultural growth, reduced employment opportunities in rural areas, and high food 
prices. All these would typically be likely to be associated with persLstent, or even 
increasing poverty." On the issue of food insecurity the authors argued that the 1990s 
have been characterized by a sad paradox. On the one hand there is situation where a 
sizeable proportion of our population cannot access foodgrain at affordable prices and 
on the other hand there is accumulation of unsold food stocks with the government -
to the tunc of 62 million tones (by the end of 2001). The high level of food stocks 
with the government accumulated at a time when the per capita foodgrain availability 
to the public declined from an average of 510 gm a day in 1991 to 458 gm in 2000. 
This was despite a much lower growth rate of population in the 1990s than in the 
earlier decades. 
Chandrasekhar, C P and Ghosli, .layali; (2002): The Market thai Failed: A Decade oj 
Neolihera! Economic Rejorim in India, Lcflword Books, New Delhi. 
Dev et all (2003)^^ pointed out that even after half a centuiy since 
independence, still over 50 percent of the population cannot be said to be secure from 
the point of view of food and nutrition. One of the contributors to the volume writes: 
"Under the cover of 'food security' the government is keeping millions of tones of 
food out of reach of the people." It is both a paradox and a scandal. A major problem. 
as far as food security is concerned is found in food subsidy bill. It is argued that 
subsidy instead of reaching the poor for whom it is meant actually reaches the large 
farmers in the form of MSP and still there is no check in increase in the MSP prices. 
In a nutshell the overall finding is that with the possible exception of Kerala, the PDS 
plays only a modest role in assuring food security, especially for the poor who need 
support most. With regard to the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) it has 
been argued that from the point of food security the TPDS is a WTOng instrument 
because malnutrition and under-nourishment are widely prevalent even among many 
people who, from a mere income perspective, are considered to be not poor. 
Shiva and Bedi (2002) , cover a wide range of issues in the context of 
globalization and food security, liberalization in Asia and India, coiporatization of 
agriculture, and globalization of food insecurity. The editors conclude that the current 
process of globalization of agriculture threaten to undermine all three dimensions of 
ecological security, livelihood security and food security. Shiva opines that the 
withdrawal of the state from agriculture in India has facilitated transfer of the power 
and control over natural resources, production system and markets and trade to global 
agribusiness instead of the farming communities and autonomous producers who 
stand dispossessed and dis-empowered in the process. She argued that food security in 
the country is threatened due to resource and livelihood insecurity caused by undoing 
of land reforms and indebtedness. It is also threaten due to decline in food production 
and consumption. Sen, on the other hand, argues that the ensuing liberalization will 
further stagnate the agricultural output and increase in the poverty. Whereas, 
Mukharjee sought to play down that trade is not the ansv>'er to food security rather it 
has to be ensured at the household level through national policies. 
Dcv, S. ^4ahendl"a Kannan, K.P and Ramachandrau, Nira (edits.); (2003): Towards a Food 
Secure India: Issues and Policies, Inslilute for Human Development, New Delhi, and Centre 
for Econoinic and Social Studies, Hyderabad. 
Shiva, Vandana and Bedi. Gitanjah (Eds.); (2002): Sustainable Agriculture and Food 
Security: The Impact of Globalization, Sage Publications. 
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Alagh, (2003)^^ seeks to argue that when farmers divert resources and labor to 
cash crops to take advantage of the opportunities for exports, local food productions 
declines and food dependency sets in. In such a situation inability of millions of 
marginal farmers in deprived regions can sink them into triple crises; economic, 
environmental and nutritional. Other contributors have also tried to show that trade 
has turned out to be a costly proposition to maintain stability in domestic prices and it 
has aggravated the income and employment opportunities in the country. 
Alagli, Y. K (edit.); (2003): Glohcilizalion and Agriailture Crisis in India. Deep and Deep 
Publicalions, New Delhi, pp. 384. 
Chapter Two 
DATA BASE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Food security is defined when all people at all time have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life. To measure food security it is important to 
go through the dimension of food security both in rural and urban sector. Thus, food 
security is not merely a matter of agricultural activities, but is also related to a number 
of social, political and ethical aspects. In this thesis the concern to food security in 
India is analysed on three broad parameters; 
(i) Availability of food 
(ii) Access to food 
(iii) Absorption of food 
In other words major emphasis has been laid on analysing the agricultural 
development in the country and taking stock of the food security situation in the 
country after the adoption of new economic policies in early nineties. For example, 
food self sufficiency is measured in terms of overall agricultural production in the 
countiy, particularly foodgrains production, on the one hand and percapita availability 
of the same on the other. Assured supply of foodgrains is looked upon from the angle 
of efficiency and efficacy of India's Public Distribution System. It is mainly related to 
government actions such as procurements, stockings and public distribution. A critical 
evaluation of India's food policy is undertaken to assess and analyse the present food 
management in the country. As far access to food is concerned, it is very much a 
matter of distribution that in turn depends upon the prices on the one hand and the 
earnings or income on the other. Prices are directly linked with government actions in 
the form of input subsidies, minimum support and procurement prices on the one hand 
whereas consumer subsidy on the other. Earnings or income opportunities are also 
associated with governments' number of welfare activities like employment 
generation, poverty alleviations and other welfare measures such as education, health 
and rural infrastructure development etc. 
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2.1 Data Base: 
This study is exclusively based on secondary data published by various Ministries, 
Departments and Institutes of the Government of India i.e Ministry of Agriculture; 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs Food and Public Distribution; Ministry of Finance; and 
The Reserve Bank of India, this study seeks to analyse the issue of food security in 
the country in the context of liberalization, privatization and globalization policy 
pursued by government after the economic reforms in 1991. Relevant data have been 
taken from various issues of Economic Survey published by the Ministry of Finance; 
Hand Book of Statistics on the Indian Economy, published by the Reserve Bank of 
India and the various issues of the Agricultural Statistics at a Glance and Food 
Bulletins published by the Ministiy of Agriculture. Various Annual Reports of 
concerned Ministries have also been consulted for the purpose. Some of the 
information are based on the data collected by the Central Statistical Organisation 
(CSO), National Accounts Statistics (NAS) and various Rounds of sample surveys 
undertaken by National Sample Surveys Organisation (NSSO). Some P-eports of 
Committees constituted by various departments and ministries of the Government 
have also been consulted for the relevant data as well as proper understanding of the 
issue. Meetings and interviews with some government officials of the Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution have been undertaken to discuss the 
host of issues associated with food security, economic reforms and WTO. 
As far as possible all the parameters or indicators used in this study such as 
agricultural production, poverty, employment and wages etc. are analysed under two 
broad time frameworks i.e. pre economic reform decade (1980-1990) and the post 
economic refoim period (1991-2000). In a number of cases where data is annually 
available we have covered the period up to the year 2002-03. For example, most of 
the information related to Indian agriculture is up to that period. Whereas, a number 
of data are only released after five or ten years by their respective agencies like data 
on poverty, population, health and sanitation etc. In such cases we have been 
constrained to rely on the latest available data that might ha\'e been a year or two old. 
2.2 Research Methodology: 
To assess the performance of agriculture and other variables, statistical as well 
theoretical approaches arc adopted but the former is given more preference. Some 
common statistical tools like compound growth, coefficient of variation, con-elation as 
well as averages are used. All the original data along with their computed trend values 
and respected graphs are appended at the end of the Thesis. Some important 
definitions used in the Thesis are as follows: 
Production: The estimates of crop production are obtained by multiplication 
of area estimates by corresponding yield estimates. 
Yield: Is defined as production per unit of area. 
Povert}' Line: Is defined by the Planning Commission on the basis of 
percapita consumption expenditure that meet the average 
percapita daily calorie requirements of 2400 calories in rural 
areas and 2100 calories in urban areas, plus a minimum of non-
food expenditure. Thus, the poverty line for 1999-2000 worked 
out to be at Rs. 327.56 percapita per month for rural areas and 
Rs. 454.11 percapita per month for urban areas. 
Compound rate of growth have been computed with the help of the equation; 
Y= a ( l + r ) ' 
The estimated equation is the log form of the above equation: 
LnY = Lna + tLn(l+r) 
Where: 
Y: is the variable in question 
t: is the time 
a: is intercept and 
r: is compound rate of growth 
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For knowing the instability in the production as well as other variables the coefficient 
of variation is calculated through following formula; 
Coefficient of variafion (CV) = (Standard Deviation/ Arithmefic Mean)* 100. 
Where. 
J Sum of squares of deviation from mean 
Standard Deviation = ^ 
Number of observations 
In order to find out the association between the two variables; coefficient of 
correlation is calculated by following formula; 
Z x y 
Correlation Coefficient = 
NSxSy 
Where: 
X = (X-X) and y = (Y - Y) 
5x = Standard deviation of series X 
5y = Standard deviation of series Y 
N = Number of observation 
Net Availability of Foodgrains is defined as: 
NAF - GP-SPW-E + I ± S 
Where, 
NAF = Net Availability of Foodgrains 
GP = Gross Production of Foodgrains 
SPW' = Seed, feed and wastage of foodgrains @ 12 5 % 
E = Export of foodgrains 
1 ^ Import of foodgrains 
S == Changes in stocks of foodgrains 
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2.3 Limitations of the Study: 
This study is mainly carried out with the purpose of assessing India's food security 
situation after the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies or the so-called 
economic reforms in 1991. Based on the secondary data, this study looks at the pre 
and post economic reforms performance of the Indian agriculture. However, the fact 
remains that agriculture in the countiy is still very much dependent on monsoon. One 
good or bad monsoon can offset the performance of whole decade. 
Further, scope of this work, at the most, is limited to the extent of economic 
factors rather than the political and other factors responsible for any change in 
government's policy. 
In addition, data available to us were not always in the form that we wanted. 
For example, data on poverty, its incidence and income distribution were not available 
to us as per the requirements. They were also not available to us according to the 
exact period of our study. Some times, methodology and presentation of a particular 
data did not suite our requirements. In all such cases we have used the data according 
to their respective reporting periods that might have been overlapping or not covering 
the entire period of this study thus affecting the findings of this study. 
Chapter Three 
FOOD SECURITY SITUATION IN INDIA 
The concept of food security is wider, larger and more comprehensive than the mere 
banishing of hunger. Consequently, it has been interpreted in various ways. However, 
physical and economic access to food at the household level, at all times, to ensure 
healthy and active life is the crux of food security at macro level. FAO Committee on 
World Food Security, (1983) incorporated three specific goals for food security i.e. (i) 
ensuring adequacy of food supplies; (ii) maximising stability of supplies; and (iii) 
securing access to available supplies to all who need them. In other words it was 
recognised that the term food security covers adequate production and availability of 
food at national as well as individual level and it is also associated with peoples' 
ability to buy such food, which is necessaty for them to live a healthy life. 
As far the first aspect i.e. production is concerned. India has achieved a fairly 
high degree of self-sufficiency in foodgrain. A breakthrough has also been achieved 
in the production of milk, eggs, vegetables and marine products etc. One of the 
biggest achievements in post independence India lies in banishing famines and hunger 
and developing a capacity to meet any fluctuations caused by droughts and other 
natural calamities. The way the challenge posed by the 1987 drought, considered one 
of the severest in the century, was met, illustrates this fact. It is also creditable that in 
spite of burgeoning population, the nutritional status of people has not only been 
maintained but there has been improvement in the nutritional status of severely 
malnourished pre-school age children. However, as a matter of fact it is also true that 
still more than two hundred sixty million people are suffering from starvation in the 
country. Total number of malnourished people in India is equal to the total population 
of the U.S. And despite concerted efforts to eliminate hunger through elaborate 
welfare schemes like food for work, Jawahar Rozgar Yojna (JRY), National Rozgar 
Yojna (NRY), Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS). and an extensive Public 
Distribution System (PDS), India's foretold on the ladder to food security remains a 
tenuous one. 
Physical and economic access to adequate, safe, nutritious, and relevant food 
at all times for all people at the national level does not necessarily guarantee local and 
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household food security, which in turn provides no insurance to individual food 
security. This is precisely the case with India which is bulging with the access stocks 
of million of tones of food and simultaneously millions of people facing acute hunger 
and malnourishment. Food deprivation and poverty is a mass level phenomena in the 
country. In terms of consumption levels over a quarter of the country's total 
population was in poverty in 1999-2000, calorie intakes too are low for over 70-80 
percent of the households in the countiy. More than 50 percent of adult as well as 
children are undernourished and food still accounts for a major chunk of the 
households' expenditure. 
3.1 Definition and Measurement of Food Security: 
Food security has many dimensions. It has been vai'iously defined and interpreted 
across the v/orld. The first time the term food security was given attention during 
1974 World Food Summit in which the food security was recognised as a comm.on 
responsibility of all nations. In 1992, during Internationa! Conference on Nutrition 
involving over 150 countries and European Economic Community, all the 
participating countries agreed that hunger and malnutrition are unacceptable and 
access to nutritionally adequate and safe food is a right of all individuals. During 
World Food Summit 1996, more than 180 countries committed to decreasing the 
number of undernourished people to half their present level by the year 2015. The 
Rome declaration on World Food Security further emphasised that povert}' is a major 
cause of food insecurity therefore, sustainable progress in poverty alleviation is 
critical to improve access to food. 
During early discourse, food security implied an arrangement for providing 
minimum level of foodgrains for the population during years of normal as well as 
poor harvests (Reutlinger, 1977). With experience it was realised that fluctuations in 
food supplies were the chronic problems of food security and therefore it required a 
national and international solutions through grain reserves, grain insurance and other 
such measures (Johnson, 1976, Valdes, 1981). It was also identified that physical 
availability alone would not ensure economic access to food for all population, 
especially the poor and vulnerable sections. Accordingly, it was emphasised that 
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production and availability in supplies should match efforts in poverty eradication and 
creating effective demand to ensure economic and physical access to food for the 
poor. 
The term "food security" and "food insecurity" are widely used by scientist 
and policy makers. The term food security mainly refers to the ability of a country to 
provide amounts of food for its population. It differs from hunger in a sense that later 
is experienced by an individual whereas the former is a situation which involves state, 
community or a region. Some scholars define it as all people obtaining a culturally 
acceptable, nutritionally adequate diet, through non-emergency measures, at all times 
(Cohen and Burt, 1989). Margen (1989) on the other hand defines food security as a 
condition in which all people have access to nutritionally adequate food through 
normal food channels. Normally the food security has three dimensions namely; 
availability, which means having enough food available for the entire population at all 
times. This means, country's production system produces enough in the short run; is 
sustainable in the long run; does not place undue risk to its agricultural process; and 
responds promptly to any disruptions in food supply. The second dimension of food 
security is related with effective demand which means all people must have enough 
purchasing power to access their required food. And the third dimension of food 
security is adequacy, which is also defined in terms of nutritional requirements of an 
individual. Witlwer (1980, 1982) added another dimension to food security that is 
dependability. The World Bank (1986) has defined food security as access by all 
people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Further it has made 
distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity 
refers to continuous inadequate diet caused by the inability to acquire food, whereas 
the transitoiy food insecurity refers to temporary decline in the household's access to 
enough food. It mainly results from instability in food prices, food production and 
household income. The most accepted definition of food security is "access by all 
people at all time to enough food for an active and healthy life". It includes; 
• The ready availability of nutritionally adequate and safe food. 
• Assured ability to acquire personally acceptable foods in socially acceptable 
way(Cambell, 1990). 
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FAO (1983) enlarged the concept of food security to include the following 
components. 
a. The ultimate objective of food security should be to ensure that all peoples at 
all times have both physical and economic access to food they need. 
b. Food security should have three basic aims; ensuring production of adequate 
food, supplies, maximising stability in the flow of supplies and securing 
access to available supplies. 
Berck and Bigman (1990) defined food security as availability of enough food 
in order to sustain life and good health of ail the world population at all times, across 
all countries and regions, across all income groups and across all members of 
individual households. 
Swaminathan (1996) recognises three phases; food self-sufficiency, food 
security, and nutritional security. According to him, food self-sufficiency is merely an 
statistical concept for measuring quantitative adequacy of food available in the market 
within a country. It is achieved through indigenous production and imports. A country 
is called quantitative self-sufficient when it either produces enough at home or have 
economic ability to import it from abroad. On the other hand food security is defined 
as a step further in the direction of food self-sufficiency. It is the capacity of an 
individual to have ph)'sical and economic access to food all times. Whereas, 
nutritional security is the advance stage where people have physical and economic 
access to balance nutrition and clean drinking water by all people at all times. 
India's food security situation is analysed below in the light of three basic goal 
of food security i.e.; 
(i) Ensuring adequate production. 
(ii) Maximising stability in the flow of supplies, and 
(iii) Securing access to available supplies on the pari of those who need them.' 
I Dimension of New Economic I'olicv, Vol. 2, p 40. 
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3.2. Food Production: 
Agriculture is the backbone of India's economy and despite the rapid pace of 
Industrial development agricultural activities still hold a prime place of importance in 
the country. Agriculture in India is not only source for the supply of foodgrains, but 
also an important means of livelihood for over 60 percent of the population. Progress 
made by the domestic agriculture in the last fifty years has been one of the biggest 
success story of India. The production of foodgrains in the country underwent a 
radical change from the late sixties onwards. Prior to the green revolution India was 
heavily dependent on food import. From fifties to m.id seventies an average of about 
four million tones of foodgrains were imported per annum. There was wide annual 
gap between supply and demand of food from the early sixties to the mid seventies. 
Green revolution made the drastic change by increasing the land productivity to its 
limits tlii-ough the use of modern inputs. The introduction of the high yielding verities 
seeds which are heavily water and fertilizer dependent brought in a rapid increase in 
irrigation facilities and area under foodgrains v.'hich displayed a spectacular results in 
wheat production from 12 million tones in 1964-65 to 26 million tones in 1971-72. 
Though rice during the same time could not perform as of wheat, because of the 
diversity of the condition and the microclimates under which rice is grown made the 
introduction of the new varieties seeds more complex than in case of wheat. Also 
because monsoon crops rice was more vulnerable to the pests and diseases. Thus, 
while the production of the wheat more than doubled in the period from mid sixties to 
the early seventies, rice production during the same period recorded an increase of 
four million tones only. Overall the agricultural recorded a growth 2.55 percent in mid 
sixties to 3.28 percent in the early seventies. Thereafter two bad monsoons of the 
1972 and 1974 disturbed the growth for a while." Again in eighties there was marked 
improvement in growth rate of foodgrains. Annual growth rate of foodgrains during 
eighties recorded 3.59 percent, though sharp fluctuations in agricultural output still 
persisted. The year 1999-2000 displayed the figure of 209.8 million tones of 
foodgrains with an annual gro\^th of foodgrains (wheat and rice together) 2.27 percent 
during nineties and for the year 2001-2002, the total foodgrains production was 
Olhci factors may also be responsible foi this like power shortages affected irrigation adversely 
and prices of imported feilili/crs regisleied a sicep hike, due to fertilizer consumption may be 
bciiun to decline etc 
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recorded at 212 million tones. However, current year's production has registered a 
decline of about 30 million tones (Table 5.23). 
Thus, foodgrain production increased from around 50 million tones at the time 
of Independence to over 200 million tonnes in recent years. During the last 3 decades 
the foodgrains production growth rate has outpaced the human population growth 
rate. During all these years rice and wheat cropping have provided a sober base to the 
food security of the region. In late eighties, however, the growth rate of foodgrains 
production started showing some sluggishness. Application of high doses of fertilizers 
had adversely influenced the crop yield. It has been observed that as against the 
recommended N.P.K. ratio of 4:2:1, Indian farmers have been applying fertilizer in 
8.5:2.6:1 ratio which initially induced vegetative growth but was susceptible to pests 
and diseases, water logging, poor floral indirection and delayed maternity. Excessive 
use of water for irrigation has also been causing nutrient loss and acceleration of pests 
& disease and thus causing damage to over a million hectare fertile fannlands by 
turning it into saline wastelands. It is reported that 32.7 percent of geographical area 
of the country suffers from different form of land degradation. Since 1970s onwards 
India maintained a satisfactory level of food production, which in the 1980s steadily 
increased but the 1990s witnessed a sharp fall in the growth rate. In fact during 
nineties the average annual growth for foodgrains has been 1.73 percent which has 
been lower than the annual population growth rate at 1.85 percent. This implied 
stagnate percapita production of foodgrains. Specially the season of Kharif production 
has been more severely affected than the Rabi production, the growth rate of Khariff 
food grain production declined from 2.23 percent in the 1980s to 0.66 percent per 
annum in the 1990. The growth rate of rabi foodgrains production also experienced a 
decline during the period from 3.33 percent in the 1980s to 3.12 percent per annum in 
the 1990s. The decline in Khariff production growth rate has been caused by the 
decline in both area and yield. The major causes of these decline in growth rate has 
been ascribed lo the onset of second generation problems essentially comprising soil 
fatigue due to intensive agriculture, salutation of HYVs in terms of yield, coverage 
and absence of any significant technological break through, declining response to 
higher inputs use specially the fertilizers, declining water table and the increasing 
incidence of water logging and salinity. 
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Thus, there should be the sustainabihty in hidia's foodgrain production in 
general and rice and wheat in particular to keep its food security intact for its teaming 
millions. This entire aspect of a sustainable food production at a respectable rate and 
food security for over a billion human being need a serious consideration on a planned 
and focussed action. A recent report on food security provides a comprehensive 
analysis on the extent of food insecurity in cities and towns by using a series of maps 
to identify food insecurity "hotspots" in the countr>'. The report adopts a broader 
definition of food security which includes; 
1) The availability of food, which depends on production and distribution; 
2) The access to food, which is determined by an individual's purchasing power, 
and in turn purchasing power is affected by livelihood access, access to 
housing, caste and gender discrimination; and 
3) The absorption of food, which is affected by sanitation, clean drinking water 
and health care. 
The report reveals that that more than 21 percent of India's urban population 
live in slums, 23 percent of urban households do not have access to toilet facilities and 
nearh' 8 percent of urban households are unable to find safe drinking water. The 
cereal intake of the lowest 10 percent is negatively related to the extent of 
urbanisation. It also indicates that the lowest urban deciles (by monthly expenditure) 
in all states eat less than the state average. Further the diet of the lowest deciles in all 
states is barely diversified and hardly contains vegetables, fruits, pulses, meat, fish, 
milk and eggs. For the countiy as a whole, more than 14 percent of the urban 
population is dependent on casual labour as a means of livelihood. For the lowest 10 
percent of the urban population, 37.49 percent are engaged in casual labour and 41.34 
percent are self-employed, suggesting thai a vast majority of the urban poor are 
vulnerable to uncertain incomes and. hence, vulnerable to under-nourishment. The 
stud)' points out that unemployment is on the rise in urban hidia and that current daily 
status of unemployment is as high as 9.5 percent for lower expenditure classes. 
Higher unemployment rales are indicative of lower calorie intakes among the bottom 
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10 percent. The effect of inadequate employment opportunities is compounded by low 
literacy levels, as 27.7 percent of the urban population is illiterate." 
3.3 Assured Supply: 
Historically, the public distribution system (PDS) in the countiy has been one of the 
most important means for ensuring physical access to foodgrain at reasonable prices 
through the network of fair price shops, which began with the establishment of the 
first foodgrain policy committee under the Chainnanship of Sir Theodore Gregory in 
1943. The Committee recommended rationing to increase available supplies and 
statutory price control to check rising prices. On an average about 9 to 15 percent of 
the total foodgrains production is channelised through the PDS via a network of Fair 
Price Shops. Fair price shops were established in rural as well as urban areas and 
now the total number of fair price shops has increased to about half a million.^ On an 
average, one fair price shop covers a population of about 200. Foodgrains distributed 
through PDS mainly consist of rice and wheat, though in a few states, some coarse 
cereals are also distributed. Up to seventies, wheat was the major foodgrain for 
distribution but from eighties onwards, nearly equal quantities of rice and wheat have 
been distributed. There is a wide fluctuation in distribution, large amount were 
distributed during lean years with a considerable drop in years when market prices are 
low. 
Establishment of PDS has significantly contributed to relieving the misery 
faced in distress situation to a considerable extent. The PDS since SAP has been 
revised with a focus on narrow targeting to reduce the food subsidy bill of the 
go\ernment. Between 1992 and 1997, the country had a PDS for normal areas both 
urban and rural and a Revamped Public Distribution System for the tribal and other 
notified blocks. Under the RPDS distribution of foodgrains was issued cheaper by 50 
MS. Swannnathan Research Foundation, (2002), "Food Insecurity; Alias of Urban India", 
Ctiennai and ttie World Food Programme. 
Taimni, K. Brij (2004): War on Poverlv. For Taking Poor to Portals of Civil Life, APtl 
Publishing Corporation, New Delhi. 
Annual Reports 2002-03: Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, 
Government of India, New Delhi 
See table 4.1 and 5.23. 
paisa per kg and relatively higher allocation were made in the notified areas. From P' 
June 1997, a new system entitled Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was 
commenced under which, allocations to states were made on the basis of number of 
families living below the poverty line. In the beginning foodgrains were issued at the 
rate 10 kg of wheat or rice or both per month at a highly subsidised prices.^ The prices 
charged for the APL families, however, were gradually linked to the economic costs 
of the procurement of these foodgrains. 
The effect of this new policy has been found in the form of reduced offtake of 
foodgrains, particularly in the states where PDS functioning is not as efficient. For 
example. Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan & U.P., which account for about 50 
percent of the poor in the country, could receive only 10 percent of the wheat 
distributed through PDS. The offtake of rice also fell substantially in poorer areas of 
the countiy. 
Another notable aspect is that a large proportion of the subsidy, which the 
government marked for the poor, actually reached the higher income people. A study 
by Reddy and Selvaraju (1992) based on NSS data reveals that food subsidy accruing 
to the higher income classes is higher than that accruing to the poor. This disparity is 
noi merely confined to the rich and the poor, but also exists and is widening between 
the urban poor and the rural poor. Taking the distribution pattern of wheat, it is 
observed that the bottom 40 percent of the households accounts for 46.24 percent of 
PDS users, but purchase only 24.31 percent of total PDS supplies of wheat in rural 
areas. In urban areas the picture is slightly better, with the lowest 40 percent 
expenditure class accounting for 48 percent of PDS users and consuming 35 percent 
of total PDS wheat. The distribution of rice is, however, more balanced with the 
bottom 40 percent of rural household accounting for 5 percent of PDS users and 
purchasing 40 percent of the PDS rice, while the corresponding urban households 
account for 49 percent of the users and 45 percent of the purchases. 
The role of PDS as a price stabilizer particularly during crisis situations has 
been quite remarkable. For example, during the drought of 1987-88, which led to a 
considerable decline in food production the resultant increase in foodgrain prices, was 
' This quota was subsequently increa.sed to 35 kg per family per month. 
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less than 10 percent. This was made possible due to the large-scale sale of food 
though the PDS. However, in recent years, the importance of PDS as an outlet for 
foodgrains at controlled prices has diminished remarkably as a result of steep and 
frequent increases in the procurement prices on the one hand and more than 
proportionate increase in the central issue prices of foodgrains on the other. During 
1990-1994, the central issue price of rice was raised by 85.8 percent, whereas the 
same foe wheat increased to 71.8 percent during the corresponding period. This has 
rendered the PDS out of reach of a large number of poorer households. This is 
discernible from the fact that the annual allocation for wheat has been about 10 
million tonnes in 1991 of which the offtake of wheat was 8.79 million tonnes in 1991-
92. The offtake dropped to 4.83 million tonnes by 1994-95 and further to 3.8 million 
tones by 2000-2001. However, in recent years it seems that offtake is again gaining 
some momentum, for example, offtake of wheat in 2001-02 increased to above 5.5 
million tones then in 2002-03 it rose up to 9.7 million and the latest figure shows that 
offtake of wheat has shot over 10 million tones in 2003-04. For rice also, the annual 
allocation continuously increased from 11.36 million tonnes in 1991-92 to 13.89 
million tonnes in 1999-2000 and thereafter it increased to 17 million tonnes 2001-02. 
hi 2002-03 it shaiply increased to above 36 million tones. In cun'ent year, however, 
the allotment of rice has marginally declined to about 34 million tones. As against 
these allocations, the annual offtake of rice has seen ups and down. It declined from 
9.95 million tonnes in 1991-92 to 8 million tonnes in 1994-95, and then rose to above 
10 million tones in 1998-99 and 2000. Thereafter it declined to 7.9 million tones in 
2000-01. After that it is gradually increasing. In 2003-04 the offtake of rice was about 
12 million tones (Table 3.1 and also see table 4.1 for earlier period). 
Table: 3.1 Allotment and Offtake of Foodgrains Under PDS/TPDS 
(Million Tones) 
Year 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04'' 
Rice 
Alilotmcnt 
12.93 
13.89 
16.26 
17.24 
36.02 
34.46 
Off-take 
10.74 
11.31 
07.97 
08.16 
10.31 
12.08 
Wheat 
Allotment 
10.12 
10.37 
11.57 
13.14 
38.66 
37.11 
Off-take 
07.95 
05.76 
04.07 
05.68 
09.78 
10.71 
Total 
Allotment 
23.05 
24.26 
27.83 
30.37 
74.68 
71.56 
Offtake 
18.69 
17.08 
12.04 
13.84 
20.13 
22.79 
Source: Animal Report: 2003-20()-l, Ministry of Food, Consumer Affairs and Public 
Distribution, Government of India. Note: Figure includes offtake and allocation to Defence. 
CRP17BSF and Bhutan. # Offtake figures are provisional. 
Despite a wide network of PDS arrangement through shops, the procurement, 
buffer stocking and storage are not efficient. Often there are complaints of low-grade 
agricultural commodities and irregular supply at the ration shops. This simply means 
that despite availability of foodgrains for meeting the necessary requirements there 
are problems of effective demand from the poor either due to lack of purchasing 
problem or due to unwillingness to purchase low quality grains generally available at 
the ration shops. Since effective food security means achievement of both physical 
and economic access to food, a large section of our population can still be considered 
food insecure, despite the fact that the food subsidy bill of the Government is rising 
continuously. A stock of the food subsidy show that the subsidy provided by he 
central government is rising at exponential rates. (Please see section 5.25 for more 
details). 
When the food subsidy bill reached an unsustainable level, the government in 
an attempt to prune it decided to hike the Central Issue Prices (CIP) of foodgrains 
distributed through ration shops. But it had another effect in the form of reduced 
offtake making the situation grimmer for the poor households. On the other hand, 
reduced offtake made the government even spend more on the cari-ying costs of the 
foodgrains rotting in the warehouses. Almost a quarter of the total subsidy is eaten up 
by the carr>'ing cost. For another, the storage losses are high, hi addition to this, the 
high procurement incidentals, distribution and administrative cost put together form a 
very high proportion of the actual cost of the grain. 
A number of starvation deaths are reported from the various parts of the 
country. Recently over thousand in five tribal districts of Maharashtra died owing to 
malnutrition. A couple of weeks earlier, there was another report from the West 
Bengal where several people had died of starvation in a couple of tribal villages. Soon 
after there was an equally grim story from Tamil Nadu where farmers were found 
subsisting on rats for want of work and lack of supplies from the PDS. In a survey 
conducted by ORGMARG in 1999 it was found that about 14 percent of the Indians 
do not get two square meals a day. This was a frightening figure and refuted by the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), which predicted the figure of people 
not getting two meals at 3.8 percent.' But this too is no mean for a countiy which 
Taimini, K Brij, (2004), op. cit, p. 106 
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boast of having the largest food security programme (serving over 230 million ration 
cards holders) in the world. In another survey, it was found that about 67.7 percent of 
the urban and 52 percent of the rural population were suffering from low calorie 
intake. It shows that as many as 286 million people are not meeting their minimum 
daily energy requirements. Of this about 63 percent live in rural areas and the rest 37 
percent are located in urban areas. 
3.3.1 Buffer Stock: 
Buffer stock is the most important arrangement for ensuring food security in the 
country, especially in a situation where agricultural production is still largely 
dependent on vagaries of monsoon. Food stocks are maintained by the Central 
government with an aim to (i) meet the prescribed minimum buffer stocks norms for 
food security, (ii) for monthly released for foodgrains for supply tluough PDS and 
other welfare schemes, (iii) to meet emergent situations such as crop failure calamities 
cii^. anu l^ iv^ lui luair^ci lliiei \ cliLiuii lu :5i.auiiis*^ lUuugidUi pin.,LS. i i i u i , uic luOu 
security system of the countiy rests on the building up and maintenance of buffer 
Stocks. Initially the stocks were maintained through imports of foodgrains, however, 
after the green revolution in late seventies the government of India started building 
stocks from domestic sources. Since the govermiients' policy is to absorb the access 
production of good crop so as to maintain a favourable price level for the producers, 
the food stocks with the government has steadily increased over the years, even much 
above the desired norms of stocks. 
In recent years the stocks of foodgrains have reached almost thrice of the 
desired requirements. This is mainly due to increasing Minimum Support Prices 
(MSP) to the farmers on the one hand and targeted distribution of foodgrains on the 
other. The FCI has been procuring foodgrains beyond its capacity to store such grains, 
which has been making government to spend a huge sum on transportation and 
storage of such stocks at far furlong areas in the country. Wc can see from the table 
3.2 that in recent years actual stocks of rice and wheat had reached about three times 
higher than the required buffer norms. It is only the current year stocks which arc 
higher by only about 8 million tones (Also sec table 4.1 for excess stocks). 
Table: 3.2 Minimum Buffer Norms and Stocks of Foodgrains in Recent 
Years 
(Million Tones) 
AS ON 
01.01.2001 
01.01.2002 
01.01.2003 
01.01.2004 
W H E A T 
Actual 
stock 
25.41 
32.42 
28.83 
12.69 
Minimum 
buffer norms 
08.40 
08.40 
08.40 
08.40 
R I C E 
Actual 
slock 
20.70 
25.62 
19.37 
11.72 
Minimum 
buffer norms 
08.40 
08.40 
08.40 
08.40 
T O T A L 
Actual 
stock 
45.74 
58.03 
48.20 
24.41 
Minimum 
buffer norms 
16.80 
16.80 
16.80 
16.80 
Source: Annual Report 2003-2004, Ministry of Food, Consumer Affairs and Public 
distribution. Government of India. 
Thus, there is a need to shift from the existing expensive, inefficient and 
corruption ridden institutional arrangement to the one that will ensure cheap delivery 
of requisite quantity grains at reasonable prices to the poor and also make government 
spend much portion of the expenditure on poor tlian on poverty schemes. 
3.4 Access to Food: 
Physical access to food can best be measured in tenns of percapita availability of 
foodgrains. There have been fluctuations in the year to year per capita availability, 
(gram/per day) of foodgrains, however, the underlying trend has been one of the 
increase from 394.9 gram of foodgrain percapita per day in 1951, which amounted to 
98.5 percent of the basic requirement of 400 grams per day to 125 percent of the basic 
requirement in 1991. But after that there is sharp fluctuation in the availability of 
foodgrains specially since 1997 and the year 2001 show the lowest availability of 
foodgrains ever since. 
Economic access to food is measured by assessing the proportion of percapita 
income required to buy a unit of food. On an average, rural household spends about 
64 percent of their monthly percapita expenditure on food items of which 26 percent 
is spends on cereals. Whereas, an urban household on an average spends 56 percent of 
its monthly percapita expenditure on food of which only 15 percent is spends on 
" Agricultural Statistics ul a Glance 2003. Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of 
Aiiricuiture, New Delhi, 2001. 
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cereals. There is significant increase in percapita consumption of rice and wheat till 
the late the late 1980s, followed by stagnation and then decline. 
Data from the National Accounts Statistic confirms 6 percent reduction in the 
percapita real expenditure on cereals between 1990-91 and 2000-2001. At the same 
time there was 16 percent increase in percapita real consumption expenditure on all 
food items taken together. But this is because of increased consumption on non-
cereals food. The increased consumption of non-cereals items during the period of 
nineties has improved the variety and diversity in the diets of the countrymen. 
However, it is notable that cereals have been cheaper sources of protein to the poor. 
Therefore, diversification away from the cereals is increasing the cost per unit 
nutrition so that the increase in calorie and protein intake is less than the increase in 
food expenditure. NSS data reveals that among major states like Assam, Gujarat. 
Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, total calorie intake averaged less than 2000 
Kcal/day in each of these during 1993-94 and except in Kerala and Maharashtra, 
worsened further by 1999-2000. Noticeably, these states are above the average 
percapita income and below the average poverty incidence. Since these states have the 
lower percapita cereals production among the major states. Production deficit and 
relatively long distance from surplus regions leads to relatively higher prices because 
of additional cost and effort of getting supplies from elsewhere. Therefore, the 
nutritional outcome among children is even worse in these states. On the other hand, 
rich cereals surplus states like Haryana and Punjab where cereals consumption has 
now fallen below the all India average but total nutrition intake is amongst the highest 
because of high consumption of other food. 
Thus, without greater and sustained effort at providing assured supplies of 
cereals either through local production or through a well functioning distribution 
system, improvement in India's appalling nutritional outcomes, which can keep 
cereals affordable and prevent undue fluctuation in their prices, could not be achieved. 
During nineties the real cereals prices increased sharply, for example, the ratio of the 
WPI for cereals to the ail commodit) declined 27.1 percent during 1975—76 and 
1991. However thereafter it increased to 8.4 percent in 1991-92 and remained 
relatively stable for the next four \ears then rose to 23.2 percent between 1996-97 and 
1999-2000. On wholesale price index bases, real cereals prices increased 33.2 percent 
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between 1990-91 and 1999-2000. Thus, rising cereals prices during the 1990s 
especially in the later half of the decade has dampened diversification of agricultural 
output and also prevented reduction of the cereals share in household budgets leading 
to decline in the capacity to purchase food by the poor. Food balance sheet shows a 
decline of percapita calorie intake or no increase of percapita availability of cereals 
since 1991.'" Thus, despite increase in physical and economic access to food the 
nutritional condition of the poor actually worsened during the post economic reform. 
3.5 Right to Food: 
Despite attaining self-sufficiency in foodgrain production and a well established 
system of foodgrains distribution and a large buffer stocks in the country there is 
persistent crisis of hunger and malnutrition. Because of a large-scale displacement 
effect, food sovereignty of a large number of people have been destroyed due to 
unfair terms of trade between rural and urban areas, between agriculture and industry 
and between rich and poor states. 
In India the Right to Food campaign has been of recent origin. It particularly 
received attention from a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in the Supreme Court 
by an NGO called People's Union for CWil Liberties (PUCL). In its pefition the PUCL 
demanded that the accumulating stocks in the government's food warehouses be used 
to meet the endemic conditions of scarcity and deprivation in the country, particularly 
the areas which had suffered through successive years of se\'erc rainfall deficiency. 
The crux of the PUCL petition was that the right to food was derived from the right to 
life guarantee in Article 21 of the Constitution. In the light of the above it requested 
the court that people who were too poor to buy their own food, needed to be ensured 
minimum means of subsistence by the state. In circumstance that seriously threatens 
to impair the right to food, the state was obliged to provide sustenance, by way either 
of direct food aid or access to gainful employment. 
After four hearings, the Supreme Court in September 2001, while expressing 
dissatisfaction with the rate of progress, issued notices to the Union government and 
'" Report of the High Level Commiltee on Long-term Grain Policy, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 
Food and Public Distrihulion, Government of India, New Delhi, 2002. p. 122. 
41 
16 States demanding explanations for their failure to identify the "below poverty line" 
(BPL) families earmarked as special beneficiaries under the Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TPDS). In November 2001, the Supreme Court asked the Union 
government to "indicate" how it would ensure that the welfare and food security 
schemes it had formulated would actually reach the intended beneficiaries. It also 
asked States and Union Territories to start serving mid-day meals with specified 
nutritive value, for children in government and government-aided primary schools, for 
a minimum period of 200 days a year. Further, in March 2002, the court invited the 
responses of various State governments to the proposal that they introduce an 
employment guarantee scheme, which would provide an ironclad guarantee of food 
security. The Supreme Court in November 2002 laid out procedures of accountability. 
Thus, it was now mandatory for every state to publicise the details of the court's order 
in village panchayat offices, school buildings and fair price shops. Further the 
Supreme Court warned that it would be the "duty" of every State and Union Ten'itory 
to ensure that deaths owing to starvation and malnutrition did not take place. And in 
case of any such eventuality the Chief Secretaries of the States could be called to 
account. 
India's National Magazine Front Line reports that India has the largest 
incidence of chronic under nourishment and endemic hunger, both in absolute and 
relative terms. India's high levels of maternal under nourishment directly accounts for 
the high proportion of underweight babies born. And these babies, in turn, have a 
much higher predisposition to cardio-vascular disease in their adult years. Most 
hungry people are rural producers who are hungry either because their resources have 
been ecologically degraded or alienated, or because they are too deeply in debt to buy 
costly inputs for agriculture production, 'fhcy cannot consume the food they grow. 
People of Kalahandi and Kashipur in Orissa starved because mainly due to erosion in 
their entitlements of food. On the other hand, FCI has been exporting grain at prices 
far below the costs of procurement, handling and storage that it bears." 
Thus, the problem of scarcil}' and hunger at the household level should be 
addressed before deciding to allow foodgrain export. As a number of case studies on 
the Public Distribution System (PDS) have revealed that while the underlying theme 
From Line, Volume 20 - issue 03, February 01 - 14, 2003. 
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was food insecurity in rural India, it was felt thai policy should go beyond providing 
food and address the chronic problem of hunger and poverty. Self-sufficiency in 
foodgrain production at the macro level meant nothing when households faced a 
situation of near-starvation. 
Several case studies suggest that erosion in the entitlements of food to people 
has its root in government recent agriculture policy. For example, capital-intensive 
systems of agriculture rob peasants of incomes and push them into debt and penury. 
The epidemic of farmers' suicides is a reflection of this growing crisis of increasing 
costs of production. Secondly, as markets get integrated globally and import 
restrictions (quantitative restrictions or QRs) are removed, the artificial prices set by 
the monopoly control of agribusiness and the $400 billion-worth subsidies in rich 
countries depress domestic prices, robbing farmers of markets and incomes. In such a 
situation, recently announced U.S. decision (U.S. Farm Bill) to further increase U.S. 
subsidies to $ 18 billion over the next few years will further depress the prices farmers 
receive-worldwide, making agriculture non-viable for small and marginal producers. 
The third level at which food entitlements of the poor are eroded is by the shift from 
'Tood first to export first" policies. India's new agriculture policy as well as the last 
two Union Budgets made this shift evident. Export-oriented agriculture policies divert 
scarce land and water from meeting local food needs to providing for export markets 
thus creating hunger and conditions for famine for the most vulnerable and marginal 
communities. Finally, hunger is a result of policies linked to structural adjustment and 
globalisation which forced sudden withdrawal of the state and reckless dependence on 
markets. Thus dismantling of the Public Distribution System (PDS) is spreading food 
insecurity at large. 
Chapter Four 
FOOD POLICY IN INDIA 
India's food policy evolved out of the Bengal famine of 1943 which killed more than 
a million people with starvation caused mainly by lack of adequate supplies of 
foodgrains than the lack of production. Foodgrains Policy Committee 1943 was 
appointed under the chairmanship of Sir George Theodore which emphasized 
rationing to overcome such situation in the future. Since then successive governments 
have been trying to enhance the level of foodgrain production in the country through 
offering minimum support prices to the farmers. In addition, PDS was evolved to 
safeguard the interest of the consumers particularly the more vulnerable section of the 
society. Aimed to curb the speculative price rise, simultaneously evolved price policy 
contained four major policy instruments; namely inputs subsidies; minimum support 
prices; procurement prices; and issue prices. They were devised to achieve the basic 
goal of the food security. Despite changes in contents and emphases over the years the 
basic goal of India's food policy could be summarized as follows;' 
1. Increase in foodgrain production. 
2. Stabilizing foodgrain prices and 
3. Maintaining adequate stocks of foodgrains as a measure of food security. 
To attain the above mentioned objective two central bodies namely the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) and Agriculture Price Commission (APC) were established 
in 1965. The FCI was responsible for procurement, import, distribution, storage and 
the sale of foodgrain. While the APC was to control and guide the cropping pattern, 
land use and profitability through minimum support price mechanism. This policy 
continued till the dawn of the new economic reforms in 1991 when the World Bank, 
which had earlier designed these two centralized institutions called for dismantling 
them, besides advising the government of India to dismantle the PDS as well. The 
Bank also asked for the removal of the Essential Commodities Act, the removal of 
price and inventory control and deregulation of agricultural trade. Further, it 
T)agi, D S., Managing India's food Econom\- Problems and Alternatives, Sage Publications, 
New" Delhi 1990, p^IT! 
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recommended the corporatisation of agriculture and a shift from a state-centred to a 
corporate-centred food system.'^  
Radical restructuring of the PDS and withdrawal of food subsidies were the 
important aspects of India's structural adjustment programme that began in 1991. The 
Revamped PDS (RPDS), which started in 1992, was supposed to target particularly 
the vulnerable regions and sections besides curtailing the public expenditure. But the 
scheme not only failed in achieving its stated objective but also ended up aggravating 
both of them. Therefore, in 1997, the RPDS was replaced by the Targeted PDS 
(TPDS), which artificially divided the population into "Below Poverty Line" (BPL) 
and "Above Poverty Line" (APL). The APL category was defined as those earning 
Rs. 1500/month and above. Those falling in the APL category were subsequently 
asked to bear 100 percent of the procurement and distribution costs. Whereas those 
falling in the BPL category were provided 10 kg of wheat or rice a month at highly 
subsidised prices. The withdrawal of subsidies for families above poverty line (APL) 
resulted food prices to rise substantially and beyond the reach of a large number of 
families. This took its toll on the offtake which fell substantially leading to un-
surmounting stock of foodgrains. That is why the recent government committee 
established to formulate the long-term grain policy has recommended the prices of 
grain for APL families to be slashed by 25 percent. 
PDS expanded enormously after establishment of the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) and the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) now known as 
Commission for Agriculture Costs and Prices (CACP). Over the years, the amount of 
foodgrains distributed through the PDS has increased enormously. However despite 
an extensive public distribution programme, the benefits quite often have not reached 
the people it was intended for. Simultaneously, the vulnerable producers who are 
growing rain-fed crops like jowar, bajra etc could not benefit from the governments' 
policy of assuring ruminative prices. Added to this the fixed pricing policy of the 
government throughout the year for the purpose of procurement and distribution has 
increased the concentration of the market arrivals in a few month or the days of the 
month. High degree of concentration of market arrivals results disorderly marketing 
The Frontline, (No l^anacca, A comment on) "The Report on Food Subsidy of the Expenditure 
Reforms Commission", Volume 17 - issue 21, October 14-27, 2000. 
From March 2002 the quota was increased to 35 kg of foodgrain per family per month. 
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of the produce and make difficult, the handling of the large quantities of the grains 
purchased efficiently in a short post harvest period by the FCI, as a result the 
difference of the economic cost of the FCI and the issue prices widened. At the same 
time size of the distribution continued enlarging year after year leading to much 
increase in the burden of the food subsidy on the exchequer. Despite the country 
reaching near self-sufficiency in foodgrains production, its continued policy of 
offering higher MSP has reached a limit where farmers are more interested in selling 
their produce to the Government then to the market, as a result the market prices of 
the foodgrains have increased to adversely affect the poor. Secondly, the stocks 
position has also gone beyond the desired level leading to heavy increase in the 
burden of the food subsidy. Government's decision to increase the issue prices of the 
foodgrains, to make up the deficit, have sharply reduced the offtake leading to further 
bulging of the stocks. 
It is noteworthy that after the SAP in 1991 the overall system of food 
management and public delivery was over hauled. Initially the RPDS was introduced 
with nartow targeting and thereafter the RPDS was replaced by the TPDS in 1997. 
Unfortunately both the schemes miserably failed in achieving their stated objectives 
of increasing the foodgrain availability among the poorest and reducing the 
government's food subsidy burden. It is important to note that after the structural 
adjustment programme the consumer food subsidy has fallen in real terms and since 
then has not changed much as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).'' It is due to 
increases in intermediate costs and costs of procurement, storage, buffer-stock 
operations and transportation. Consequently, the burden of inefficiencies in the 
system of storage and distribution are being passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices. For example, between 1975 and 1989, the distribution costs of the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) has increased by 274 percent whereas the procurement 
costs increased only by 70 percent. And in 1992-93 the per-quintal cost of 
procurement and distribution of the FCI was almost as high as the per quintal support 
price. Particularly, the period of structural adjustment saw a steep rise in the prices of 
foodgrains supplied through the public distiibution system and the consequent decline 
' The Frontline, Vol. 14: No. 21: Oct 18 - 3 1, i 997. 
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in the offtake of the same. Following pages have some more details about India's 
evolving food policy since the World War II. 
4.1 Historical Background of Food Management in India 
4.1.1 Food Situation Pre World War 11 
Famines were not unusual in the pre independent India but they were mostly confined 
to the limited affected areas. A survey shows that between 1860-1909 twenty famines 
occurred in the country. But it was only in 1890-91 when the food situation became 
precarious. During this period the growth in population was much above (5 percent 
annual) than the growth in foodgrain output (2 percent annual). Consequently there 
was a sharp increase in the prices of foodgrains between 1895-1909. Food supply 
became narrowed with the demand and reached its lowest levels at the quinquennum 
1905-1909 causing sharp increase in the foodgrains prices." The trend of rising 
population and declining cultivation of crops continued until the turn of the century. 
Between 1893-94 and 1915-16 population increased by 7 percent whereas the output 
of food crops percapita declined by 9 percent. Percapita area under cultivation sharply 
declined after 1921 which further aggravated the food problem. Great depression of 
1929 further suppressed the foodgrain prices and agriculture production. Thus, 
foodgrains production declined from 54.3 million tones in 1921-22 to 50.1 million 
tones in 1931-32 and further to 45.7 million tones in 1941-42. Shortage of domestic 
production increased the government's foodgrain import. Since that time India was 
dependent on import of rice from Burma, the entry of Japanese in the Second World 
War and occupation of Burma made the situation worse for the country at the time 
when the country was already in short of supply of foodgrain by 10 million tones.' 
^ Dalta, Kl. Report on the Rise oj Prices and M'ages, GO!, n.d., p. 58. 
'' Report of the Foodgrains I'ohcv Committee 19-13. Govt of India. 
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4.1.2 Bengal Famine of 1943: 
Bengal famine of 1943 shocked the conscience of the world which killed about 1.5 
million people. This famine occurred as consequence of WWII and inefficient 
administrative handling of the food situation by the government. Bengal was short of 
land to feed its population of 60 million. Food production was not catching up with 
the increasing population of 1 milHon a year. The net import of foodgrain into Bengal 
averaged 140000 tones. Mobility of the rice crop through the marketing channels was 
the only source to feed the people and that was badly affected in 1943. Before WWII 
the gap between demand and supply of foodgrain was filled by import, however, the 
gap was too precarious that any perceived danger of dislocation either in the 
production, import and distribution of foodgrain could play havoc. Entrj' and 
occupation of Burma by Japanese forces made this fear comes true when not only 
Bengal, but also the whole country was facing a deficit in food stock. Crop failure of 
1941 further aggravated the shortage of food supply. Cyclone and unfavorable crop 
output abruptly increased the prices of rice in many parts of the country owing mainly 
to heavy and speculative buying. There was no institutional arrangement for food 
procurement, therefore, the situation continued worsening especially in Bengal and its 
surroundings and ultimately in October 1943 about 1.5 million people died due to 
shortage of food supply. 
4.2 Emergence of Comprehensive Food Policy: 
The history of food policy in India began taking shape during the Bengal famine of 
1943. Prior to this, the government of India had no set principle of food policy but 
only a sort of ad-hoc arrangement of feeding the people during crisis. But the famine 
of 1943 led to the appointment of the first Foodgrains Policy Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Sir George Gregory, which after examining the whole situation 
recommended; 
1. Procurement of foodgrains from the surplus areas. 
2. Rationing for equitable distribution and 
3. Statutory price control for checking the price rise. 
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The Committee also emphasized the need for the active involvement of the 
central government in the management of food economy of the country. Since then 
central government of the country remains actively involved in the food management 
of economy. After the independence, the government resolved to increase the 
indigenous production of foodgrain by at least 10 million tones per annum and import 
of foodgrains only for the reserve stocks for unforeseen circumstances. Keeping this 
in view, another foodgrains policy committee was appointed in 1947, which 
recommended gradual abolition of the food controls and rationing and import for the 
maintenance of the reserve stocks. Therefore, the control on foodgrains, which was 
imposed in the wake of the Bengal famine and the war was removed but shortly 
reinforced in 1948 when the rising prices of the foodgrains created another havoc. The 
Foodgrains Procurement Commission 1950 suggested the rationing of foodgrains in 
all the towns with a population of over 50000. Besides it also asked for informal 
rationing in other towns and some regulated supply of grains in rural areas. The 
Foodgrain Enquiry Committee 1957 further suggested the maintenance of buffer 
stocks, and setting up of the foodgrains stabilization organization to undertake 
purchase and sale operation of foodgrains as during 1957-58 to 1966-67 food 
economy was completely dominated by the import under PL480 to serve the public 
distribution. In the light of the aforementioned observations, the Food Corporation of 
hidia was set up in 1965 with the aim to procure foodgrains including through imports 
and making available the foodgrains at different destinations for the purpose of public 
distribution. It was further recognized that food policy of the country should have 
three main objectives; (i) food self-sufficiency (ii) foodgrain price stability (iii) and 
assurance of an equitable distribution of foodgrains at reasonable prices. 
4.2.1 Food Self Sufficiency: 
At the time of independence food supply situation in the country was not very 
comfortable. India had inherited a completely exhausted agriculture sector, where the 
supply of foodgrains was substantially short of the national requirements. Therefore, 
the import of large quantity of foodgrains was inevitable. Method of cultivation was 
very traditional, and a large pari of the cultivated area was under rain-fed which had 
rendered agricultural output particularly that of foodgrains quite fluctuating. Further, 
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the land tenure system and other institutional arrangements like infrastructure 
facilities were not conducive for rapid agricultural growth. Percapita income was very 
low, markets were disintegrated, weak and exploited due to lack of transportation 
facilities. 
Between 1951 and 1954. the share of imports in the total availability of 
foodgrains in the country was 4.8 percent, which in the next five years i.e. 1955-59 
declined to 3.9 percent. However, during the first half of the sixties this share 
increased to 6.25 percent and further to 8.3 percent in the late sixties (1965-69). So to 
increase the production of foodgrains in the countiy, major emphases was put on 
enhancing the land productivity, as the potential for bringing more area under 
cultivation had started saturating. Consequently, India turned towards the potentially 
high yielding varieties (HYV) by applying the modem farm inputs like HYV seeds, 
chemical fertilizers and mechanization of certain agricultural operation. Thus the role 
of technology was accorded explicit recognition as a major input in agriculture. But, 
this policy had three major concern areas. 
a. It required heavy investment on the part of the farmers to reach at higher 
production possibility curve. 
b. It required a favorable price climate for agricultural produce and 
c. It required availability of modern farm inputs at affordable prices. 
Above constraints required the government too look afresh at the ongoing 
food policy and make the necessary changes accordingly. Therefore, the Agricultural 
Price Commission was setup keeping in view the following points. 
1. The need to provide incentives to the producer for adopting improved 
technology for the purpose of enhancing production. 
2. The need to ensure rational utilization of land and other production resources. 
3. The likely effect of the price policy on the rest of the economy as cost of 
living, level of wages etc. 
Tyagi, D.S.. op. cil., p. 16. 
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4.2.2 Agriculture Price Policy: 
The policy has evolved out of need to augment the domestic foodgrains production so 
as to achieve food self-sufficiency and protect the consumers from scarcity and 
speculative price rise. Thus, the main objective of foodgrains price policies in India 
had broadly been concerned more with the stabilization of consumer prices than with 
ensuring maximum prices to the producers. During the first five-year plan foodgrains 
prices moved haphazardly, government then depended entirely on ad-hoc corrective 
measures. On the other hand when grains prices were crashing with good production 
in 1954-55, government was unable to come out with an adequate purchase plan for a 
considerable period. During second plan also the maintenance of price stability 
through physical control and other regulator}' measures continued to be the primary 
objective but in spite of these the prices showed a continuous upward trends. 
Therefore, during the third plan it was realized that a policy is necessary to prevent 
sharp fluctuation in prices as well as to ensure a certain minimum to the farmers. 
Simultaneously, consumers' interest which is also paramount to be taken care off 
through proper buffer stock, trade regulatory measure and suitable distributive 
arrangements. The L. K Jha Committee 1964 prescribed the first price policy in the 
matter of foodgrains. The objective of the price stability was sought to be achieved 
through reducing year-to-year seasonal fluctuations in the prices. The Committee 
recommended the constitution of a body that will advice the Government on 
agricultural prices and price structure in the context of the need to raise agricultural 
production. The Committee also recommended the minimum support prices for the 
year 1964-65. hi the light of the recommendation Agriculture Price Commission 
(APC) was setup in 1965 and since then it has been recommending the minimum 
support prices, (below the market prices) and the procurement prices (higher than 
minimum support price but below the market prices). The support prices acted as 
insurance and direct incentive to the farmers to increase agricultural production. 
Foodgrain prices since then had been under varying degree of control despite the fact 
that barely 10 percent of the total foodgrain production and 25 percent of its 
marketable surplus passed through the PDS. On the other hand, the administered issue 
prices, which had an element of food subsidy in it, did had a more than marginal 
downward effect on the market prices, as a consequence the actual rise in foodgrain 
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price was less than the potential rise. Subsequently, agriculture price policy 
intervened to cover many more agricultural commodities in the network of minimum 
o 
guaranteed prices. There arc four main instruments of agriculture price policy; 
namely, input subsidies, minimum support price, procurement price, and issue price. 
4.2.2.1 Input Subsidies: 
Input subsidies are provided to enhance the foodgrain production in the countiy, as it 
encourages the adoption of specific technology and benefits small producers. 
Fertilizer, electricity, imgation and bank credit at nominal charges are the major input 
subsidies besides HYV seeds and other facilities that help farmers encourage food 
production (for more details, please see table 5.32). 
4.2.2.2 Minimum Support Price: 
The rationale of minimum support price lies in assuring the farmers who may suffer 
from periodicals gluts caused by good monsoon or the use of superior technology. 
The minimum support price for principal commodities are generally announced at the 
sowing time and the government agree to buy any amount of quantity offered for sale 
at those prices (for more details, please see table 5.28). 
4.2.2.3 Procurement Price: 
Procurement prices are fixed and announced at the starts of the marketing season. Till 
1970s they represented the prices at which the states agencies were ready to procure 
grains from the producers, millers and the market. These prices were generally lower 
than the normal market prices. The quantity to be procured was determined by the 
Government's need for buffer stocks as well as quantities needed for the 
disbursements under the PDS. Mowever, the actual quantity of procurement depended 
upon the prices offered by the Government irrespective of the requirement for buffer 
stocks or the PDS. Later on the difference between MSP and the Procurement Prices 
Bhalla, G.S. (Ed.), Economic Lthcralizalion and Indian Agriculture, Institute for Studies in 
Industrial Development, New Delhi, 1994, p. 110. 
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were abolished. Now government announces only Minimum Support Prices for 
different commodities. 
4.2.2.4 Issue Price: 
These are the prices at which the Government releases foodgrains stocks from the 
central pool to the PDS. They are lower than the prevailing market prices and slightly 
higher than the procurement prices. These prices involves heavy element of subsidy 
from the government on foodgrains as well as non-food items such as sugar and 
edible oil (for more details, please see table 5.28). 
4.2.3 Institutions to Implement Agriculture Price Policy: 
4.2.3.1 The Commission for Agricultural Cost and Prices (CACP) 
This is a renewed version of the erstwhile Agricultural Price Commission (APC). It is 
the chief advisory body on agriculture price policy. While recommending a price for a 
commodity the commission takes into account, among other factors, the prices fixed 
in the previous year, trends in open market prices reflecting overall shortages or 
surplus, the latest available estimates of cost of production and changes in the input 
prices, the need for securing a balanced growth in the output of related crops, 
reduction in inter states price dispersion, the likely effect of the recommended prices 
on the cost of living and the general price level. At present, the main task of the 
commission is to recommend the procurement prices for principal crops although its 
terms of reference are quite comprehensive. 
4.2.3.2 The Food Corporation of India (FCI): 
The FCI was set up in 1964 through an act of parliament. Its primary responsibility is 
to undertake purchase, storage, transportation, distribution and sale of foodgrains. It 
also aims to ensure that the primary producer gets the minimum price set by the 
government and the consumer is protected from the vagaries of speculative trades. 
FCI has been the main filed instrument of the government of India's food policy since 
its establishment. On behalf of the government, it looks after the price support, 
procurement, storage, interstate movement and distribution operations of foodgrains. 
The FCI also provides price support to farmers by purchasing quantities that could not 
fetch minimum support prices in the market, stores the grains scientifically, moves 
grains from surplus to deficit areas and makes available grains to states for the 
purpose of public distribution system. On behalf of the central Government it is 
authorized to handle all purchase, storage, movement, distribution and sale of 
foodgrains besides engaging itself in import and export of foodgrains as and when 
necessary. 
Since April 1969, FCI is also acting as the sole agency of the central 
Government for state trading in foodgrains. It helps government to achieve the 
following objectives. 
1. Guarantee of minimum support price to the producers. 
2. Restrictions on the inter state movement of foodgrains by private traders. 
3. Imports of foodgrains where necessary 
4. The maintenance of Public Distribution System through statutory and other 
controls. 
5. Building up of the required buffer stocks of grains. 
4.2.4 The Impact of Agriculture Price Policy: 
Till the mid sixties, cultivation of rice and wheat was not profitable because the 
procurement prices of these crops were below the full cost of their production. For 
example, price of wheat was lower by 14 to 38 percent in five states namely, UP, 
Punjab, Haryana, Bihar and Rajasthan. Even the farm harvest price was lower than the 
full cost of the production in some states. Similarly in the case of rice, procurement 
price was lower than the full cost of production in Andlira Pradesh, Tamil Nadu. 
Kerala and West Bengal which together accounted for about 40 percent of the total 
national output."^ Thus, the major producing stales were not able to profit from the 
production of these two crops. The onslaught of severe drought in 1965-66 further 
' Tyagi, D.S.. op, cit., p 69. 
'" lb,d 
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shortened the supply leading escalation in the real prices of wheat and rice. The 
wholesale price index of wheat deflated by the all commodities index increased from 
100 in 1961-62 to 130 in 1965-66 and to 173 in 1967-68. Likewise the wholesale 
price index of rice deflated by the all commodities index had increased from 100 in 
1961-62 to 139 in 1965-66 and to 164 in 1966-67. In the light of this, the procurement 
prices of wheat and rice were also fixed at higher levels in 1966-67 and 1967-68. 
Thus, making an induced increase in the prices of wheat and rice. Thereafter, the 
cultivation of these crops became profitable by the end of sixties. Not only the 
procurement prices but also the farm harvest prices became higher than the cost of 
production and the margin in some cases was as high as 66 percent." Consequently, 
there was healthy increase in the net income per hectare from the cultivafion of wheat 
and rice. 
With the introduction of the High Yielding Varieties of wheat, the area under 
wheat and its yield (per hectare) started rising rapidly.'^ The area under wheat 
increased by 18.2 million hectares within three to four years, and production increased 
to 23.08 million tones by 1970-71 and average yield reached to 1,307 kgs. As a 
proportion, the area under high yielding varieties to the total area under wheat 
increased from 19.6 percent in 1967-68 to 36 percent in 1970-71 and further to 78.6 
percent by 1983-84. Apart from this the proportion of irrigated wheat area also 
increased phenomenally from 43 percent in 1967-68 to 54 percent by 1970-71 and 72 
percent by 1983-84. The occurrence of severe drought in 1965-66 and 1966-67 at the 
time when adequate supply of wheat from the world market was not available brought 
a sharp increase in the price of wheat. The wholesale price index of wheat escalated 
from 100 in 1961-62 to 177.7 in 1966-67 and 213.7 in 1967-68. Thus, in another 
attempt to better the production, procurement price of wheat was raised from Rs. 540 
per tone in 1966-67 to Rs 700 per tone in 1967-68 and further to Rs 760 per tone in 
1968-69. This price was maintained till 1973-74.'^ 
" Ibid p. 74 
'" Till that time the maximum production of wheat was 12.3 million tones achieved in 1964-65. 
when productivity was at the highest level of 913 kgs per hectare until 1964-65, maximum area 
under wheat had been 13.6 million hectares 
'" Tyagi, D.S., op. cit., pp. 59-63. 
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In the case of rice production the main breakthrough was achieved in the mid 
seventies when area under rice increased from 37.8 million hectares in 1974-75 to 
40.5 million hectares by 1978-79. The area under high yielding varieties of rice went 
up from 5.4 million hectares in 1970-71 to 17 million hectares by 1978-79. The 
proportion of area under high yielding varieties to the total area under rice increased 
from 14.5 percent in 1970-71 to 31.5 percent by 1975-76 and 42.0 percent by 1978-
79. Whereas during the period of 1967-68 to 1975-76 the proportion of irrigated area 
under rice to the total area remained unchanged. The procurement prices of paddy 
(common rice) were fixed between Rs 460 and Rs 525 per tone during 1967-68 in the 
different states which remained unchanged till 1972-73. Then in 1973-74 procurement 
price was raised to Rs 700 per tones and further to Rs 770 in 1977 78 and to Rs 1,050 
in 1980-81. The administered price of rice increased by 81 percent whereas the samie 
of wheat by 71 percent during the 1972-73 to 1980-81. 
The policy of government intervention also helped producers by forestalling 
the unnecessary decline in the prices during bum.per harvest like in 1971-72 when 
wheat production was 11 percent higher tl lan in the previous year. Given the demand 
elasticity of wheat at 0.44, the prices of wheat declined by about 25 percent.''' But 
since the Government purchased all the wheat that was offered at the fixed price of Rs 
760 per tone the prices actually registered an increase of nearly 7 percent.'"^ 
In the later years, government to enlarge the size of foodgrain procurement 
started offering the prices even higher than those recommended by the Commission of 
Agricultural Cost and Prices (CACP). Thereafter, the prices were made so attractive 
that without effort procurement targets are easily met.'*^  During 1984-85 season the 
total procurement was over one million tone than in 1983-84 despite the fact that the 
output in 1984-85 was lower than in 1983-84 by about 1.4 million tones. Thus, 
despite lower growth in the agriculture ibodgrains, procurement by the FCI increased 
significantly over the years. In the 1980s yearly procurement of wheat by the FCI 
rantied between 6-10 million tones with the highest in 1985-86 at 10.54 million. 
" Ibid, p 79. 
" Ibid. p.79. 
"' For details of the CACP recommended prices and government announced prices during the pre 
and post economic reform period, please see. Government of India (2003): "Food and Nutrition 
Security" in- Tenth Five Year- PJXirr2'0~0~2-2X)d-7, Ministry of Planning, New Delhi, pp.365-67. 
^ r<7 (.n ' 
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Likewise, the increase in rice procurement was ranged between 5 and 10 million tones 
during 1980s. 
Till mid nineties, tlie food policy management moved to keep in view the 
increase in foodgrain production, particularly of rice and wheat mainly due to fear of 
the scarcity and import dependence. But, during nineties Government's policy to 
announce larger increase in MSP particularly after 1997 have increased the 
procurement much beyond the stipulated buffer nomis. 
4.2.4.1 Procurement: 
Procurement implies purchase of surpluses from producers by the government at 
predetermined fair prices. This surplus is utilized to feed the rationed population 
whereas the quantities left with the producers and traders is used for the non-rationed 
population. Procurement is undertaken by the FCI in collaboration with numerous 
state agencies at prices fixed by the Government on the recommendation of the 
CACP. ' There have been ups and dov/ns in the procurement levels since 1947, as 
several factors have been playing crucial role like; procurement target, crop 
performance and the import of foodgrains. Crop performance on the other hand has 
been related with the performance of monsoon. Foodgrains import has been subject to 
international compulsions and price fluctuations. Since it was the responsibility of the 
government to arrange for the equitable distribution of foodgrains at reasonable 
prices, very often any shortfall in procurement targets were met through imports. 
However, paying scarce foreign exchange for food was not always as easy. Therefore, 
government always endeavored to make the countr>' self sufficient in foodgrains 
production. In fact the crux of India's entire food policy is to enable the country 
produce enough for the entire requirements including those for the PDS as well as 
stocks. 
Procurement was done through different mechanism but the most successful 
among them was the procurement under price support, which substantially augmented 
the foodgrains production in the Indo-Gangetic plains falling in the regions of Punjab, 
Until late seventies the FCI used to handle all cereals including coarse cereals but since 1980 the 
FCI has confined its operation to only wheat and rice. Coarse cereals are now handled by the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation (NAFED). 
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Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh. The impact of price policy was so effective in 
the region that on quite a few occasions goverrunent purchased foodgrains only to 
avoid crash in prices. Another way of procurement is through the statutory levy 
imposed by the state governments on the millers and traders. 
The quantum of procurement by the FCI and state agencies largely depends 
upon the volume of production and the difference between the open market prices and 
government determined procurement prices. In case of rice procurement is mainly 
through levy on millers. The rice millers are required to sell a specified percentage of 
the total rice milled by them to the FCI, at prices equal to the procurement prices of 
paddy plus milling cost. However when the prices of paddy tend to touch the 
procurement level, the FCI also purchases paddy. This paddy is then milled either 
through custom milling or in the FCIs own rice mills. Thus notwithstanding year to 
year fluctuations, procurement by the FCI as a proportion of total production have 
displayed an increasing trend. 
In recent years, government's policy of fixing minimum support price (MSPs) 
much higher than costs of production or even the price recommended by the CACP, 
has diluted the grains quality besides increasing the statutory levies by the states. 
These have increased FCI's effective purchase cost of grain to above the price at 
which offtake can equal the procurement with reasonable subsidy. Regular hike in 
minimum support prices have increased the procurement of foodgrains beyond the 
sustainable level. Present high stocks are result of this and of past decisions to 
increase the issue prices. Due to lack of proper stocking capacities FCI is forced to 
transport large quantities of stocks to far and wide depots in the countr>', which 
involves heavy transportation and damage costs besides the usual wear and tear. Thus, 
the open-ended procurement policy of the government at continual higher MSPs has 
only added to the governments' rapidly increasing food subsidy bill. 
Table 4.1 shows steady increase in the foodgrains procurement during eighties 
and nineties. However, procurement growth in nineties is more pronounced then in 
eighties. Except in the year 1987-88 and 1988-89 there was slow but continuous rise 
in procurement of rice as well as wheat. Another trend to note is the fact that during 
the post reform period except for two breaks (i.e. 1995-96 and 1998-99) contribution 
of rice in total procurement has been greater than that of wheat. After the economic 
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reforms in 1991-92 foodgrains procurement has increased from 17 million tones to 
over 41 million tones in 2001-02. 
Table: 4.1 Procurement, Offtake and Stocks of Foodgrains 
(Million Tones) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
J 985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-0! 
2001-02 
Rice 
5.34 
7.02 
7.14 
7.58 
9.82 
9.62 
9.36 J 
7.04 
7.64 
11.20 
12.90 
9.41 
12.70 
13.60 
13.10 
9.97 
12.20 
14.40 
11.90 
17.30 
19.60 
21.30 
["rocurement 
Wheat 
5.86 
6.59 
7.71 
8.29 
9.30 
10.35 
10.54 
7.88 
6.53 
9.00 
11.07 
7.75 
6.38 
12.84 
11.87 
12.33 
8.16 
9.30 
12.65 
14.14 
16.36 
20.63 
Total 
11.20 
13.61 
14.85 
15.87 
19.12 
19.97 
19.90 
14.92 
14.17 
20.17 
24.16 
17.16 
19.78 
26.40 
24.99 
22.24 
20 03 
23.82 
24.22 
31.43 
36.46 
41.30 j 
Rice 
5.88 
6.74 
7.69 
7.67 
6.61 
7.40 
9.03 
10.10 
9.08 
7.48 
7.91 
10.30 
9.89 
9.46 
8.85 
11.60 
12.30 
11.20 
11.80 
12.40 
10.40 
15.30 
Offtake 
Wheat 
7.51 
6.69 
7.90 
7.45 
6.72 
11.72 
10.35 
12.78 
8.66 
7.51 
8.58 
10.48 
8.06 
9.14 
10.59 
12.72 
13.32 
7,76 
8.90 
10.63 
7.79 
15.99 
Total® 
13.54 
13.59 
15.73 
15.34 
13.40 
19.28 
19.61 
23.00 
17.97 
14.99 
16.49 
20.74 
17.96 
18.61 
19,44 
24.35 
25.63 
18.96 
20.73 
23.05 
18.21 
31.31 
Rice 
6.69 
6.36 
5,24 
5,24 
8,58 
10.30 
10,00 
5.91 
3.86 
7.06 
10.20 
8.86 
9.93 
13.60 
18.10 
13.10 
13.20 
13.10 
12.20 
15.70 
23.20 
24.90 
Stocks* 
Wheat 
3.07 
4.55 
5.64 
9.62 
12.47 
10.21 
9.44 
3.34 
2.31 
3.46 
5.60 
2.21 
2.74 
7.00 
8.72 
7.76 
3.24 
5.08 
9.66 
13.19 
21.50 
26.04 
Tota!'^ 
9.87 
11.07 
11.10 
14.92 
21.20 
20.75 
19.53 
9.43 
6.18 
10.52 
15.81 
11.07 
12.67 
20.54 
26.80 
20.82 
16.41 
18.12 
21.82 
2891 
44.98 
51.02 
Notes: Procurement figures related to marketing years, i.e. Rice (Oct-Sept), Wheat (April-
March) @ : Includes coarse cereals. *: Stocks are as at March-end. 
Source: Hand Book of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2002-2003, Reserve Bank of India, 
Mumbai, 2003. 
4.2.4.2 Offtake: 
There is gradual increase in the offtake from the central pool. Starting from merely 13 
million tones of offtake in 1980-81 the total offtake of foodgrains reached highest to 
23 million tones in 1987-88. During the post reform period we find some marked 
fluctuations in the offtake. However looking at the scheme wise we find that during 
the RPDS era there was steady increase in the offtake from 17 million tones in 1992-
93 to over 25 million tones in 1996-97. Thereafter fluctuations are more marked. In 
1999-2000 the offtake was 23 million (ones which in 2000-01 declined to 18 million 
tones then registered a sharp increase of 31 million tones in 2001-02 (Table 4.1). 
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Comparing with the allocation, the post reform period saw increasing the gap 
between allocation and offtake from PDS. For example, the offtake of rice as a 
percentage of its allocation declined from 90 percent of its allocation in 1991-92 to 84 
percent in 1992-93, 73 percent in 1993-94 and 60 percent in 1994-95. Thereafter, the 
offtake of rice improved in proportion to allocation. For example, in the year 1995-96 
offtake was 67 percent of the total allocation, which rose to 80 percent in 1996-97, 
and further 83 percent in 1998-99. In the case of wheat, offtake as percentage of 
allocation declined from 85 percent in 1991-92 and 1992-93 to 64 percent in 1993-94 
and further 47 percent in 1994-95. Thereafter, the offtake of wheat rose to 51.3 
percent of allocation in 1995-96, and further to 87 percent in 1996-97.'^ In 2000-01 
offtake of wheat and rice again fell as low as 32 and 48 percent respectively. 
4.2.4.3 Buffer Stock: 
Buffer stock is another important constituent of India's food policy especially in the 
condition where agricultural production largely dependents upon the monsoon. It 
provides the best and most flexible instrument for moderating the short-term 
fluctuations in the demand and supply of foodgrains so that scarce resources can be 
employed more efficiently to attain the long-term growth objective in agriculture 
development. Buffer stocks are buildup by the FCI as a necessary policy measure in 
the interest of producers as well as consumers. The maintenance of buffer stocks 
becomes essential to cater for the lean years when minimum level of consumption in 
food must be provided and also to give price support to the producers in a bumper 
crops. Thus, buffer stock ensures availability of foodgrains at reasonable price to the 
consumer in bad years and gives the confidence to the farmers in good years so that 
they continue producing. 
In fact, various food policy inquiry committees appointed by the government 
form time to time have stressed the need for such reserves. The Foodgrains Policy 
Committees 1943 recommended the creation of a central foodgrains reserve of not 
less than five lakh tones. The Bengal Famine Enquiry Commission 1945 also 
suggested a buffer stock. The Foodgrains Policy Committee 1948 emphasized the 
Mishra, R.K and Puii S.K., Indian Economy, Himalya Publishing House. 2000, p. 502. 
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importance of a central reserve of one million tones. Foodgrains Enquiry Committee 
1957 went so far as to recommend the setting up of a foodgrains stabilization 
organization. The two main tasks of which would be to create an emergency reserve 
stocks of at least two million tones and to undertake buffer stocks operation to achieve 
stabilization of prices. Foodgrains Policy Committee 1966 also recommended buffer 
stocks to achieve the objective of inter seasonal stability in supply. Originally such a 
stock was to be created out of imported grains. However, after late sixties local 
surplus production of foodgrains increased so much so that it promised a sustained 
increase in production, which prompted the government to decide on the building 
buffer stocks with indigenous grains. The Committee also recommended the 
minimum level of buffer stock of 5 million tones from which the stock should not be 
allowed to fall below that level. The Teclmical group appointed by the central 
government in April 1981, suggested increase in the amount of buffer stocks to 15 
million tones.''^ 
Thus, a major objective of the maintenance of buffer and operational stock is 
to ensure an uninten-upted supply of foodgrains to the PDS. Up to mid seventies most 
of the stocks were built out of import, however, thereafter domestic production has 
reached a level where large buffer stocks could be build through domestic 
procurements only. During eighties we find more fluctuations in government stocks 
(Table 4.1). Total stock which was 9 million tones in 1980-81 increased to over 14 
million tones in 1983-84. The in the next year it recorded net growth of over 7 million 
tones. From 1985-86 it started declining to reach 6 million tones in 1988-89. After the 
economic reforms we find marked improvement in the stock levels. Beginning with 
the stock level of 11 million tones in 1991-92 the total foodgrain stock of government 
has reached to over 51 million tones at the end of March 2001-02. In between we do 
find some deceleration in stock during 1996-97 and 1997-98. 
No doubt central pool must ha\'e a sufficient stock in order to meet the 
eventualities. But at the same time it also need to reconcile the confiicfing needs of 
ensuring a comfoilable availability position with the needs to economise on wastage, 
storaoe and interest cost on credit availed for the food management. As large stocks of 
Tyagi, D.S , op. cit., p 46 
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foodgrains over the years have substanlially increased the carrying cost of foodgrains 
posing threat to the viability of the entire food management. 
4.3 Public Distribution System (PDS): 
Introduced in the wake of Bengal famine 1943, the PDS has come out to be the most 
important constituent of India's food policy. The need for a public distribution, as an 
effective instrument of price stabilization in the national economy was emphasized 
time and again in various foodgrains enquiry committee reports. Starting with 
Theodore Gregory's recommendation 1943, followed by Foodgrains Procurement 
Committee Report of 1950-51 asking for a controlled system of procurement and 
distribution of foodgrains. The Foodgrains Policy Committee 1966 laid emphasis on 
equitable distribution of foodgrains by making the surplus produces in suiplus states 
available at reasonable prices to non-producing consumers as well as to the deficit 
states with prime objective to protect the low income groups people from the adverse 
impact of food shortages. Thus. PDS has been outlined a vital role after the grains had 
been procured or imported for the distribution purposes. It is the joint responsibility of 
the central and state governments and union territories administrations to ensure the 
smooth functioning of public distribution system. While the responsibility of the 
central government is to procure, store and transport it from purchase points to central 
godowns, the responsibility of the state governments and union territory 
administrations is to lift these grains from the central godowns and distribute them to 
consumers through the network of fair price shops. Historically, the PDS has been 
functioning with the following objectives. 
a. Maintaining price stability. 
b. Raising the welfare of the poor by providing them access to basic foods at 
reasonable prices. 
c. Rationing during scarcity situations and 
d. Keeping a check on private trades. 
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Essential Constituents of the P1)S: 
1. To collect sufficient quantities of foodgrains so as to able to distribute it 
throughout the year at reasonable prices, commensurate with the commitment 
and coverage either through the internal procurement or by imports to the 
extent of necessity. 
2. To arrange for the adequate storage capacity at procurement and distribution 
centers for operational as well as buffer stocks. 
3. To lay down the grains specification and quality control at various stages of 
procurement, storage and distribution. 
4. To determine the issue prices of foodgrains, in consultation with the 
government in the light of the recommendation of the CACP, before the 
commencement of marketing season. Thus, fixing of the issue price is of 
crucial importance both from the point of view of regulating the market prices 
and of determining the size of the commitment undertaken through the PDS. It 
is also a vital force for maintaining prices at reasonable level.'^ '^  
4.3.1 Management of the Public Distribution System: 
Under the existing division of the authority between central and states governments, 
Central Government through the FCl procures, transports and stores the foodgrains. 
On the other hand, state governments are liable to pick the foodgrains from FCI 
depots and make it available to the consumers through the network of fair price shops. 
A fair price shop covers a population of about 2000 of a particular village/ town or 
city. The overall control of the public distribution system rests with the food and civil 
supplies department of the state government. All people whether rich or poor are 
entitled to draw supplies from fair price shops at fixed prices. The number of fair 
price shops has been increasing continuously over the years in both rural and urban 
areas. According to the civil supplies department about 25 percent of the fair price 
shops were run by cooperatives. The scale of PDS became massive as during the 
period of 1971 to 1990 public distribution of cereals ranged between 8.9 and 15 
Chopra, R N , Food Policy in India, Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, 
million tones per year. Over the years the share of PDS has varied from 9 to 15 
percent of the total cereal production.^' The distribution is quite high during lean 
years and quite low when market prices are low. The quantities supplied through the 
PDS outlets remained below 5 million tones up to 1963 and thereafter they had gone 
up to 14 million tones by mid 1960s. Throughout the seventies the quantities 
remained around 10 million tones and during eighties the average was around 16 
million tones. In the post reform period average distribution marginally improved to 
17 million tones (table 5.23). 
PDS continues to be the major instrument of Governments' economic policy 
not only for ensuring food security but also for protecting purchasing power of the 
poor. According to the Economic Survey '^' 75 percent of the ration shops were 
located in rural areas. More than 70 percent of the PDS rice and more than 55 percent 
of the PDS wheat was sold in rural areas. The distribution of PDS was more effective 
in states like Gujarat, Kerala. Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and West 
Bengal. There is a regular operation of PDS supplying the food at highly subsidized 
prices lo those living in the Integrated Tribal Development Project Areas. Different 
anti poverty employment programme also distribute foodgrains as a part payment for 
wages to help the poor. These operations have caused subsidy on food to increase 
over the years. " 
4.3.2 Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS): 
After the economic reforms in 1991 there was substantial change in the government's 
food policy. In fact owing to its difficult fiscal situation government had but little 
choice to have a re-look at its policy of massive public distribution of foodgrains. 
PDS was also criticized on account of its ineffectiveness in reaching the most 
vulnerable sections of the society. Some other criticism like leakages and corruption 
in the overall management of the FCI were also hounding the government for some 
"' Bhalla, G.S. (Ed.), Economic Liberal tut iun ami Indian AgriciillJirc, Institute for Studies in 
Industrial Development, New Delhi, 1994, p. I48. 
"" George, P S, (1996): "PDS. Food Subsidy and Production Incentives", Economic and Political 
Weekly, September 28, p. A141. 
'•' Economic Survey 1991-92; p. 53. 
"^  Mooij, Jos, Food Policy and the Indian Stale. The Public Distiibitiion System in South India, 
Oxford University Press. Delhi, 1999. 
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time. But it was the fiscal strangulation after the structural adjustment programme that 
propelled the government to restructure the public distributions system as Revamped 
PDS (RPDS) in the year 1992. The RPDS was started by identifying over 1700 blocks 
of tribal, hilly and drought prone areas, which had weak PDS due to low 
infrastructural facilities in the region. Government increased the allocation of the 
foodgrains under the new scheme to these difficult areas and increased the number of 
fair price shops in the region to improve the physical access of beneficiaries. 
Under the RPDS wheat and rice were supplied at Rs. 50 per quintal less than 
the normal central issue price. The quantities supplied through the PDS outlets 
increased a peak level of 19 million tones in 1991-92 from 16 million tones in 
eighties. Simultaneously, with the launching of the RPDS government increased the 
issue prices of foodgrains to curtail its burgeoning food subsidy bill. This increase in 
issue price considerably reduced the gap between open market price and the prices 
charged under PDS. The issue prices of foodgrains within the first four years of 
structural adjustment had increased by 40 percent which resulted in substantial 
decline of the offtake from PDS. Notwithstanding this, the upward trend in minimum 
support and procurement prices continued unabated, which proved very detrimental to 
the government's efforts in cutting down the unviable food subsidy burden. (For more 
details please see, section 5.2.2.1.1 and table 5.24) 
4.3.3 Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS): 
Another attempt in narrow targeting with an aim to restrict the PDS only to the poor 
and phase it gradually out to the non-poor. This scheme replaced the RPDS in June 
1997 by dividing the whole lot of population into two broad groups namely; the 
people above the poverty line (APL) and those below the poverty line (BPL). It 
specifically focused on the people falling in the second category i.e. "belovs? poverty 
line". Under this scheme, foodgrains are allocated to states on the basis of the 
estimates of the BPL population. The identification of the poor under the scheme was 
to be done by the respective states as per the estimates of planning commission. "^  The 
"' Based on llic methodo!og> devised by the Expert Group on estimation of proportion and number 
of poor. Chaired by Late Prof, Lai<da\vala, for more details see, Annual Report 2002-03, 
65 
allocation of foodgrains to the States/UTs is made on the bases of average 
consumption in the past. As against the underhned philosophy of the RPDS to target 
all in poor areas, the TPDS aimed at targeting poor in all areas particularly the 
notorious food deficit areas. The central government transfers to state governments 
wheat and rice at an issue price close to the market price. The allocation is made on 
the basis of 10 kgs of cereals per family per month. From March 2001, the scale of 
issue to BPL consumer was raised from to 20 kgs/month. The allocation was further 
revised and increased from March 2002 to 35 kgs per month for both BPL and APL 
families. With the introduction of the dual pricing system the changes in issue prices 
were now linked to the changes in the economic cost. Now the BPL families were 
required to pay lower than the price paid in the general PDS, whereas for the APL 
families the supply cost was fixed at higher than the general PDS prices. For BPL 
families initially the prices were charged at 40 percent of the economic cost, on the 
other hand for APL families the prices were fixed at 80 percent of the economic 
cost. Additional requirements desired by the states were allotted at further higher 
prices. By the time of the Budget 2000-01. the enfire subsidy for the APL customer 
was withdrawn, whereas, the BPL consumers were now required to pay 50 percent of 
the economic cost. However, on the recommendation of the Long Terai Grain Policy 
Committee Report 2002, the prices for APL consumers have been slashed by 25 
percent from April 2002. 
While there has been excessive procurement of rice and wheat, the offtake of 
foodgrains under the TPDS has been low particularly in case of wheat. This is mainly 
on account of narrowing differential between PDS and open market prices particularly 
for the APL families. As the issue price is closing to the market prices, a large 
proportion of APL families are moving out of the PDS network. (For more details on 
this, please see sections 5.2.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.1.3 and table 5.25). 
Ministry of Consumer .Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Governmenl of India, New Delhi, 
p 13. 
"'' Economic cost: cost of food corporation of India comprising the procurement cost procurement 
incidentals, interest storage across the country transportation and losses if any with in a limit. 
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4.3.4 Miscellaneous Schemes: 
Antyodaya Anna Yojna (AAY): 
Introduced on 25'^ December 2001, the scheme aimed to identify 10 million poorest 
of the poor out of the total 65 million BPL families. Under this scheme selected 
families are provided 35 kg foodgrains per month at the Central Issue Price of Rs 2 
per kg for wheat and Rs 3 per kg for rice. Initially the scheme has been slow to take 
off in many states, however, with the passage of time scheme's performance has 
remarkably improved. (For allocation and offtake please see, section 5.2.2.1.3 and 
table 5.25). 
Mid Day Meal Scheme: 
The scheme was launched by the Ministry of Human Resource Development from 
August 15, 1995 for the benefit of students in primary schools in EAS/earlier RPDS 
blocks (2368). The Scheme covers students (Class I-V) in the Government Primary' 
Schools / Primary Schools aided by Govt, and the Primary Schools run by local 
bodies. Foodgrains (wheat and rice) are supplied free of cost @ 100 gram per child 
per school day where cooked/processed hot meal is being served with a Minimum 
content of 300 calories and 8-12 gms of protein each day of school for a minimum of 
200 days and 3 kgs per student per month for 10 months in a year, where foodgrains 
are distributed in raw form. 
Wheat Based Nutrition Programme (WBNP): 
Launched under the auspices of the Department of Women & Child Development, 
Ministry of Human Resource Development, allotted foodgrains under the scheme are 
utilized by the States/UTs under Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) for 
providing nutritious/ energy food to children below 6 years of age and expectant 
lactating women. 
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Scheme For Foodgrains to SC/ST/OBC HostelsAVelfare Institutions: 
Introduced in October 1994, the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment 
implements and monitors the scheme. The residents of the hostels having 2/3 students 
belonging to these categories are eligible to get 15 kg foodgrains per resident per 
month. 
Annapurna Scheme: 
The Ministry of Rural Development launched this scheme in 2001-2002 for indigent 
senior citizens or 65 years of age or above who though eligible for old age pension 
under the National Old Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS) but are not getting the pension 
are covered under the Scheme. 10 kgs of foodgrains per person per month are 
supplied free of cost under the scheme. 
4.4 Long Term Grain Policy: 
Instituted in November 2000, the Long-term Grain Policy Committee was asked to 
look into the functioning of MSP. PDS, buffer stocking and international trade in 
foodgrains. The Committee examined the following areas and keeping in view the 
basic objective of food policy as well as the budget constraints, submitted its final 
report to the government in July 2002. 
1. Minimum Support Prices (MSP) and Price Support Operations. 
2. The Role of the Food Corporation of India. (FCI) 
3. Functioning of the Public Distribution System. (PDS) 
4. Policies regarding buffer stocks, open market sales and foreign trade. 
4.4.1 Minimum Support Prices (MSP) and Price Support Operations: 
Regarding the MSP, the Committee recommended that the existing MSP policy 
should continue but over the time its functioning and the policy regarding the private 
trade should be improved so that the volume of public procurement is balanced to 
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meet the needs of price stabilization and the PDS. With regard to the fixation of 
different MSP for same crop in different regions, the committee observed that this 
trend is is likely to encourage inefficiency in production and may require undesirable 
controls on movement from one region to another. Therefore, it was suggested that 
the Central Government should continue to be responsible for fixing both the 
Minimum Support Prices (MSP) as well as the Central Issue Prices (CIP). The 
Committee also suggested that MSPs should continue as floor price and be declared 
before the sowing season, with guarantee of open-ended purchase but without any 
obligation on farmers to sell at MSP.^ ^ 
Regarding the role of CACP in advising the government on MSP, the 
Committee's views were as follows: 
a. The MSPs that CACP recommends must be based on its projection of the full C2 
cost in regions of relatively efficient production, taking into account the A2+FL 
cost (i.e. paid out costs plus imputed cost of family labor) even in regions of 
relatively high cost production. 
b. li" prolonged excess of production over domestic requirement leads to 
unacceptably high stock levels, and these coincide with world prices lower than 
domestic pi-ices, MSPs must signal readjustment of cropping patterns. MSPs 
will then have to be adjusted to reflect C2 costs of only the most efficient surplus 
producing states. 
c. The MSP should truly be a national level floor price, rather than remaining 
confined to established surplus regions. 
d. The existing MSP system, which was developed with reference to a closed 
economy, must adapt to the context of liberalized trade, hi this regard, MSP 
policy will have to be supplemented by variable import and export tariff policies 
for effective price stabilization. 
' ' Report of the High Level Comiiiiitee on Long-tenn Grain Policy, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 
Food and Public Distribution, Government of India, New Deliii, 2002, pp. 9-10 
69 
4.4.2 The Role of the Food Corporation of India (FCI): 
The Commillee expressed satisfaction over the role FCI has performed over the years. 
However, it criticized the FCI for its predominant role in procuring from a few 
surplus states rather than ensuring price support to cultivators throughout the country 
and developing markets for grain in relatively underdeveloped regions. The 
Committee recommended additional budgetary support for FCI to perform its 
remaming tasks. 
Regarding the management of FCI, the Committee did not envisage any basic 
change in the structure of the FCI. But it called for giving the FCI greater operational 
flexibility in strengthening the market intelligence set-up and improving its 
management practices in procurement, storage and quality control. The Committee 
expressed dissatisfaction over the market intelligence set up of FCI, which in 
Committee's view, is extremely rudimentary and does not cater to data requirements 
on domestic and international prices for open market sales, purchases and release of 
stocks for export. 
Thus, given the present crisis in the foodgrain management in the country, the 
Committee recommended for immediate and bold initiatives to correct the 
imbalances. In the opinion of the Committee, the existing measures taken by the 
government for the purpose of reducing stocks have pertained only to disposal and 
distribution and have not addressed the critical issue of procurement. In the 
committee's assessment, present level of stocks cannot be reduced unless there is 
corresponding reduction in procurement. 
4.4.3 Functioning of the Public Distribution System (PDS): 
The Committee admitted that the effective reach of the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) has shrunken alarmingly in recent years. Despite bulging stocks and a poor 
harvest, PDS offtake in 2001 was the lowest since 1978, reflecting viability problems 
in the PDS network. Consequently, pcrcapita cereals availability in 2001 fell to its 
-' ibid. p. 16 
-' Ibid. pp. 20-25. 
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lowest level in over two decades. In regard to the functioning of the PDS, the 
committee recommended that:"'" 
a. The Central Issue Price (CIP) principle under universal PDS was to provide 
grain at "reasonable price" to consumers. In that context, its main function was 
one of pan-national price equalization of supply from public stock. To serve 
this function, the ClPs should be equal to acquisition costs, which implies 
subsidy equal to distribution cost. 
b. The TPDS intent, to shift subsidies from the rich to poor, conflicts with the 
function of universal PDS to shift physical supplies from regions of surplus to 
regions of deficit. It also involves a conflict between "poverty" and 
"nutritional status", since although States in South and West India may have 
higher percapita incomes than average, calorie intake and cereals consumption 
are lower. 
c. These conflicts can be resolved within TPDS by setting the CIP for APL equal 
to acquisition cost. Alternativcl). there can be a uniform CIP at this level plus 
cash grants to States equal to the differential subsidy to the poor, giving States 
choice of delivery systems. 
d. With BPL prices lower than MSP. the potential for leakage to the open market 
is higher under TPDS, and in fact there is incentive to recycle PDS supplies 
back to procurement. 
e. Leakages can be checked by charging Fair Price Shops (FPS) owners a higher 
uniform CIP for grain and giving the differential subsidy for the poor directly 
through coupons, which FPS owners can redeem in cash. FPS viability can be 
restored by bringing back some of the APL and by having delivery points 
other than registered PDS outlets. 
f In the longer run, the cash-cum-allocation idea can be extended to allow States 
to source requiicments flexibly from open-ended sales through OMSS. For 
this. States would have to be given the cash difference between the state-
speciflc OMSS price (or the state specific economic cost) and the CIP (or the 
30 Ibid p 74-77 
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all-India acquisition cost) on all lifting up to the state's PDS allocation, in 
addition to the differentia] subsidy for those identified as BPL. 
g. The principles of "pre-emptive purchase" and of FCI as "buyer of last resort" 
are important and necessary to maintain the sanctity of the Central Pool while 
proceeding with decentralization. However, in the long run, it is desirable for 
MSP, set as a floor price, to become statutory. 
h. All larger traders and wholesalers who are involved in inter-state or inter-
regional or export trade must also adhere to the proposed statutory floor price. 
i. To reduce the overheads, the Committee felt the need of an inter-ministerial 
Working Group going into the feasibility of greater co-ordination between 
different Central undertakings who are cuirently involved in price support 
operations like the Food Corporation of India (FCI), the Cotton Corporation of 
India (CCI) and the Jute Corporation of India (JCI) along with NAFED. 
To save the transportation costs and meet the consumers need more adequately 
the Committee suggested decentralization of procurement by recommending 
followings: 
1. Grain procured under the Decentralized Scheme must be treated as part of the 
Central Pool, with the FCls. in its capacity as buyer of last resort, guaranteeing 
the lifting of any stock in excess of the State's own PDS offtake at a uniform 
MSP-linked acquisition cost. 
2. Based on this guarantee of Central purchase at MSP linked price, there should 
be open-ended bank credit as provided to FCI. 
3. The subsidy provided by the Centre on States lifting from own procurement 
should be at the same rale as provided to States lifting from the FCI, i.e. the 
difference between the State-specific economic cost of the FCI (or the normal 
OMSS price defined earlier) and the Central Issue price. 
4. There should be an adequate system of auditing of actual procurement and 
offtake by State governments. 
5. State agencies may continue to be used by FCI as agents to undertake 
operations in different States, if doing so is likely to improve its own 
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efficiency. Similarly, State governments should be allowed to appoint agents 
for procurement, provided statutory provisions are in place to ensure MSP 
payment by these agents/ 
4.4.4 Policies Regarding Buffer Stocks, Open Market Sales and Foreign Trade: 
The Committee observed that the situation of over stocking is of recent origin and is 
mainly an outcome of a fundamental imbalance between procurement and offtake. 
The Committee observed: 
1. Stocks were below the buffer norm on October 1, 1997, at only 15.3 million 
tones. Subsequently. end-December stocks have been 18.3, 24.4, 31.4, 45.7 
and 58.0 million tones in 1997. 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
2. Annual procurement had averaged 21.9 million tones during 1991-97. Since 
then this has been 22.4, 25.4. 30.0, 34.1 and 39.3 million tones in 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
3. On the other hand, annual PDS offtake, which averaged 17.3 million tones 
during 1991-97, declined steadily from 18.6 million tones in 1998 to 17.7, 
12.8 and 12.7 million tones in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
4. Total offtake from the Central Pool exceeds PDS offtake on account of open 
market sales, exports, and releases for welfare schemes (such as mid-day 
meals and food for work). This was balanced with procurement during 1991-
97, averaging 21.9 million tones annually, but dropped to 19.1 and 17.9 
million tones in calendar 2000 and fiscal 2000-01 respectively. 
5. Larger open sales and exports, reintroduction of food for works, and some 
increase in PDS sales following issue price cuts increased total offtake to 25.4 
million tones in calendar 2001 and further to 30.1 million tones in fiscal 2001-
02. Yet offtake remained well below procurement. Also, PDS offtake was only 
32 and 43 percent of procurement and total offtake respectively in 2001-02, as 
against 79 and 80 percent during 1991-97. 
The subsidy here refers to the difTeiencc between the State-specific economic cost of the FCI 
(tiie normal OMSS price defined later) and the Central Issue price. See, Report of the High 
Level Commillee on Lone term Gram Policy, p 11. 
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The Committee admitted that the imbalance between procurement and offtake 
were mainly Ihe outcome of unrealistic administered prices. The Committee, for 
example noted that: 
I. Production of rice and wheat has fluctuated in the range 148-166 million tones 
since 1996-97, and was 151T million tones in 1996-97 and 153.6 million 
tones in 2000-01. Therefore, increase in production explains only a small part 
of the massive increase in procurement. 
II. As against 26.8 percent increase in the all-commodity WPI since 1996-97, the 
MSP for wheat has increased by 63.1 percent and for paddy by 39.5 percent. 
During this period, wholesale prices for wheat and rice rose less, by 27 and 31 
percent respectively, and international prices actually declined 17 and 22 
percent in rupee terms. Which clearly shows that MSPs were more attractive 
than open market prices and even higher than world prices. This, and repeated 
relaxation of quality norms, has increased procurement. 
III. Besides attractive MSPs and relaxed quaiit>' norms, another reason for high 
procurement has been the withdrawal of private trade from primary grain 
markets. This is because of subsidised Open Market Sales from public stocks. 
Purchase from these sales is now much more profitable than purchase from 
farmers at MSP. The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) introduced 
in 1997 with differential pricing for the poor and non-poor made PDS less 
attractive to those above the poverty line (APL) and, although prices were 
reduced for those below poverty line (BPL), the initial BPL quota was set at 
only 10 kgs per household per month. Because of this, PDS offtake fell from 
19.6 million tones in 1996-97 to an annual average of 17.5 million tones 
during 1997-2000. After the TPDS was made fully targeted in April 2000. The 
BPL quota was doubled and APL subsidies were eliminated by raising APL 
Central Issue Prices (CIP) to economic cost, i.e. more than double pre-TPDS 
levels. As result, BPL offtake increased from 7.0 million tones in 1999-00 to 
9.2 million tones in 2000-01 but this was swamped by a collapse in APL 
offtake from 10.1 to only 2.1 million tones. This increased stocks and, since 
the annual cost of carrying these was larger than the saving on APL subsidy, 
also proved fiscally counterproductive. On the other hand, the distress 
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associated with developments in the cereals sector was more evident among 
poor consumers. This was most clearly the case during 2000-01 when record 
procurement and a sharp drop in PDS offtake coincided with a 5.7 per cent 
drop in cereals production. As a result, the percapita cereals availability in 
2001 fell 8.3 percent from the previous year, much more than production, to 
drop to its lowest since 1980. 
Regarding the open market sales and foreign trade, the Committee called for 
the prices in the Open Market Sale Scheme (OMSS) to be based on the corresponding 
Central Issue Prices (which should normally be the acquisition cost of grain) plus the 
full cost of transport and storage. The Committee also advised that since OMSS 
carries no subsidy and does not distort markets. There should be open-ended sales at 
these prices to stabilize markets. For stabilization, when world prices are very high, 
the committee suggested, OMSS prices to take into account the import prices. In such 
situations, it asked the imports to be subsidized in such a way that this does not reduce 
OMSS prices below their normal levels determined on the basis of economic cost. In 
case of high world prices, domestic price stability should be handled through export 
tariffs rather than a ban on exports. 
Regarding agricultural trade, the Committee recommended that the system of 
exports and imports of food grains should be based on a system of variable tariffs. 
Import tariffs should vary with world prices to ensure that the tariff inclusive (c.i.f) 
cost of imports do not fall below the economic cost. Exports, on the other hand, 
should be entirely on private account. The price for exports should therefore follow 
the same principle as other OMSS sales. Subsidies on this, if any, should, as far as 
possible, be at the point of export rather than at the point of sale from public stocks 
and not be higher than on PDS sales. Subsidies should be given only if domestic 
stocks are sufficiently high and worid prices are less than the domestic OMSS price. 
4.5 Critical Evaluation of India's Food Policy: 
The existing food management system has basically evolved in response to severe 
food shortages and lack of proper distribution. So the prime objective of the food 
'- Ibid. p. 14. 
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management system was to increase the domestic foodgrains production, procurement 
and storage, movement and public distribution and maintenance of the buffer stocks 
of foodgrains. So that any supply shortages are met on time. Several agencies, like 
FCI, CACP, Commodity Boards, Agricultural Marketing Boards and parastatal 
organizations like Seed Corporations, States Trading Corporations and Marketing 
Cooperative etc., were created to implement the food policy objectives. In addition, a 
number of other regulations were enacted to control agricultural marketing, 
particularly of foodgrains. These include. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, 
Essential Commodity Act 1955, the Regulated Market Acts, the prevention of black 
marketing and maintenance of supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980. Besides 
there were number of other restrictions on interstates movement of foodgrains and 
regulations on input markets particularly seeds and pesticides etc. All these 
institutions, rules as well as regulations were devised to deal with the situation of food 
scarcity and inadequate supply of the same. Therefore, as long as India had problem 
of food scarcity and fear of short supply, the food policy did satisfactory if not quite 
well. However, after India achieved near self-sufficiency in foodgrain production, 
particularly during eighties and more specifically after India opted for the structural 
adjustment porgramme in early nineties leading to opening of its trade frontiers, 
India's food management system, which had its background in food scarcity and lack 
of supply, started wavering leading to failure of a number of programmes. Many of its 
policy programmes started with a purpose to reduce food subsidy bill, in fact ended 
up with increasing the same, besides creating some other serious policy implications 
like bulging stocks and reducing beneficiaries. There are now serious question about 
the efficacy of India's present food management system. 
The creation of artificial profitability in the form of price support to farmers 
had a far-reaching impact on India's farm economy. It was on the eve of Green 
Revolution when the government of India decided to create two centralized 
institutions i.e. Food Corporation of India (FCI), which was made responsible for 
procurement, import, distribution, storage and the sale of foodgrain and the 
Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) which was asked to advice government on 
minimum support prices for foodgrains. Through these two institutions the central 
government controlled the economics of foodgrain production and distribution. 
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However, over the years, the profitability of foodgrain production in this centralized, 
subsidised and enclavised form could not be sustained and government started feeling 
the pinch when the subsidies on it became a drain on the government budget. In 1991, 
the World Bank, which had earlier designed these very two centralized institutions, 
called for dismantling the same. The Bank also demanded the restructuring of the 
PDS as well as the removal of the Essential Commodities Act, besides advising the 
government to remove the price and inventory control and deregulate the agricultural 
trade. The underlined aim was corporatisation of agriculture and a shift from a state-
centred to a corporate-centred food system. 
Structural adjustment policies called for withdrawal of food subsidies which 
necessitated radical restructuring of the PDS. The Revamped PDS (RPDS) was the 
answer which sought to target the vulnerable regions better while also aiming to 
reduce the public expenditure. But it did the exact opposite, hunger increased and so 
the government expenditure. Therefore, in 1997, the RPDS was replaced by the 
Targeted PDS (TPDS), which sought to help the poor by first dividing the people into 
below and above poverty line and then focusing its attenfion on the people "below 
poverty line". Initially, it provided 10 kg of grain (wheat/rice) a month to families 
below the poverty line (BPL) at the subsidised prices. On the other hand, it gradually 
withdrew subsidy for families above the poverty line (APL). Later on, food 
entitlements to the targeted families were increased to 35 kgs per family per month 
with even increased subsidy to BPL families, whereas, the prices for APL families 
were linked to the full economic costs of grains. This resulted increase in food prices 
causing lower offtake from the central pool. Thus the objective of reducing food 
subsidy remained illusive as government continued yielding to the pressure exerted by 
strong farm lobbies to raise the minimum support prices. The procurement of 
foodgrains kept growing, whereas narrow targeting kept reducing the offtake. The 
result came in the form of overflowing stocks of foodgrain. 
There were major problems with the TPDS. First, the division of BPL/APL 
categories was arbitrary then further in the BPL beneficiaries were reduced 
artificially. This put a great question mark on the sincerity of the government whether 
it was really serious in targeting the poor or it was merely an exercise to reduce the 
government's fiscal burden. The problem was further compounded when 12 States 
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informed the Supreme Court that they could not identify people in the BPL category. 
Defining the APL category as those earning Rs.l500/month and above barely meets 
the criteria of basic needs. Asking these people to pay the full economic cost, which 
includes corruption, leakages and other incidentals, is no more than an exercise of 
making these people further poor. Obviously the APL families either found the PDS 
beyond their reach or open market as cheaper and more convenient source of their 
food requirements. 
The economic bi-partition of people on hypothetical considerations was 
always susceptible to faults and thus making policy on that basis could not have been 
expected to give most satisfactory result. For example a person earning Rs. 1500 and 
above per month is considered having enough purchasing power therefore qualified to 
be excluded from the PDS whereas the one who is earning Rs 1450 is eligible for the 
subsidised food. One may rightly ask if it is incentive for the BPL or disincentive for 
APL. Earning as a criteria can also be questioned on the basis that the same level of 
earning can have different purchasing power at different place and time. It can have 
different nutritional value as well. Even supposing the criteria to be OK then question 
arises how come 10 kg of grain would be sufficient for a family's whole month's food 
requirements. In fact the TPDS mischievously altered the principle of entitlements 
from a percapita norm to a family norm. Even the revised entitlement of 35 kgs a 
month is much short of the average family requirements. According to the Indian 
Council of Medical Research (ICMR), annual cereal requirement of an individual is 
135 kg/annum, which comes out to be 11.25 kg a month. For an average five-member 
family, the new ration scale, of about 2 kg per person a month, provides less than 18 
percent of the recommended intake. 
The TPDS could also be criticized on the ground that it always had lower 
reach in poorer states like Bihar. Madhya Pradesh and Orrissa where population 
below poverty is around 45 percent, whereas it (TPDS) is stronger in richer states like 
Kerala. Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu etc. Burgeoning food subsidy which 
is often cited as reason for the TPDS is in fact not the amount spend on consumer 
rather a large part of it is actually a producer subsidy, a fact aptly admitted in the 
Report on Food Subsidy of the Expendilurc Reforms Commission. 
' - ^ ^ ^ 
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As noted earlier thai as long as the problem of food scarcity and inadequate 
supply was concerned, the food policy moved satisfactorily ensuring food security for 
the population, protecting the interest of the consumers and restraining the price rise. 
It helped in increasing the foodgrains production with a view to attaining self-
sufficiency and meeting the increasing demand through domestic supply. It also 
succeeded in safeguarding the interest of the consumers by holding adequate stocks of 
foodgrains for meeting year-to-year fluctuation and to bring about relative stability in 
foodgrain prices. Positive results were seen in the form of enhanced physical and 
economic access to food, reduction in inter regional and inter seasonal prices of 
foodgrains and effective tackling of the problem of drought. The instruments used for 
this purpose like minimum support prices, procurement prices, and other input 
incentives were quite helpful in attaining their respective objectives. But the problem 
started when the regulations, policies, acts and organizations that were created for the 
need fulfillment objective continued even after the relative self-sufficiency in 
foodgrains were achieved. For example, the minimum support price operation, which 
was introduced with the sole aim of inducing higher foodgrains production by 
guaranteeing the farmers minimum price of their produce, continued even with much 
vigor when not only the countiy is self sufficient in food production but even the 
country's godowns are bulging with rotten food stuffs. It is observed that during the 
post reform period MSP for wheat, rice, cotton, coarse cereals, pulses and groundnut 
have increased many fold. Moreover, continuous rise in MSPs have directed the 
grains from the market to state godowns. which has unduly increased the open market 
prices of these grains due to lack of supply. This is in conflict with the government's 
objective of providing cheap food to the consumer. 
Procurement is undertaken by the FCl in collaboration with numerous state 
agencies at fixed prices offered by the Government on the recommendation of the 
CACP. With a purpose of increasing the procurement, the commission had a policy of 
offering remunerative prices to producers so that they keep augmenting their 
production by adopting new technologies. Initially the procurement prices were kept 
higher than the minimum support prices but below the market prices. The principal 
objective behind the procurement prices was to procure enough foodgrains for the 
buffer stocks as well as for PDS. However, in eighties the procurement prices were 
79 
sharply raised making the farmers more wiUing to sell their produce to the 
Government rather than in the market, the availabiUty of the foodgrains in the market 
reduced, so that the rise in the prices of foodgrains, which ultimately hurt the poor. 
Moreover, the same prices offered during the entire season increased the 
concentration of the market arrivals within few weeks of the season. This causes 
difficulty for the FCI to handle the foodgrains. Over the years FCI's economic cost 
has increased because of rising procurement and distribution incidentals (economic 
cost = procurement price + procurement incidentals + distribution incidentals). Thus, 
the present high stocks situation has its share in government's mismanaged price 
policy. Selective support prices have distorted the incentives across crops as well as 
states besides having detrimental ecological and environmental effect on the overall 
economy. 
Chapter Five 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME AND FOOD 
SECURITY IN INDIA 
India opted for the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1991 when it faced 
unmanageable fiscal deficit and balance of payment crisis. Since then there has been a 
significant shift in economic policies of the country in the favour of liberalization, 
privatization and globalization. In response to the ensuing economic crises, India, in 
fact, had but little choice to try and adjust to the changed conditions, as India badly 
needed financial assistance from the international financial institutions like the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to qualify for that India had no 
option but to accept the structural adjustment policies. 
Each SAP is designed keeping in view the peculiar condition attached to the 
recipient country, however, the underlined guiding principle and feature of SAP is its 
major emphasis on export promotion so that the country is able to earn enough foreign 
exchange to pay for its maturing foreign liabilities. Other important features of the 
SAP laden economic policies are liberalizing industrial and trade policy, relaxing 
foreign exchange control and reducing licensing requirements. Despite no specific 
mention to agriculture in the new economic policy there were several ways in which 
the agriculture was not going to remain aloof Some of the newly introduced 
economic policies indeed positively affected the agriculture but there were many 
other policy measures that began hurting Indian agriculture and which were too 
crucial for an economy like India to ignore where still about 66 percent of the total 
labor force depends on agriculture for its livelihood. The major impact of SAP guided 
economic policy on Indian agriculture could be seen on agricultural exports, imports, 
investments in new technology, rural infrastructure, pattern of agricultural growth, 
income and employment, agricultural prices, and food security. Export oriented 
agriculture policy was envisaged for leading higher agricultural income and 
employment. However, after o\'er a decade of experience it as been observed India 
did not succeed much in achieving the abo\c stated objectives. On the other hand 
export-oriented policy had many serious implications for country's agriculture sector. 
Amidst these policy changes, establishment of WTO in 1995 further accentuated the 
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concern of Indian agriculture. In particular the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was 
meant to exert a signillcant impact on the Indian agriculture. In this chapter an 
exhaustive attempt is made to analyse the implication of SAP and WTO laden 
economic policy on Indian agriculture in general and issues concerning food security 
of its over 1000 million people in particular. The chapter proceeds under the 
following three broad heads; 
1. Structural Adjustment and Agriculture 
2. Structural Adjustment and Food Security 
3. WTO and Indian Agriculture 
5.1 Structural Adjustment and Agriculture: 
Despite tremendous industrialization in the country during the last fifty years, India 
could still be safely called as an agrarian economy where about 66 percent of the total 
working force is engaged for l;\elihood. After independence, Indian policy makers 
accorded high priority to agriculture, therefore, a concerted and sustained effort was 
made to enhance the agricultural production in the country. To accomplish the goal 
successive governments at the centre took active part in land reforms, improving the 
quality of seed, enhancing the irrigation facilities and making available other inputs at 
highly subsidised prices. 
The advent of the green revolution during the mid sixties occurred at a time 
when the availability and expansion of further land for agriculture had almost reached 
saturation. Since then the agricultural scenario changed from the one of land 
reclamation to the one heavily dependent on modern inputs. Green revolution brought 
a quantitative change in the food and agricultural situation. Cereal production was 
encouraged by covering food crops under High Yielding Varieties (HYVs). Despite 
tremendous achievements, the overall growth of agriculture during the last five 
decades has not been free of ups and downs. The growth was appreciably higher 
during the initial years (up to the mid sixties) then it slowed down during the 
subsequent years and after that it again gathered momentum during the eighties to 
decelerate after the economic reforms. 
82 
5.1.1. Growth and Performance of Agriculture: 
The agriculture sector dominates the hidian economy not only in terms of income but 
more so in terms of employment. There is extra ordinary population pressure on 
Indian agriculture, which is marred with low productivity and income, institutional 
rigidities and inadequate infrastructure. Despite all it provides food and fiber to 
country's huge section of the population and employs over 66 percent of them. It 
contributes close to 30 percent of the gross domestic product and about 20 percent of 
the total foreign export earnings. Because of heavy dependence of its population on 
agriculture India has been trj'ing to achieve self-sufficiency in food crops and reduce 
dependence on import. Concerted efforts, therefore, have been made to strengthen the 
agriculture sector as a result of which agricultural production increased manifold. The 
government of India made strenuous efforts for extensive use of land and water 
resources, significant increase in public investment, research and development 
extension, infrastructure and government support for input subsidies and output 
prices. These efforts led to maintain an upward growth of overall agricultural 
production at the annual average rale of 2.7 percent keeping pace with the growth in 
population. 
During fifties, production of all crops recorded an impressive annual 
compound growth of 3.64 percent, which in sixties declined to 1.44 percent. Next two 
decades, seventies and eighties saw acceleration in growth to 2.01 and 3.19 percent 
respectively. After the economic reforms in 1991 the production substantially 
declined to 1.2 percent. Area under cultivation increased handsomely during fifties by 
2.03 percent per annum; however, after that it managed to grow by 0.52 percent in 
sixties and 0.60 in seventies. In eighties the growth in area further came down to 0.10 
percent, which in the post economic reform period deteriorated to -0.23 percent. The 
Non-foodgrains indeed managed to grow positively during the post reform period 
(0.24 percent) but the decline in area of foodgrains was larger at -0.41 percent. Yield 
on the other hand grew at 1.40 percent per annum in fifties and thereafter declined to 
0.57 percent in sixties. In seventies it managed to grow just above 1 percent. The 
eighties recorded highest achievement in yield when it grew by 2.56 percent per 
annum, which after the post economic reform period slumped to 0.86 percent. 
In the case of foodgrains the post economic reforms period is worst, in case of 
area as well as the production (-0.41 percent and 1.19 respectively). Yield too 
decelerated substantially (1.17 percent) in comparison to the eighties but it managed 
to remain afloat above than the growth achieved in sixties and seventies. Fluctuations 
in area of all crops arc not very perceptible except in the decade of fifties when CV 
was 6.23 percent. Thereafter it remained varying between 2.10 to 2.77 percent. 
Fluctuations in production and yield during the pre economic reform decade are 
recorded higher (11.34 and 8.68) in comparison to the post-economic refonn period 
(6.98 percent & 4.57 percent) (Table 1.1). 
Table: 5.1 Compound Growth Rates of Agricultural Production 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1979-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Food Grains 
Weight (62.92) 
A 
1.96 
(6.16) 
0.55 
(2.37) 
0.44 
(2.52) 
-0.23 
(2.36) 
-0,41 
(2.74) 
P 
3.62 
(13.90) 
1.41 
(10.70) 
1.93 
(10.24) 
2.85 
(10.17) 
1.19 
(6.89) 
Y 
1.60 
(8.30) 
0.66 
(8.06) 
1.07 
(8.04) 
2.74 
(9.87) 
1.17 
(5.51) 
Non Food Crops 
Weight (37.08) 
A 
2.30 
(8.47) 
0.42 
(2.76) 
1.10 
(3.25) 
1.12 
(6.05) 
0.24 
(4.01) 
P 
3.66 
(15.74) 
1.49 
(12.40) 
2.17 
(12.01) 
3.77 
(11.23) 
1.21 
(8.03) 
Y 
0.99 
(7.45) 
0.41 
(7.55) 
1.00 
(4.96) 
2.31 
(4.74) 
0.47 
(4.15) 
All Principal Crops 
A 
2.03 
(6.23) 
0.52 
(2.10) 
0.60 
(2.77) 
0.10 
(2.35) 
-0.23 
(2.54) 
P 
3.64 
(11.49) 
1.44 
(8.47) 
2.01 
(9.27) 
3.19 
(11.34) 
1.20 
(6.98) 
Y 
1.40 
(5.91) 
0.57 
(6.65) 
1.04 
(6.13) 
2.56 
(8.68) 
0.86 
(4.57) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance: 2003. Directorate of Econoinics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent respective CV. 
Heavy input subsidies on fertilizers, power, irrigation and credit along with 
High Yield Varieties (HYVs) seeds played an important role in accelerating the 
agricultural growth during 1980s. However, during the post reform period the 
performance of Indian agriculture has deteriorated to a much extent, which could be 
deduced from the fact that the average annua! growth in all crops was 4.07 percent 
during 1981-91 which in the post economic reform period declined to 0.60 percent. 
Foodgrains and Non-foodgrains also performed badly in the post economic reform 
period. Average production of foodgrains declined to 0.43 percent in the post 
economic reform period from the 3.56 percent in the previous decade. Likewise 
average production of non-foodgrains also declined substantially from 5.11 percent in 
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eighties to 0.94 percent after tlial (Table 5.2). One of the reasons for this decline 
during post reform decade was attributed to the decline in production of coarse cereals 
as well as lack of growth in pulses production, as coarse cereals and pulses are grown 
in rainfed areas where technological developments remained very poor. 
Table: 5.2 Average Annual Growth Rates of Index of Agricultural Production 
(Percent) 
Year 
1980-1981 
1981-1982 
1983-1984 
1984-1985 
1985-1986 
1986-1987 
1987-1988 
1988-1989 
1989-1990 
1990-1991 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003"'' 
AH Crops 
7.00 
-4.00 
13.20 
-0.60 
1.40 
-3.60 
0.10 
21.4 
2.10 
3.80 
-2.00 
4.20 
3.80 
4.90 
-2.60 
9.30 
-5.90 
7.70 
-0.70 
-6.30 
7.20 
-12.50 
Foodgrains 
2.60 
-3.60 
18.40 
-4.30 
5.00 
-5.30 
-2.80 
21.70 
0.70 
3.30 
-4.20 
4.70 
4.20 
3.70 
-6.20 
10.10 
-3.20 
6.10 
2.70 
-6.70 
8.50 
-14 60 
Non-Foodgrains 
14.80 
-4.70 
4.60 
6.40 
-4.70 
-0.40 
5.20 
21.00 
4.50 
4.40 
1.60 
3.30 
3.40 
6.70 
2,50 
8.30 
-9.60 
10.20 
-5.60 
-5.70 
5.30 
-9.20 
Averages 
1981-1991 
1992-2003 
4.07 
0.60 
3.56 
0.43 
5.11 
0.94 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
The growth rate of agricultural output had exceeded the population growth 
rale of 2.1 percent per annum during the period 1951 - 1991. But over the nineties, the 
growth rate of foodgrain production dropped to 1.66 percent per annum which was 
lower than the growth in population of 1.9 percent during the same period. During 
eighties the agricultural production responded positively with the time, and remained 
high whereas, after the structural adjustment programme the growth was not as 
speculating despite an all time bumper crop in 1998-99 and good favorable monsoon 
for o\er a decade in a row. fhe increase in production after the SAP has not matched 
the previous decade mainly owing to decline in the productivity, which is not only 
true for foodgrains but all crops taken together. 
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5.1.1.1 Foodgrains: 
India is nov/ self sufficient in foodgrains. During the past over five decades 
foodgrains output recorded a four-fold rise from 50.8 million tones in 1950-51 to 
211.17 million tones in 2001-2002 (Table 5.3). Average annual growth rate of 
foodgrain production was highest in fifties (5.08 percent) followed by 4.96 percent in 
eighties. During sixties and sevenfies it grew by 3.25 percent and 1.58 percent 
respectively. However, the worst performance of foodgrains is witnessed after the 
structural adjustment programme when the average annual growth in foodgrains 
production was recorded only 0.73 percent. 
Table 5.3 Production of Major Agricultural Commodities in India 
{Million Tones) 
Year 
1950-51 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03"'' 
Source: Ag 
Wheat 
6.46 
11.00 
23.83 
36.31 
37.45 
42.79 
45.48 
44.07 
47.05 
44.32 
46.17 
54.11 
49.85 
55.14 
55.69 
57.21 
59.84 
65.77 
62.10 
69.35 
66.35 
71.29 
76.37 
69.68 
71.81 
69.32 
Ticuhural 
Rice 
20.58 
34.58 
42.22 
53.63 
53.25 
47.12 
60.10 
58.34 
63.83 
60.56 
56.86 
70.49 
73.57 
74.29 
74.68 
72.86 
80.30 
81.81 
76.98 
81.74 
82.53 
86.08 
89.68 
84.98 
93.08 
75.72 
Statistics c 
Coarse Cereals 
15.38 
23.74 
30.55 
29.02 
31.09 
27.75 
33.90 
31.17 
26.20 
26.83 
26.36 
31.47 
34.76 
32.70 
25.99 
36.59 
30.82 
29.88 
29.03 
34.10 
30.40 
31.34 
31.08 
33.94 
26.22 
/ a Glance 2003 
Total Cereals 
42.42 
69.32 
96.60 
118.96 
121.79 
117.66 
139.48 
133.58 
137.08 
131.71 
129.39 
156.07 
158.18 
162.13 
156.36 
166.66 
170.96 
177.46 
168.11 
185.19 
179.28 
188.71 
196.38 
185.74 
198.83 
171.26 
, Directorate o 
Pulses 
8.41 
12.70 
11.82 
10.63 
11.51 
11.86 
12.89 
11.96 
13.36 
11.71 
10.96 
13.85 
12.86 
14.26 
12.02 
12.82 
13.30 
14.04 
12.31 
14.24 
12.98 
14.91 
13.42 
11.08 
13.19 
11.31 
' Economics 
Total Food 
Grains 
50.83 
82.02 
108.42 
129.59 
133.30 
129.52 
152.37 
145.54 
150.44 
143.42 
140.35 
169.92 
171.04 
176.39 
168.38 
179.48 
184.26 
191.50 
180.42 
199.43 
192.26 
203.62 
209.80 
196,82 
212.02 
182.57 
and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
86 
Taking into account the annual compound growth we find that despite 
favorable terms of trade for agriculture and normal behavior of monsoon, the growth 
of faod production has been lackluster after the economic reforms. The compound 
growth rate of foodgrain production during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was 4.25, 
1.85 and 2.07 percent respectively. In eighties it rose to 2.73 percent but after the 
economic reforms it fell down to merely 1.27 percent (Table 5.4). It is notable that the 
growth of foodgrain production during 1990s has been close to the growth in 
population which implied a stagnant percapita production. 
Tabic: 5.4 Compound Growth Rate of Foodgrains 
(Percent/ann um) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
1.94 
(6.16) 
0.52 
(2.37) 
0.46 
(2.52) 
-0.23 
(2.36) 
-0.41 
(2.73) 
Production 
4.25 
(13.90) 
1.85 
(10.70) 
2.07 
(10.24) 
2.73 
n o 17^  
1.27 
(7.02) 
Yield 
2.26 
(8.30) 
1.32 
(8.47) 
1.60 
(8.04) 
2.97 
(9.87) 
1.69 
(7.19) 
Source: Agricultural Slatislics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis show Coefficient of Variance. 
Aggregate foodgrain production increased by about 26 million tones since 
1990-91 as against 52 million tones in the eighties. Among foodgrain group, cereals 
performed better than pulses. Cereal sector was specializing in favor of rice and wheat 
due to availability of high yielding varieties seeds. These replaced sorghum, millets 
and barley. Though the area under foodgrains has been continuously declining but it 
has most severely been affected during the post economic reform period. The figures 
of pre and post reform period show negative growth in the area of foodgrains at -0.23 
percent in eighties which further aggravated in nineties onwards at -0.41 percent. The 
performance of yield also deteriorated after the economic reforms from 2.97 percent 
in eighties to 1.69 percent in the post reform period. One of the most important reason 
attributed to hindering the foodgrain performance after the economic reforms has 
been severe decline in the yield mainly cau.scd by falling use of agricultural inputs due 
to increased prices of the same and decline in public investment in agriculture. For 
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example, the growth in fertilizer use was 7.8 percent in the 1980s which declined to 
4.3 percent in the 1990s.' The coefficient of variance for foodgrain production was 
10.17 in eighties as compared to 6.94 percent in nineties. But despite more stability 
and consistency in production of foodgrain in nineties onwards the overall growth was 
lower in the decade as compared to the eighties. 
Table: 5.5 Fluctuations in Foodgrain Production and Area 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Production 
(Million Tones) 
129.59 
133.30 
129.52 
152.37 
145.54 
150.44 
143.42 
140.35 
169.92 
171.04 
176.39 
168.38 
179.48 
184.26 
191.50 
180.42 
199.43 
192.26 
203.62 
209.80 
196.81 
212.03 
182.57 
Fluctuation 
(Percent) 
2.86 
-2.84 
17.64 
-4.48 
3.37 
-4.67 
-2.14 
21.07 
0.66 
3.13 
-4.54 
6.59 
2.66 
3.93 
-5.79 
10.54 
-3.60 
5.91 
3.04 
-6.19 
7.73 
-13.89 
Area 
(Million Hectares) 
126.67 
129.14 
125.10 
131.16 
126.67 
128.02 
127.20 
119.69 
127.67 
126.77 
127.84 
121.87 
123.15 
122.75 
123.86 
121.01 
123.58 
123.85 
125.17 
123.10 
121.05 
121.9! 
113.13 
Fluctuation 
(Percent) 
1.95 
-3.13 
4.84 
-3.42 
1.07 
-0.64 
-5.90 
6.67 
-0.70 
0.84 
-4.67 
1.05 
-0.32 
0.90 
-2.30 
2.12 
0.22 
1.07 
-1.65 
-1.67 
0.71 
-7.20 
Source: Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003. Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Area under cultivation seems to be an important factor responsible for 
fluctuations in the foodgrains production but other factors have equally been 
important. Table 5.5 shows fluctuations in production and area devoted to foodgrains 
during pre and post economic reform period. It appears that fluctuations in production 
India Development Report 1997, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, p. 
49. 
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are primarily caused by the fluctuations in the area. For example, 1982-83 showed 
decline in production by 2.84 percent and in area by 3.13 percent. Similarly 
production declined by 4.48 percent and the area declined by 3.42 percent in 1984-85. 
However, in the year 1986-87 the decline in area was only 0.64 percent but the 
decline in production was as high as 4.67 percent. During nineties also production 
declined by 4.54 percent and the area declined by 4.67 percent in 1991-92. Further in 
1995-96 production declined by 5.79 percent while the decline in the area was only 
2.30 percent. In the year 1997-98 production declined to 3.60 percent without any 
decline in the area. In 1999-2000 area declined to 1.65 percent but production in the 
same year still managed to go up by 3.04 percent. In 2000-01 there is a huge gap in 
the decline in area and production, the area decline in the year was only 1.67 percent 
but the decline in production was staggering at 6.19 percent. But the most severe 
setback to production as well as area came in the year 2002-03 when the decline in the 
production was recorded at 13.8 percent, in the same year decline in area was also 
recorded highest at 7.20 percent. 
On the whole, achievements in the production of foodgrain, which has been 
quite displaying in 1980s, could not sustain in the post economic reforms period 
despite the fact that the country has been exporting foodgrains since 1995 and 
government's stocks of the same has also been rising considerably. But there are other 
factors responsible for auguring the exports as well as the higher government stocks. 
Yield of various crops has constantly risen since independence, however, after the 
structural adjustment programme moribund growth in yield has been a major cause of 
concern. 
5.1.1.1.1 Wheat: 
Wheat is one of the most important foodgrain crops in India. Its production has 
remarkably improved since 1950-51 and especially after the advent of green 
rcN'olution in mid sixties it has maintained an upward trend in production. 
I'ablc 5.6 gives annual compound growth in area, production and yield of 
wheat. The area growth of wheat during fifties was 4.05 percent, which declined to 
2.25 percent during sixties and thereafter marginally improved to 2.39 percent during 
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seventies. Comparing the pre and post periods of SAP we find tliat area under wheat 
marginally grew by 0.46 percent in eighties whereas the growth of the same in the 
post reform period slightly improved to 0.80 percent. On the production front fifties 
and sixties recorded very high growth of 5.17 and 6.82 percent respectively. However, 
thereafter production growth declined to 4.31 percent in seventies and further to 3.58 
percent in eighties. The decline continued during 1990s & 2000s at 2.44 percent. 
Yield of wheat has not been very high except in sixties at 4.46 percent and eighties 
3.10 percent. In other decades it just hovered around 1-2 percent, for example, 1.08 
percent in fifties; 1.87 percent in seventies and 1.63 percent in nineties. 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Table: 5.6 Compound Growth Rate of Wheat 
(Percent/annvm) 
Area 
4.05 
(13.13) 
2.25 
(9.28) 
2.39 
(8.26) 
0.46 
(3.29) 
0.80 
(4.78) 
Production 
5.17 
(16.65) 
6.82 
(27.84) 
4.31 
(15.68) 
3.58 
(11.79) 
2.44 
(10.40) 
Yield 
1.08 
(7.45) 
4.46 
(17.54) 
1.87 
(8.09) 
3.10 
(9.89) 
1.63 
(6.85) 
Source: Agricullural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Thus, it could be observed from the above analysis that after the exemplary 
performance of wheat since the green revolution in mid sixties its performance has 
declined thereafter. The lower growth in the post reform period compared to the pre 
reform period is mainly due to decline in the productivity caused by increased prices 
of inputs like that of fertilizers and reduced subsidies after the new economic reforms. 
5.1.1.1.2 Rice: 
Rice is the most important food item in the country consumed by a large majority of 
the people. Along with wheat it constitutes major component of the foodgrain 
production. Over the years, the area share of rice under total foodgrain has 
consistently risen from about 30 percent in seventies to above 36 percent in 1999-
2000. In production too rice has achieved tremendously from mere 20.58 million 
90 
tones in 1950-51 to over 90 million tones by 2001-2002. However, the current year 
figure shows a steep decline in the production of rice at 75 million tones only. In the 
pre reform decade the average growth in area, production and yield of rice stood at 
0.51, 6.5 and 5.45 percent respectively, which after the economic reforms (1990-
2002) has declined substantially. The average grovv4h in area was 0.35 percent while 
the same for production was 1.87 percent and the yield also decelerated to 1.48 
percent from high 5.45 percent. 
Analyzing the compound growth we find that the growth in area declined from 
1.26 percent in fifties to 0.83 in sixties. Thereafter it marginally improved to 0.88 
percent in seventies. During the pre-economic reform decade the growth in area was 
only 0.41 percent which deteriorated further after the economic reforms to 0.25 
percent. In production, the fifties saw higher growth of 4.46 percent as against 1.19 
percent in sixties and 1.90 percent in seventies. Eighties registered a substantial 
growth of 3.62 percent which after the economic reforms sharply declined to 1.29 
percent. In yield also the highest growth was recorded in fifties at 3.15 percent 
thereafter it fell down to 0.36 percent in sixties. In seventies it improved to cross over 
1 percent. In eighties the yield improved substantially at 3.19 percent but in the post 
reform period this also fell down to 1.04 percent (Table 5.7). 
Tabic: 5.7 Compound Growth Rate of Rice 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1979-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
1.26 
(4.16) 
0.83 
(2.96) 
0.88 
(3.20) 
0.41 
(3.06) 
0.25 
(3.12) 
Production 
4.46 
(14.65) 
1.19 
(10.11) 
1.90 
(11.55) 
3.62 
(13.35) 
1.29 
(7.65) 
Yield 
3.15 
(11.31) 
0.36 
(8,36) 
1.01 
(8.70) 
3.19 
(11.0) 
1.04 
(5.30) 
Source: Agricul/ural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government oflndia, New Delhi. 
Here too the decline in yield could mainly be attributed to the lack of 
investment in agriculture in the post economic reform period which could be observed 
from the fact that the share of irrigation and agriculture in plan otitlays has 
substantially reduced in the post reform period over the eighties. 
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5.1.1.1.3 Coarse Cereals: 
The output of coarse cereals has more than doubled during the last fifty years from 
15.38 million tones in 1950-51 to over 33 million tones in 2001-2002. In the current 
year the production of coarse cereals has declined by about 6 million tones. In recent 
years, output of coarse cereal has not improved due to expansion in the area but due to 
improvement in the yield. In fact the combined area under jowar, bajra, and maize has 
declined from 28.6 percent in 1950-51 to 22 percent in 2000-01. The main reasons for 
this decline is attributed to lower profit, lower value status and restricted demand for 
consumption as it is largely consumed by very poor people. Lower demand of coarse 
cereals had its impact on yield enhancing techniques. 
Table: 5.8 Compound Growth Rate of Coarse Cereals 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-59-60 
1960-61-69-70 
1970-71-1979-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-05 
Area 
1.32 
(5.78) 
0.66 
(2.76) 
-0.87 
(3.85) 
-i.34 
(4.72) 
-1.92 
(8.16) 
Production 
3.66 
(13.94) 
1.51 
(8.46) 
1.11 
(9.49) 
0.35 
(10.36) 
-0.30 
(9.62) 
Yield 
2.33 
(9.00) 
0.91 
(6.44) 
2.00 
(9.32) 
1.71 
(10.96) 
1.66 
(9.51) 
Source: Agricultural Slatislics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Looking at the compound growth of coarse cereals in table 5.8 we notice that 
the period of post economic reforms has been the worst in terms of area growth as 
well as in production. Both became negative during the nineties to -1.92 percent and 
-0.30 percent respectively. However, the yield during the post reform was marginally 
lower at 1.66 percent than the previous decade at 1.71 percent. Area growth of coarse 
cereals has not been encouraging except during fifties when it registered the growth of 
1.32 percent after that the area expansion declined to 0.66 percent in sixties. From 
seventies onwards it is constantly experiencing higher negative growth, -0.87 percent 
in seventies, -1.34 percent in eighties and -1.92 after the economic reforms. 
Production too grew highest during fifties at 3.66 percent and since then its gro^vth is 
constantly declining, 1.51 percent in sixties, 1.11 percent in seventies and 0.35 
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percent in eighties. In the post reform, coarse cereals production growth became 
negative. Similar is the case in yield too. The highest growth was achieved in fifties at 
2.33 percent and thereafter it declined to 0.91 percent in sixties then improved to 2.0 
percent in seventies then again fell down to 1.71 percent in eighties and fiirther 1.66 
percent in the post reform period. 
It is notable that the influence of negative growth in area under coarse grains 
during 1980s and 1990s was such that despite having positive increase in wheat and 
rice area during the 1990s there had been a negative growth in the area of total cereals 
during 1980s and 1990s. Share of coarse cereal in foodgrain has been declining 
throughout the previous three decades. The area share in total foodgrain stood 36.9 
percent in seventies which declined to 32 percent in eighties and then to 28 percent in 
nineties. In the year 1999-2000 its share had further declined to about 23 percent. In 
recent years the demand for coarse cereals has been increasing to feed the animals, 
although, increasing demand for cereals for non-human consumption has not been 
sufficient enough to boost its demand significantly. 
5.1,1.1.4 Pulses: 
Pulses are relatively cheap source of protein. Despite enhancement in the 
technological advancement and increasing other facilities the growth in pulses 
production has not kept pace with the population growth, resulting an overall decline 
in the percapita availability and higher prices for pulses. The percapita net availability 
of pulses has reduced to almost half from about 60.7 gms/day in 1950-51 to 35 
gms/day in 2002, as against the minimum requirement of 43 gms/day. Among all 
foodgrains, performance of pulses is the most dismal. In the last three decades, there 
has been a progressive decline in the pulse consumption specially among the poorer 
segment of the population. Its area and production remained static during the last 
three decades. The production of pulses showed some better performance in the 
eighties compared to other decades but again it reversed during the post economic 
reform period. 
Table 5.9 shows that compound growth rate of area was not satisfactory 
during eighties (-0.10 percent) and nineties onwards (-0.87 percent). The share of 
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pulses in the tolal foodgrain production was 16.55 percent in 1950-51, which came 
down to 6.53 percent by 2001. Share of pulses in total area under foodgrain has 
almost been constant during the last three decades, rather of late it has actually 
declined. 
Table: 5.9 Compound Growth Rate of Pulses 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
J. 1 J 
(9.65) 
-1.32 
(4.68) 
0.59 
(4.46) 
-0.10 
(3.69) 
-0.87 
(5.00) 
Production 
4.10 
(14.80) 
-1.29 
(12.28) 
-0.39 
(12.25) 
1.49 
(8.61) 
-0.72 
(8.87) 
Yield 
0.94 
(7.09) 
0.03 
(11.44) 
-0.98 
(9.78) 
1.59 
(6.91) 
0.16 
(6.47) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Compound growth table further makes the point that the best decade for pulses 
in terms of grov/th in area and productions was fifties when the area and production 
growth was recorded at 3.13 and 4.10 percent respectively. Yield in fifties was not 
very smart but it still managed to achieve about 1.0 percent growth. In sixties, 
however, the growth in area and production turned negative in almost identical terms 
-1.32 and -1.29 percent respectively, the yield too remained subservient and barely 
managed to remain positive at 0.03 percent. In seventies area growth turned positive 
at 0.59 percent but yield growth became negative at -0.98 percent. Owing to this 
production also remained negative at -0.39 percent. The eighties saw marginal 
decline in the area by -0.10 percent, however, the production and yield did achieve 
some consolation by growing at 1.49 and 1.59 percent respectively. The period of post 
economic reforms performed poorly in terms of growth in area and production, yield 
however managed to remain at positive figure (0.16 percent). The area growth figures 
for nineties stood at -0.87 percent, whereas the gro\\^h in production was recorded at 
-0.72 percent. Average productivity of pulses was low because of lack of knowledge 
on crop management, technological constraints and low fertilizer use. 
94 
5.1.1.2 Non-foodgrains: 
After great improvements in foodgrain production particularly wheat and rice India 
turned towards commercial crop production in the eighties. SAP further enforced this 
pattern of commercialization of agriculture in the nineties. Therefore, the area under 
non-foodgrain crops increased steadily over the years. Among the non-foodgrain 
crops particularly sugarcane and cotton exhibited quite high growth in their area after 
the SAP. 
Table 5.10 shows a continuous rise in the output of non-foodgrains from 45.8 
in 1950-51 to 67.4 in 1960-61 and further to 82.6 in 1970-71. In eighties it started 
with a production of 97.4 and after touching the 200 mark in the 1996-97 and 1998-99 
reached to 170.4 by 2002-03. In spite of the fluctuations, non-foodgrains production 
increased substantially but the growth was slow after the economic reforms than the 
eighties. The trend shows that the non-foodgrain crops have gradually replaced 
foodgrain crops, with the latter going up from about 30 percent of the cultivated area 
in 1981-82 to 35 percent in 1998-99. but in value terms it went up significantly from 
about 52 percent to 60 percent in the respective periods. The compound growth rate of 
non-foodgrain production was 3.77 percent in the eighties that came down to 1.21 
percent in the post reform period (Table 5.1). Area growth in non-foodgrain after the 
reform declined to 0.24 percent compared with 1.12 percent during eighties. 
However, the worst performer has been the yield which declined to 0.47 percent in the 
post economic reform period from the 2.31 percent in eighties. The post reform period 
showed more consistency than the preceding decade. 
Oil seeds, sugarcane and cotton too witnessed spiral rise in their production 
except few leaps and bounds. For example, oil seeds production almost doubled 
during 1950-51 to 1970-71 from 5.16 million tones to 9.63 million tones. Further, its 
production increased from 9.37 million tones in 1980-81 to 16.92 million tones at the 
end of the decade. And by the end of nineties it had reached the figure of 20.72 
million tones. In comparison lo eighties the production of oil seeds has been quite 
remarkable after the economic reforms except in the year 2002-03 when it recorded 
lowest production of the decade at 15.75 million tones. Sugarcane production also 
doubled during the first two decades from mere 57.05 million tones in 1950-51 to 
126.37 million tones in 1970-71. Comparing the pre and post-reform periods. 
95 
sugarcane performance appears quite similar, though, in recent years, except the 
current one, sugarcane production has been more consistent. Cotton production on the 
other hand increased little slowly during fifties and seventies. A major breakthrough 
to cotton came in 1989-90 when it recorded the highest production (11.42 million 
bales). During nineties its production has been impressive except the current year 
when its production was only 9.3 million bales. 
Table; 5.10 Production of Major Non-foodgrains 
Year 
1950-51 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 -
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03** 
Oil Seeds# (Nine Major) 
5.16 
6.98 
9.63 
9.37 
12.08 
10.00 
12.69 
12.95 
10.83 
11.27 
12.65 
18.03 
16.92 
18.61 
18.6 
20.11 
21.5 
21.34 
22.1! 
24.38 
21.32 
24.75 
20,72 
18.44 
20.80 
15.75 
Sugarcane 
57.05 
110.00 
126.37 
154.25 
186.36 
189.51 
174.08 
170.32 
170.65 
186.09 
196.74 
203.04 
225.57 
241.05 
254.00 
228.03 
229.66 
275.54 
281.10 
277.56 
279.54 
288.72 
299.32 
295.96 
300.10 
278.56 
Cotton@ 
3.04 
5.60 
4.76 
7.01 
7.88 
7.53 
6.39 
8.51 
8.73 
6.91 
6.38 
8.74 
11.42 
9.84 
9.71 
11.4 
10.74 
11.89 
12.86 
14.23 
10.85 
12.29 
11.53 
9.52 
10.09 
9.31 
(Million Tones) 
Non-foodgrains* 
45.8 
67.4 
82.6 
97.4 
111.8 
106.6 
111.5 
118.6 
113.0 
112.5 
118.3 
143.2 
149.7 
156.3 
158.8 
164 
169.5 
180.9 
185.5 
200.9 
181.6 
200.2 
189.00 
178.20 
187.70 
170.40 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Notes: *(Weight 37.08), (Base; Trienniinn Ending 1981-82 = 100). ** Advance Estimate as 
on 01.07-2003. #Data of Oil Seeds for 1950-51 to 1960-61 relate to total of five 
major oil seeds viz. groundnut, castorseed, sesamum, rapeseed & mustered and 
linseed and thereafter four more oil seeds viz. Nigerseed, Safflower, Soyabeen and 
Sunflower included. @ Production of coUon- Million Bales of 170 kgs each. 
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5.1.1.2.1 Oil Seeds: 
India is one of the largest producers of oilseeds in the world. There is many fold 
increase in its production since independence. The period since mid eighties has seen 
a marked shift in favor of oilseeds as the pressure of edible oil imports forced a 
conscious decision on the part of the government to target self-sufficiency in edible 
oils. A 'technology mission' on oilseeds was launched during the mid eighties, which 
resulted in a significant increase in the area under oilseeds. Domestic market prices of 
oilseeds were substantially pushed up to provide incentives to the farmers. This 
resulted in near self-sufficiency in edible oils by 1992-93. About 7 million hectares of 
additional area came under oilseeds, the shift was largely from coarse cereal but in 
some pockets even pulses gave way to oilseeds. Area under oilseeds increased 
rapidly from 19 million hectares in 1985-86 to 26.2 million hectares in 1998-99. Since 
then the area under oilseeds has been constantly falling. In 1999- 2000 the area under 
oilseeds fell to 24.28 million hectares, which in the current year further declined to 
21.50 million hectares. 
Table: 5.11 Compound Growth Rate of Oil Seeds 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
2.50 
(8.24) 
0.40 
(3.56) 
0.40 
(3.13) 
2.44 
(8.74) 
-1.08 
(6.69) 
Production 
4.10 
(13.89) 
0.29 
(9.87) 
0.74 
(10.44) 
5.45 
(22.09) 
-0.35 
(11.87) 
Yield 
1.56 
(8.26) 
-0.12 
(8.95) 
0.33 
(8.70) 
2.95 
(13.74) 
0.74 
(8.39) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Table 5.11 gives the compound growth rates of oil seeds. A look at the table 
reveals that during eighties oil seeds area has substantially increased to 2.44 percent 
compared to 0.40 in seventies. But in the post reform period the area growth fell 
negative (-1.08). Production was affected due to declining growth in area and thus fell 
Gulati, Asliok and Timkelley, Trade Liberalization and Indian Agncitltiire. New Delhi, 1999, p 
16 
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to -0.35 percent in the post reform period as against 5.45 percent in the eighties. 
Similarly, yield loo has badly been affected in the post reform period as the growth in 
yield declined to 0.74 percent from 2.95 percent in the eighties. 
Thus it is observed that the decade of pre economic reform was much better 
for oils seeds than the post economic reform period on all the parameters. However, it 
is noticeable that fluctuations in the area, production as well as in the yield were much 
higher during eighties as compared to the post reform period. Another notable aspect 
is that despite substantial increase in the production of oil seeds, India's consumption 
requirements are still unfulfilled from the domestic supply, therefore, imports are 
inevitable to fill the gap. Moreover, after the structural adjustment and WTO 
agreement India's obligation to open its shore for agricultural imports has deteriorated 
the prospects for domestic producers, which can be deduced from the fact that the 
share of edible oil in total agricultural imports which was around 26 percent in the 
March 1991 rose up to over 51 percent of at the end of March 2003. 
5.1.1.2.2 Sugarcane: 
Sugarcane production increased from 57.2 in 1950-51 to over 300 million tons in 
2001-02 (Table 5.10). The increase was remarkable during eighties and nineties. 
Beginning at 154.25 million tones in 1980-81 its production at the end of 1989-90 had 
reached to 225.57 million tones. During nineties too sugarcane production recorded 
impressive growth from 241.05 million tones in 1991-92 to about 300 million tones 
by 2001-02. This however, substantially reduced in the current year to 278 million 
tones. 
The annual compound growth (Table 5.12) of sugarcane production is also 
quite impressive. Comparing pre and post economic reforms periods, we find that 
only area growth was better in the post reform period from 1.46 percent in eighties to 
1.62 percent. Whereas in production and yield, the post reform period could not match 
the previous decade as in the case of many other crops. Production growth in the post 
reform period declined to 2.01 percent from 2.71 percent in the eighties. Similarly, 
yield also registered a declining growth in the post reform period from 1.23 percent in 
eighties to 0.38 percent in the post reform. However, taking together, it can be said 
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that the overall position of sugarcane has been quite promising for the last two 
decades. Although, the performance during post economic reforms period had shown 
some slackening. 
Tabic: 5.12 Compound Growth Rate of Sugarcane 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
2.58 
(12.39) 
0.64 
(10.01) 
1.90 
(9.09) 
1.46 
(7.84) 
1.62 
(7.52) 
Production 
4.35 
(16.69) 
1.82 
(13.77) 
2.56 
(12.88) 
2.71 
(O.U) 
2.01 
(9.28) 
Yield 
1.72 
(7.48) 
0.73 
(7.61) 
0.64 
(5.02) 
1.23 
(4.69) 
0.38 
(3.68) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
5.1.1.2.3 Cotton: 
Cotton is a highly sensitive crop. Cotton production increased from 3.04 million bales 
in 1950-51 to 12.86 million bales (highest) in 1995-96. Thereafter it continued 
declining and the current year figure shows the production of only 9.31 million bales 
(Table 5.10). Area under cotton rose from 5.9 million hectares in 1950-51 to 9.3 
million hectares in 1998-99 but fell to 7.48 million hectares in 2002-03. During the 
period of nineties area under cotton cultivation increased by 20 percent. 
Supplemented by other positive factors like the use of improved varieties and 
cultivation practices, the cotton output growth remained strong. 
However, it is unfortunate that despite increase in the area, production and 
yield have not been consistent after the economic reforms. Table (5.13) shows that 
area groMh after the economic reforms was impressive (1.23 percent) as against 
negative growth of area in eighties (-1.26 percent). Notwithstanding this, the 
production growth was negative in the post economic reform period (-0.41 percent) in 
comparison to the eighties (2.80). Similarly, yield too drastically declined during the 
post reform period from 4.10 percent in eighties to -1.61 percent. However, it is not 
to forget that cotton production was severely impaired during nineties due to severe 
disease problems in mid nineties and excessive rains causing heavy damage to the 
production in 1998-99 in Punjab. 
Table: 5.13 Compound Growth Rate of Cotton 
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(Percenl/annum) 
Year 
1950-51-1959-60 
1960-61-1969-70 
1970-71-1978-80 
1980-81-1989-90 
1990-91-2002-03 
Area 
3.04 
(10.92) 
-0.13 
(3.21) 
0.42 
(4 78) 
-1.26 
(6.39) 
1.23 
(9.21) 
Production 
4.30 
(16.78) 
0.30 
(6.97) 
3.68 
(15.24) 
2.80 
(19.05) 
-0.41 
(13.17) 
Yield 
1.23 
(8.79) 
0.44 
(6.79) 
3.30 
(12.67) 
4.10 
(17.77) 
-1.61 
(10.97) 
Source: Agricultural Stalislics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Thus, among the commercial crops, cotton which is considered to be more 
price sensitive and can bring improvements in the foreign exchange position, could 
not perform as expected after the economic reforms. This is despite the fact that 
govermiient invested heavily on trials to increase the cotton production. 
5.1.2 Agriculture Resources and Technology: 
hidia has made considerable progress in agricultural development and technology and 
now it is a leading producer of many crops including rice, wheat, coarse grain, pulses, 
peanuts, and cotton. However, despite significant progress, particularly in wheat, rice, 
and cotton, average crop yield still remains very low by world standards and in many 
regions even below the potentials defined the by existing teclinology. Productivity 
gains have been concentrated mainly in crops and regions where surface irrigation is 
available or groundwater irrigation is feasible. Low productivity in crops primarily 
grown on rain fed land, including coarse grains, pulses, and oilseeds, remains a 
chronic problem. 
Area and yield developments are closely linked to public and private 
investment in the sector, as well as progress in improving the water use efficiency of 
e.xisting systems. Irrigation, stemming from large public outlays for surface systems 
and strong growth in private investment in groundwater irrigation, has probably been 
the key factor in yield growth, particularly for wheat, rice, cotton, and other crops for 
which high-yielding varieties are available. Public investments in research and 
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extension have also been important components of gains in agricultural productivity. 
Outlays on research are reportedly declining, threatened by pressures on the fiscal 
deficit. Crop yields are continue to rise, but at a slower pace than in the recent past. 
5.1.2.1 Capital Formation in Agriculture: 
.Judicious use of natural resources for sustainable production of agriculture, adoption 
of advanced technology and development of infrastructure for facilitating all 
agricultural activities is inevitable for ensuring food security in the broader sense. 
Capital formation consists of additions, less disposals, to fixed assets and changes in 
inventories. It is one of the basic factors for increasing production, which becomes all 
the more important to keep pace with the increase in population against the odds of 
the vagaries of monsoon. Massive investment in irrigation, rural infrastructure and 
institutions, research and extension has had a big role in the country's attaining self-
sufficiency in food production. However, in the last two decades it is found that 
public investment in agriculture has been on declining trend. This naturally has had an 
adverse impact on agricultural growth, productivity, rural employment and the 
poverty. 
Total capital formation in agriculture grew at accelerated rates from the 1950s 
to the 1980s at 3 percent per year during the 1950s and over 6 percent a year in the 
following two decades, initially the acceleration was largely attributable to spurt in 
public sector capital formation which grew at 5 percent a year during the 1960s and 
the first half of the 1970s, at 12 percent a year during the second half of the 1970s and 
the early years of the 1980s. However, in much of the 1980s public capital formation 
declined to between 4 and 5 percent a year. Private capital formation in contrast, 
grew at a substantially higher rate of over 7 percent a year during the 1960s and first 
half of the 1970s. Its growth decelerated to less than 4 percent a year during the 
second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s and further down to only 1.5 percent 
during the three years 1984-85 to 1987-88. Despite deceleration, private capital 
formation grew at a positive rate all along. 
Mishra, S.N., "Capital Formation and Accumulation in Indian Agriculture Since Independence", 
Indian Journal of Agriculture Economics, Vol. 51 No. I &i 2, January-June, 1996, Mumbai, 
pp.43-44. 
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Year 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2000-01 
2001-02 
Table: 5.14 
GDP 
401128 
513990 
692871 
899563 
1198685 
1265429 
Capital F'ormation in Agriculture at 1993-94 Prices 
(Rs. Crores) 
Total GFCF 
in 
Agriculture 
31000 
30717 
37365 
42107 
46310 
48710 
Percent Share 
of GFCF in 
Agriculture to 
GDP 
7.73 
5.98 
5.39 
4.68 
3.86 
3.85 
Public 
Sector 
GFCF in 
Agriculture 
17213 
15229 
13577 
14949 
14539* 
NA 
Percent Share of 
Public Sector 
GFCF in 
Agriculture to 
GDP 
4.29 
2.96 
1.96 
1.66 
1.21 
NA 
Source: Report of the Committee on Capital Formation in Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, March 2003. 
Note: Total GFCF in agriculture includes capital formation in and for agriculture. 
* Figure is for the year 1999-2000. 
In 2001-02 total GFCF in agriculture at 1993-94 prices amount to Rs. 48710 
crore. As percent to GDP, GFCF in agriculture has declined from 7.73 percent in 
1980-81 to 3.85 percent in 2001-02. The share of GFCF in public sector in and for 
agriculture has also declined in relation to GDP from 4.29 percent in 1980-81 to 1.21 
percent 2000-01. There has been, therefore, a long-term deceleration in the share of 
capital formation in agriculture in GDP at both aggregate and public sector level. In 
fact the shares of GFCF in agriculture and for agriculture in GDP have declined much 
more sharply in the public sector. Overall the investment in agriculture has declined 
from 17 percent of all investment in 1980-81 to just around 9.5 percent in the 
nineties . Financial compression and inability to reduce the input subsidies compelled 
the decline in real public investment. As a result, the development of infrastructure 
like irrigation, rural electrification, roads and markets has been a major casualty. 
Public investments in research and extension have been an important 
component of gains in agricultural productivity. However, due to pressure on fiscal 
front this outlay on research is sharply declining leading to low growth in the yield of 
various crops. This is discernible from the fact that the rate of growth of 
productivity/yield rate at the level of the aggregate of principal crops fell from 2.56 
percent per annum during 1980-81/1989-90 to 0.86 percent per annum during 1990-
91/2002-03, for total foodgrains, it fell from 2.97 percent to 1.69 percent. For coarse 
India Development Report 1997, op. cit. p. 113. 
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cereals, it came down from 1.71 percent to 1.66 percent, for rice, it witnessed a steep 
decline from 3.19 percent to 1.04 percent, for wheat, it declined from 3.10 percent to 
1.63 percent, for pulses, it came down from 1.59 percent to 0.16 percent, for oilseeds, 
the decline was from 2.95 percent to 0.74 percent, for cotton, it was from 4.10 percent 
to -1.61 percent, and for the total of non foodgrains, it declined from 2.31 percent to 
0.47 percent (See respective tables). 
Chaddha has compared the pre and post reform gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) in the agriculture sector at 1993-94 prices. The crux of his analysis could be 
summarized as;^ 
a. The pace of investment in agriculture has improved during the post reform 
period as compared to the pre refonn. As the growth rate in public investment 
during nineties stands at 2.14 percent as compared to the 0.42 percent in 
eighties. However, second half of the post reform period i.e. 1995-96 to 2000-
01 witnessed a sharp decline in public investment to 1.13 percent. 
b. Investments priorities in favor of agriculture have been constantly losing 
grounds in both the decades. As the share of agriculture GFCF in total GFCF 
has declined from 15.05 percent in 1980-81 to 10.04 percent in 1990-91 and 
further to 6.91 percent in 2000-01. 
c. Public sector real investment has been continuously declining in proportion to 
the private investment. For example, the share of public sector GFCF in 
agriculture to total GFCF in agriculture was 53.63 percent in 1980-81, which 
declined to 30.82 percent in 1990-91 and further by the end of 1999-2000 it 
came down to 26.43 percent. 
d. The share of public sector GFCF in agriculture in relation to the total public 
sector GFCF has also been constantly declining in both the decades. This 
figure during the period 1980-81 was 18 percent and by the beginning of 
economic reforms in 1990-91 it came down to 7.2 percent and further by the 
end of the decade of post reform in 1999-2000 it reached to merely 5.8 
percent. 
5 Chadha, G.K., "Indian Agriculture in the New millennium: Human Resources to Technology 
Changes", in: Indian Journal of Agriculture Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, January-March, 2003, 
Mumbai, pp. 12-17. 
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A government appointed committee on 'Capital Formation in Agriculture' 
recommended immediate action to improve capital formation for agriculture in both 
public and private sectors. The Committee warned that otherwise, it might be difficult 
to sustain the agriculture growth and rural purchasing power. The Committee was of 
the opinion that the new strategy of agriculture growth and diversification would 
require more investments on cold storage, rural roads, communication, marketing 
networks and facilities, warehouses etc. Thus, it asked for substantial increase in 
investment on research & development to revitalize agriculture through introduction 
of biotechnology and other innovations. 
5.1.2.2 Genetically Modified Seeds: 
The process of breeding genetically different parents with contrasting characteristics 
to produce a hybrid offspring with the useful characteristics of both parents is called 
hybridization. It results in higher yields and more disease resistance in crops. The 
term 'biotechnology was coined by a Hungarian engineer Karl Er in 1917 to describe 
the large scale production of pigs that were fed sugar beets. Another definition of 
biotechnology refers it to the branch of technology concerned with the modification of 
living things to suit human needs and preferences. Biotechnology, broadly defined 
includes any technique that uses living organisms or parts of such organisms, to make 
or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for 
specific use. In agriculture, biotechnology offers a huge potential for increasing the 
range and quality of food, particularly more nutritious, palatable and stable food. It 
can revitalize agriculture by using the techniques of genetic modification - the joining 
of pieces of genetic material (DNA) in new combinations. 
5.1.2,2.1 Biotechnology' and Food Securit)': 
The term green revolution was coined in 1968 by Dr. William S. Gaud, Director of 
the US Agency for Internationa! Development USAID), when India achieved 
production of 17 million tones of wheat with the help of high yielding varieties seeds 
A Report of the Commillce on Capital Formation in Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
March 2003. The Committee's Report is asaiiable at www.agricoop.nic.in (Accessed in 
September 2004). 
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wheat. The so called green revolution has had great impact on different segments of 
population of India and has contributed to the great extent to the national food 
security through increased food supply and reduced food prices. Increasing population 
along with shrinking percapita availability of arable land and water makes the use of 
biotechnology inevitable if India is to remain self sufficient in food production. In fact 
there are suggestion that going by the current traits of population growth and 
environmental degradation coupled with improvement in the consumption capacity of 
the masses, India may be forced to import foodgrains to meet its domestic 
consumption requirements. 
Agricultural biotechnology will contribute to poverty reduction and food 
security if the quality and yields of food crops increases with the increasing use of this 
technology by small farmers. However, it requires following basic conditions. 
> It must focus on crops, livestock and fish commonly grown by small farmers. 
Major crops are rice, tropical maiz, wheat, sorgum, millet, banana, cassava, 
oilseeds, potatos and sweet potato. 
> High value cash crops such as cotton, soyabean and vegetables can increase 
the income of small farmers through crop diversification The prospects for 
improving these crops is bright due to the large demand of them in urban areas 
and in international markets. 
> The technology to be developed and delivered to small farmers must be simple 
low cost and carry little or no risks to human health and the environment. 
> Biotechnology development should also be accompanied by favorable policy 
environment, good governance, investments in rural infrsastructurte and 
agricultural credit and extension marketing. 
The use of GM varieties seeds helps reducing the use of insecticides and 
herbicides. Thus reducing soil and groundwater pollution and reduced tillage that 
results in topsoil loss. Many transgenic technologies in crops are designed to reduce 
yield losses such as Bacillus thuringienus (Bt.) crops (corn, cotton and potatoes). 
These crops can be thought of as pesticides inherent crops. The pesticides kills pests 
that eat the plant, thus providing an effective and virtually complete pest control 
mechanism. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) calculated that by 
using integrated pesl management methods with one or tvv'o spray the Bl coUon 
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hybrids could save Rs 1500 per hectare on chemical pesticides and provide additional 
return through higher yield of Rs 7000 to 8000 per hectare. 
Wide adoption of GM seeds will reduce the use of conventional inputs 
specially pesticides and herbicides. Thus leading to save their input costs. Second, 
field operations are saved with many of the transgenic crops releasing resources for 
other crops at crucial time during the growing season, allowing farmers to better 
manage those crops. Farmers may also benefits from increased flexibility. As many 
chemical alternatives to the herbicides tolerant crops present cany over problems so 
that farmers cannot plant certain crops in the next growing season. Herbicides tolerant 
crops used in conjunction with shoit-lived herbicides eliminate this constraint in many 
cases. Farmers may also be able to strip crop or practice conservation tillage more 
easily with transgenic crops (Fernandez- Cornejo et a! 999) 
Many studies show that pesticides inherent crops reduce the number of sprays 
required to control pests. If reduce pest control cost outweigh the additional cost of 
the seed. Herbicides tolerant crop can significantly reduce weed control costs. RR 
cotton is a good example. Before the introducing of this herbicides tolerant crop, there 
were no cotton herbicides that could be sprayed over the top of the cotton crop to 
control weeds (Carpenter and Gianeni, 2001). 
The most important argument for convincing the public and decision-makers 
about the value of genetic engineering of food has been the claim that it will produce 
new, valuable crops that may contribute importantly to the solution of the world 
hunger. However, the fact remains that there is not a single gene known to be 
responsible for such productivity enhancing properties. Such valuable properties are 
commonly the consequence of combinations of many different genes interacting with 
each other and the environment. All properties of a plant are dependent on complex 
interactions within and outside the organism For this reason, the effects of a foreign 
inserted gene is unpredictable and combined insertions are manifold more 
unpredictable. In addition, the artificial inserUon of foreign genes disrupts the 
ordinary sequence of the genetic code words that is believed to be important for 
normal functioning. This adds further to the unpredictability of gene insertions 
because there are natural protection mechanisms against uptake of foreign genes. This 
instability is most probably increases with the insertion of several genes. 
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Trial and Results: 
In India the introduction of Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) and in particular 
the genetically modified seed such as Bt cotton has been quite controversial. Trials for 
first generation Bt. Cotton crop were officially conducted in 1998 under the 
supervision of the hidian Department of Biotechnology's Review Committee on 
Genetic Manipulation (RCGM). Subsequently the cultivation of Bt. cotton was 
approved by the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) on 26th March 
2002. 
In Madhya Pradesh, the crop was afflicted by the leaf curl virus (LCV), which 
resulted in a major economic loss to the farmers as the cost of these seeds were 5 to 6 
times higher than the ordinary seeds. In Khargaon district, the loss of crop has been 
100 percent which forced the farmers to demand compensation from Monsanto-
Mahyco. Similarly, in the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra, cotton crops planted over 
30,000 hectares have been widely affected with a disease called root rot. Many 
farmers have recorded only up to 50 percent germination of seeds and many others 
had much poor germination. With the reported failure rate of only around 20 percent, 
the disease imposed a financial burden of Rs. 500 crores on the farmers of this region. 
In Gujarat, the Bt cotton turned out to be heavily infested of bollv/orm in the districts 
of Bhavanagar, Surendranagar and Rajkot. The Research Foundation for Science, 
Technology and Ecology (RFSTE), on the basis of a field survey it conducted 
between October 23'^ '' and November 2'^ ''. 2001, declared that Bt. cotton planted in 
India has not shown itself to be pest resistant, higher yielding or cost reducing. 
Modern biotechnology can enhance agricultural productivity in a way that 
further reduces poverty, improves food security and nutrition, and promote 
sustainable use of natural resources. But such benefits from biotechnology require 
policy actions on a number of fronts. The small farmers in India faces a variety of 
problems and constraints crop losses due to insects, diseases, weed and draughts 
threaten income and food availability. Acid soil, low soil fertility and lack of access to 
reasonably priced nutrients, biotic and abiotic factors also contribute to low yield. 
Poor infrastructure and dysfunctional markets for inputs and outputs along with lack 
of access to credit and technical assistance add to the problems plaguing the small 
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farmers and consumers. Modern biotechnology cannot solve all these problems but it 
can provide a critical component to the solution if it is guided by appropriate policy. 
5.1.3 Agricultural Trade: 
The process of stabilization and adjustment, initiated in mid 1991, has been associated 
with a wide-ranging trade policy reform, which sought to increase the degree of 
openness of the economy. Thus the canalization of agricultural trade flows, which 
enabled the government to determine the volume of export and imports in earlier 
period, has been abandoned. After the economic reforms all agricultural imports other 
than cereals, oilseeds and edible oils have been decanalized. Further the Uruguay 
round of multilateral liberalization has removed remaining quantitative restriction on 
agricultural products. 
Table: 5.15 Agriculture Trade in 1990s 
(Million USS) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
Source: Bli 
Reforms", J 
p.JZJ. 
Agriculture 
Exports 
3354.4 
3202.5 
3135.8 
4027.5 
4226.1 
6081.9 
6862.7 
6626.2 
6034.5 
5608.0 
6002.8 
attacharya, B., " 
'iidian Journal ( 
Percent 
Change 
-4.53 
-2.08 
28.44 
4.93 
43.91 
12.84 
-3.45 
-8.93 
-7.07 
7 04 
Trade Lib 
)f Agriciili 
Agriculture 
Imports 
631.2 
382.9 
636.6 
480.6 
1364.3 
1196.9 
1407.7 
1689.8 
2754,5 
2693.4 
1642.8 
eraiization and 
ure Ecoiioniics 
Percent 
Change 
-39.34 
66.26 
-24.51 
183.87 
-12.27 
17.61 
20.04 
63.01 
-2.22 
-39.01 
Agricultur 
, Vol. 58, 
Total Agriculture 
Trade 
3985.6 
3585.4 
3772.4 
4508.1 
5590.4 
7278.8 
8270.4 
8316.0 
8789.0 
8301.4 
7645.6 
s Price Policy in Inc 
Mo. 3, July-Septemb 
Percent 
Change 
-10.04 
5.22 
19.50 
24.01 
30.20 
13.62 
0.55 
5.69 
-5.55 
-7.90 
ia Since 
er 2003, 
Despite India being one of the largest agriculture producers in the world, its 
share in agriculture trade has been minimal. According to UNCTAD, estimates, India 
produced around 10 percent of world agricultural output in 1989 but its share in world 
trade in agricultural commodities in that year was only around 0.6 percent. Many 
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researchers while making the case for economic reforms in early 1990s had argued 
that Indian agriculture is in fact disprotected and once this protection is taken India 
will gain from trade in agriculture, as India has comparative advantage in the 
production of many agriculture commodities. During Uruguay round too the case of 
disprotcction of Indian agriculture was raised to prove that India will substantially 
gain from agriculture exports. However, thirteen years of economic reforms and over 
eight years of WTO experience show that India's gains are not as argued by the 
proponents of liberalization. Table 5.15 shows that during the economic reform period 
India's exports had almost doubled from $ 3.3 billion to above $ 6 billion, however, 
its imports have risen from $ 0.6 billion to over $ 1.6 billion. In the year 1998-99 and 
1999-2000 the import figure has crossed $ 2 billion mark. Compound growth figure 
(Table 5.16) also shows that India's export has grown much slower than the imports. 
Particularly after the Uruguay round negotiations export growth has declined at -2.16 
percent as against the growth in agricultural imports at 12.17 percent. 
Tabic: 5.16 Compound Growth Rates in Agriculture Trade 
Im 
1991-1995 
1995-2001 
1991-2001 
port 
19.35 
12.17 
19.42 
Export 
1991-1995 
1995-2001 
1991-2001 
7.16 
-2.16 
8.13 
(Percent/annum) 
Total Agriculture Trade 
1991-1995 
1995-2001 
1991-2001 
9.48 
0.90 
10.29 
Source: Agriculture Statistics at a Glance 2003, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
Overall the growth in agriculture trade has grown 10.29 percent but comparing 
the pre and post Uruguay round we find that trade growth has declined from 9.48 
percent after the economic reforms to just 0.90 percent after the Uruguay round. It 
clearly appears that much of the gain in trade is due to increase in imports rather than 
increase in exports. The data in Table (5.16) brings out the following picture. 
. In value terms, bolh agricultural exports and imports have increased 
considerably after the economic reforms. The growth rates are, however, 
widely divergent: 8.13 percent for exports and 19.42 percent for imports. 
. As a consequence, the ratio of agricultural exports to imports has consistently 
deteriorated over the period. 
[09 
5.1.3.1 Import: 
Imports in agricultural has been fluctuating. Accounting for $ 631 million in 1990-91 
it declined to $ 382 million in 1991-92, then again it shot up to over $ 636 million and 
then came back to the tune of 482 million in 1993-94. In the year 1994-95 it shot up 
to $1364 million and thereafter the import always remained over a billion US$ mark. 
In 1998 -99 and 1999-2000 the figure touched the mark of over $ 2.5 billion. Among 
India's major agricultural imports edible oils accounted for much of the total value. 
Other major items imported on a regular basis include pulses, cashew nuts, other nuts 
and fruits, wool and silk, wood and wood products, and raw cotton. During 
production shortfalls India also imports wheat, rice, sugar, and cotton. (Table 5.17) 
Agriculture imports as a share to total national import (in Rs. terms) has been rising 
from over 2.79 percent in 1990-91 to over 6 percent in 2002. On the other hand share 
of agriculture exports to total national export has been on decline from 18 percent in 
1990-91 to about 14 percent in 2001-02 
5.1.3.2 Export: 
The progress in export of non-traditional items was quite impressive during the 
decade of 1990s as compared to 1980s. Similarly, exports of fruits and vegetables 
more than doubled during the last two decades from $ 110 million in 1981-82 to $ 262 
million in 1999-2000. Major agricultural exports by India included basmati and non-
basmati rice, marine products, oil meals, cashew nuts, coffee, tea, spices, fruits and 
vegetables. Recently, India also started exporting wheat and rice from its surplus 
government stocks. Its production of exportable horticultural products has also risen 
sharply in recent years. A large share in agricultural export was contributed by 
diversification of crop and livestock sectors. It was noted that diversification of 
agricultural commodities has promoted export of many non-traditional items also. 
Historically, there was virtually no export of fruits, vegetables, and livestock and fish 
products. The exports of these commodities, as well as rice, have remarkably picked 
up during the 1990s. Export of Basmati rice has been fluctuating, for example, 
exports of 527 thousand tons in 1990-91 to 266 thousand tons in 1991-92 and 324 
' India Agricullural Sllualion' BrieJ on Indian Agriculture, 1999. 
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thousand tones in 1992-93 to above five hundred thousand tones in 1993-94. 
Thereafter it varied between 5-6 thousand tones except in the year 2000-01 when it 
went up to eight hundred thousand tones. The export of non-basmati rice has also 
been fluctuating but on many occasions its export has been as high as above four 
thousand tones. India's share in world rice trade went up to more than 10 percent in 
1990s, from a mere 3.7 percent in 1980-81 (Table 5.18). Exports of tea, coffee, 
tobacco (manufactured and un-manufactured), spices, cashew, sesamum seed and oil 
meals has been more consistent. The exports of fish shot up from $320 million in 
1981-82 to $1125 million by 1999-2000. More progress was registered in processed 
fruits and juice. The, exports of milk and milk products increased from $ 1.1 million 
in 1981-82 to $ 1.7 million in 1991-92 and reached a peak of $ 3.2 million in 1999-
2000. Exports of eggs, although too erratic, increased from a low of $ 0.4 million in 
1981-82 to $ 25.3 million in 1999-2000. It may be noted that the production of all 
these commodities increased substantially during 1990s, which led to their entry into 
export markets. 
Thus, overall the condition of agricultural trade has improved after the 
economic reforms. The export of agricultural commodities has increased during the 
nineties compared to eighties but its share in total trade has declined after the 
economic reform. 
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5.2 Structural Adjustment and Food Security: 
It is observed in the preceding section tliat India made considerable progress in the 
sphere of agricultural development in terms of increase in crop production, 
productivity, technological developments and crop diversification. Foodgrains 
production has remarkably increased during the fifty years from 50.8 million tones in 
1950-51 to the peak level of 209.8 million tones in 1999-2000. This has enabled the 
country to overcome the problems of foodgrain shortages and build up a large stock of 
foodgrains to counter any scarcity condition. Because of substantial increase in 
foodgrains production and built up of huge surplus stocks over the years the food 
problem in the sense of inadequacy and shortage of foodgrains no longer exists. 
Notwithstanding, three years of droughts during eighties, agricultural output 
recorded an average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent in eighties as against mere 0.43 
percent per annum in the nineties and onwards. Except in the last few years, the 
growth rate of agricultural output had exceeded the population growth rate. This has 
contributed to an increase in the percapita availability of foodgrains and has 
eliminated the need to import large quantities of food. Since availability of food is the 
first criterion of the food security we shall begin our discussion with the availability 
of foodgrain. 
5.2.1 Foodgrain Availability: 
Adequate availability of food is the first criteria of food security. This means a 
country must have enough resources to make available sufficient food to all its 
citizens either through domestic production, or purchase from international markets. It 
is albeit a necessary condition but not the sufficient one for food security because it 
also requires a sufficient income on the part of its people to purchase it. Therefore 
physical and economic access to food is the major component of food security. The 
availability of foodgrains derives from the accounting identity, involving production 
level, stock changes, and trade balance, can be a good estimate for aggregate 
consumption. It is observed that rise in the production has contributed to increase in 
the percapita availability of foodgrains over the years. 
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Table: 5.19 Net Availability of Cereals, Pulses and Foodgrains 
(Million Tones) 
Year 
1951 
1955 
I960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003'' 
Cereals 
Net 
Production 
40.10 
51.70 
57.10 
67.30 
76.80 
78.60 
88.50 
104.10 
106.60 
103.00 
122.00 
116.90 
119.90 
115.20 
113.20 
136.60 
138.40 
141.90 
136 80 
145.80 
149.60 
155.30 
147.10 
162.00 
156.90 
165.10 
171.80 
162.50 
174.00 
142.70 
Net 
Imports 
4.10 
0.60 
5.10 
7.40 
3.60 
7.50 
-0.50 
0.50 
1.60 
4.10 
2.40 
-0.30 
-0.10 
-0.40 
2.30 
0.80 
0.10 
-0.60 
-0.70 
2.60 
0.50 
-3.00 
-3.50 
-0.60 
-2.90 
-1.50 
-1.40 
-4.50 
-8.50 
-6.10 
Changes in 
Govt. 
Stocks 
0.60 
-0.80 
1.40 
1.10 
1.10 
5.60 
-5.80 
-0.20 
1.30 
2.70 
7.10 
2.70 
-1.60 
-9.50 
-4.60 
2.60 
6.20 
-4.40 
-1.60 
10.30 
7.50 
-1.70 
-8.50 
-1.80 
6.10 
7.50 
13.90 
12.30 
-9,90 
-23.30 
Net 
Availability 
43.60 
53.10 
60.80 
73.60 
79.30 
80.50 
93.80 
104.80 
106.90 
104.40 
117.30 
113.90 
121.40 
124.30 
120.10 
134.80 
132.30 
145.70 
137 70 
138.10 
142.60 
154.00 
152.10 
163.20 
147.90 
156.10 
156.60 
145.60 
175.40 
159.80 
Pulses 
Net 
Availability 
8.00 
10.10 
10.40 
10.80 
10.20 
8.80 
7.60 
9.40 
10.10 
10.40 
11.30 
10.50 
12.30 
10.40 
10.70 
12.50 
12.50 
12.90 
10.90 
11.70 
12.20 
12.70 
11.30 
13.00 
11.70 
13.30 
11.70 
11.30 
13.40 
11.00 
Foodgrains 
Total Net 
Availability 
51.60 
63.20 
71.20 
84.40 
89.50 
89.30 
101.40 
114.20 
117.00 
114.80 
128.60 
124.40 
133.70 
134.70 
130.80 
147.30 
144.80 
158.60 
148.60 
149.80 
154.80 
166.70 
163.40 
176.20 
159.60 
169.40 
168.30 
156.90 
188.80 
170.80 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2003 and Economic Survey 2003-04. 
Note: Net production has been taken as 87.5 percent of the gross production, as 12.5 percent 
being provided for seeds, feed requirements and waste. 
After independence foodgrain production was not adequate according to the 
requirements, therefore, till mid seventies India imported cereals to fill the gap 
between demand and supplies. However, since early eighties due to HYVs seeds more 
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inputs and other facilities, net production of cereals crossed over 100 million tones. 
This gradually reduced the imports, and the stocks of food with government started 
gradually improving. Despite some fluctuations recorded in a bad crop year, the net 
availability of cereals has been increasing over the years. Likewise net availability of 
pulses also grew though marginally. Net availability of foodgrains substantially 
improved over the years from mere 51 million tones in 1951 to 170 million tones in 
2003. Trends in percapita supply of foodgrains, which is considered as an important 
component of improvement in food security at the individual level, indicate a 
consistent rise in the percapita production of cereals but the percapita availability of 
pulses has not been as consistent. In fact over the years the percapita availability of 
pulses has either been constant or just marginally improved. The average percapita 
daily availability of cereals which was 363 gms in fifties rose to over 392 gms 
percapita per day during sixties. This went further up to 424 gms percapita per day 
during the 1980s and 436 gms percapita per day at the end of 2003 (Table 5.20). 
Table 5.20 Average Net Availabilit)' of Foodgrains 
(Grams Percapita Per Day) 
Year 
1950s 
1960s 
197Gs 
1980s 
1990s 
Rice 
178.11 
(8.16) 
188.31 
(9.60) 
183.03 
(8.24) 
198.07 
(7.03) 
209.26 
(5.15) 
Wheat 
65.85 
(12.04) 
91.07 
(8.93) 
114.80 
(13.41) 
143.31 
(7.80) 
160.55 
(8.18) 
Other Cereals 
119.44 
(8.27) 
113.50 
(5.77) 
100.90 
(10.22) 
83.24 
(12.55) 
66.50 
(13.61) 
Cereal 
363.40 
(6.37) 
392.88 
(4.79) 
398.73 
(5.99) 
424.63 
(3.73) 
436.63 
(5.40) 
Gram 
27.51 
(17.42) 
22.55 
(20.97) 
17.04 
(17.59) 
13.18 
(15.14) 
11.84 
(16.87) 
Pulses 
66.43 
(8.87) 
54.65 
(15.90) 
43.47 
(13.55) 
39.58 
(6.40) 
35.24 
(8.95) 
Foodgrains 
429.83 
(6.57) 
447.53 
(5.59) 
442.20 
(6.06) 
464.21 
(3.72) 
471.88 
(5.53) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2003. Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent respective CV. 
1990s include period up to year 2003. Figures for 2003 are provisional. 
But percapita production and use of pulses, an important source of protein in 
vegetarian diets, witnessed continuous decline. The percapita availability of pulses, 
which in fifties was 66 gms reduced to 54 gms percapita per day in sixties. In 
seventies it declined to 43.5 gms percapita per day. It further declined to 39.6 gms 
percapita per day during 1980s and ended at 35.24 gms percapita per day during 1990 
onwards. This decline in percapita availability is despite the fact that government 
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adopted a liberal import policy with regard to pulses. Pulses are allowed to be 
imported under the open general license (OGL) which imposes low tariff on the 
product thus preventing more serious decline in the availability. 
Foodgrains constitute about 60 percent of calories in the average Indian diet. 
Average of percapita availability of foodgrains particularly rice, wheat, and coarse 
grains has continuously risen over the years. Gains in wheat and rice consumption are 
partly the result of substitution away from the use of coarse grains as food. Population 
growth continues to decline. In the post reform period the growth in population has 
declined to 1.94 percent as against the growth of it in eighties at 2.13 percent. 
However, taking into account the growth in percapita availability of foodgrain we find 
that foodgrain availability has declined to 1.15 percent in the post reform period from 
2.83 percent in eighties. This is the first time when growth in foodgrain availability 
has gone below than the growth in population. Similarly, availability of pulses has 
also declined massively from 2.52 percent in eighties to -0.03 percent in the post 
reform period. Growth rate of cereals also declined in the post reform period. 
However, fluctuation is less perceptible in the post reform period as compared to the 
eighfies except in population growth (Table 5.21). 
Table: 5.21 Compound Growth Rates of Population and Percapita Availability of 
Foodgrains 
(Percent/ annum) 
Year 
1981-1990 
1991-2003 
Population 
2.13 
(6.39) 
1.94 
(7.45) 
Cereals 
2.86 
(9.12) 
1.25 
(7.01) 
Pulses 
2.52 
(9.91) 
-0.03 
(7.31) 
Foodgrains 
2.83 
(9.05) 
1.15 
(6.79) 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2003, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent respective CV. 
The net availability of percapita wheat, which was 129 gms per day, declined 
in the post reform period from 166 gms/day in 1991 to 135 gms/day in 2001. 
Similarly, rice percapita availability declined from 221 gms/day in 1991 to 190 
gms/day. Availability of other cereals, gram, pulses as well as foodgrains also 
declined markedly in the post reform period (Table 5.22). 
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Table 5.22 Net Availability of Foodgrains 
Year 
1951 
1955 
I960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002"^* 
Rice 
158.90 
179.70 
187.80 
210..20 
190.20 
158.90 
166.10 
197.80 
193.2.0 
169.80 
197.80 
188.80 
212.00 
206.00 
188.20 
215.00 
212.10 
221.70 
217.00 
201.10 
207.40 
220.00 
204.40 
214.00 
200,30 
203.40 
203.70 
190.50 
227.60 
Wheat 
65.70 
58.30 
78.30 
93.60 
102.30 
112.10 
126.80 
129.60 
127.90 
144.40 
140.80 
138.60 
151.00 
157.80 
154.20 
156.20 
132.60 
166.80 
158.60 
140.20 
159.50 
172.70 
176.00 
179.10 
151.50 
162.30 
160.00 
135.80 
164.10 
Other Cereals 
109.60 
134.90 
118.00 
114.70 
110.60 
94.80 
86.60 
89.90 
94.80 
83.30 
98.90 
87.90 
70.70 
71.00 
68.80 
80,30 
86.80 
80.00 
58.90 
86.60 
67,10 
64,90 
62.00 
72,90 
62.40 
63.40 
59.00 
56.20 
64.60 
Total Cereal 
334.20 
372.90 
384.10 
418.50 
403.10 
365.80 
379.50 
417.30 
415.90 
397.50 
437.60 
415.30 
433.70 
434.80 
411.20 
451.50 
431.50 
468.50 
434.50 
427.90 
434.00 
457.60 
442.50 
466.00 
414.20 
429.20 
422.70 
386.20 
456,30 
(Grams 
G r a m 
22.50 
31.00 
27.70 
25.50 
21.90 
14.20 
10.70 
13.40 
14.00 
15.60 
13.70 
12.90 
16.20 
12.30 
9.60 
13.40 
10.70 
13.40 
10.10 
10.70 
11.80 
14.90 
11.30 
12.40 
13.40 
14.60 
10.80 
8.00 
10.70 
Percapik 
Pulses 
60.70 
71.10 
65.50 
61.60 
51.90 
-•9.70 
30.90 
37.50 
39.20 
39.50 
41.90 
38.10 
43.80 
36.40 
36.40 
41.90 
41.10 
41.60 
34.30 
36.20 
37.20 
37.80 
32.70 
37.10 
32.80 
36.50 
31.80 
30.00 
34.90 
7 Per Day) 
Foodgrains 
394.90 
444.00 
449.60 
480.10 
455.00 
405.50 
410.40 
454.80 
455.10 
437.00 
479.50 
453.40 
477.50 
471.20 
447.60 
493.40 
472.60 
510.10 
468.80 
464.10 
471.20 
495.40 
475.20 
503.10 
447.00 
465.70 
454.50 
416.20 
491.20 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India 
2003, Directorate 
New Delhi. 
of Economics and Statistics, 
Decline in population growth should have increased the net availability of 
foodgrains in the post reform period leading to increase in percapita consumption of 
cereals but the post reform period shows different picture specially the last five years 
(1997-2001) were observed with low percapita cereals consumption. The absorption 
of the foodgrains was low and further declining during the later years of nineties. One 
reason could be the change in tastes Irom coarse cereals to superior grains such as rice 
and wheat and secondly, increase cereals prices had also negatively affected its 
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consumption of cereals. Fall in percapita absorption of foodgrains increases the 
number of hungry people particularly in rural areas. There is perceptible decline in 
nutritional intake of poor speciall}' the rural poor or the poorer three fifth of the 
population. According to food balance sheet, cereals currently supply 59 percent of 
total calories, 58 percent of total protein and 13 percent of total fats. Cereals, 
therefore, are much cheaper source of nutrition to poor than other food. It is observed 
that despite significant increase in percapita expenditure the percapita cereals 
consumption of the poor had remained the same. A government appointed committee, 
in its report, observed a slow decline in the absorption of foodgrains per head between 
1991-92 and 1997-98 but after that the decline was so steep that there was fall in 
average calorie intake by almost 250 calories from the foodgrains. 
Thus, it could be observed that the improvement in economic access to food, 
made possible by increase in growth did not result in a higher consumption of cereals. 
The decline in cereal consumption should not have been a problem if food energy 
intake levels of poor were nutritionally adequate as about 1501 Kcal energy was being 
available from cereals alone and another 123 Kcal from pulses, i.e. a total of 1624 
Kcal from foodgrains but substantial decline in pulses production resulted in even 
higher protein deficiency among the poor. Fall in net percapita output by about 5.5 kg 
since the early nineties had not been surprising as agriculture was being opened up to 
the pull of global demand. Almost 8 million hectare of foodgrains growing land has 
been diverted to exportable crops between 1991 and 2001 and yield has also not been 
rising enough to compensate for the losses. 
5.2.2 Food Distribution: 
India's experience of food shortages has been very long. Famines, wars, and draughts 
causing acute scarcity condition have often forced the government to undertake extra 
ordinary measures. The present public distribution system has also evolved out of 
Cereals prices rose 30 percent more than the general price level between 1990-91 and 2000, 
which declined the percapita demand of cereals by almost 9 percent. For more details see. 
Report of the High Level Commillec on Long Term Grain Policy, July, 2002, Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs. Food and Public Distribution, Government of India, p. 41. 
Report of the High Level Committee on Long Term Grain Policy, July, 2002, Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India. P. 117. 
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those extra ordinary measures adopted in the form of rationing after the Bengal 
famine in 1943. However, after the independence the government followed a 
systematic approach to evolve one of the largest public distribution networks in the 
world. And now the present public distribution system (PDS) is not only for ensuring 
food security to a large number of households but has also become an important 
constituent of the strategy for poverty alleviation in the country. 
5.2.2.1 Public Distribution System (PDS): 
The basic objective of the public distribution system is to provide essential consumer 
goods at cheap prices to the consumers so as to insulate them from the impact of 
rising prices of these commodities and maintain a minimum nutritional status of the 
population, specially the vulnerable. Thus, food security in the country particularly 
vulnerable sections of the population is closely linked with the proper functioning of 
public distribution system. PDS has twin responsibility of maintaining price stability 
and raising the welfare of vuinerabic section of society by providing them access to 
basic food through rationing system. The Food Corporation of India (FCI), a major 
arm of central government in food management, procures, stores and transports the 
commodities to central godowns from where state governments lift them and 
distribute it through fair price shops. All households in rural and urban areas with 
registered residential addresses are eligible for a ration card. The ration card entitles 
households to buy fixed ration of selected commodities at subsidized prices from the 
fair price shops. The six essential commodities supplied through PDS are rice, wheat, 
sugar, edible oil, kerosene and coal, llowever. wheat and rice are the two major items 
of distribution. 
The quantities supplied through PDS remains varying from year to year. In the 
lean year commodities supplied through PDS naturally becomes higher than the year 
of normal agricultural production. The quantities supplied through PDS outlets 
remained below 5 million tones up to 1963, and they had gone up to 14 million tones 
by mid 1960s. Throughout 1970s the distributed quantities remained around 10 
million tones. Whereas, in eighties the average distribution of foodgrains shot up to 
16 million tones, which in the post reform period rose up to above 17 million tones. 
The number of fair price shop^ increased from a mere 47 thousand in 1961 to over 
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10 463 thousand at the end of 2003 PDS also expanded in qualitative ways During 
1970s to 1980s the PDS ruralised considerably At the end of the 1980s approximately 
75 percent of the ration shops were located in lural areas and moie than 70 percent of 
PDS rice and more than 55 percent of PDS wheat was sold in rural areas.'' 
Table: 5.23 Production, Procurement, Offtake and Pubic Distribution of 
(Million Tones) 
Foodgrains 
Year 
1980-8! 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
l9by-90 
Average 
CV 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Average 
CV 
Production 
129 59 
133 30 
129 52 
152 37 
145 54 
150 44 
143 42 
140 35 
169 92 
17! 04 
146.55 
10.17 
176 39 
168 38 
179 48 
184 26 
191 50 
180 42 
199 43 
192 26 
203 62 
209 80 
196 81 
212 03 
182 57 
190.53 
7.02 
Procurement 
13 00 
15 40 
15 60 
18 70 
20 10 
19 70 
15 70 
14 10 
18 90 
24 00 
17.52 
19.06 
19 60 
17 90 
28 10 
26 00 
22 60 
19 80 
23 60 
26 30 
30 80 
35 60 
42 60 
40 30 
34 50 
28.28 
28.26 
Offtake 
13 54 
13 59 
15 73 
15 34 
13 40 
1928 
1961 
23 00 
17 97 
14 99 
16.65 
19.28 
1649 
20 74 
17 96 
1861 
19 44 
24 35 
25 63 
18 96 
20 73 
23 05 
1821 
31 30 
49 63 
23.47 
37.57 
Public 
Distribution 
(PD) 
13 00 
14 80 
16 20 
13 30 
15 80 
1730 
18 70 
18 60 
16 40 
16 00 
16.01 
12.09 
20 80 
18 80 
16 40 
14 00 
15 30 
1830 
17 80 
18 60 
17 70 
13 00 
13 20 
18 10 
22 50 
17.27 
16.40 
PD as % of 
Production 
10 03 
11 10 
1251 
8 73 
10 86 
11 50 
13 04 
13 25 
9 65 
9 35 
11.00 
14.34 
11 79 
11 17 
9 14 
7 60 
7 99 
10 14 
8 93 
9 67 
8 69 
6 20 
671 
8 54 
12 32 
9.14 
20.33 
PDas'/oofNet 
Availability 
1138 
12 65 
14 11 
10 34 
12 70 
12 94 
13 88 
14 22 
11 13 
1105 
12.44 
11.23 
13 11 
12 66 
10 95 
9 04 
9 18 
11 21 
10 10 
1165 
10 45 
7 72 
841 
9 59 
13 17 
10.56 
16.76 
Soni ce Agi iculhiral Statistic s at a Glance 2003, Economic Survey 2003-04 and Foodgrains 
Biillefiii (various issues) 
Annual Repoit 2003, Miiiisli} of 1 ood Consumer Affairs and Public Distiibution, Government 
of India Nev> Delhi 
Economic Sur\ey Repoiis 1991-92, Ministry of finance. Government of India, p 53 
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In eighties the distribution of foodgrains varied between 13 and 18 million 
tones, which crossed over to 22 million tones in the year 2002-03. Average wise 
public distribution as percentage to total production was recorded 11 percent in 
eighties, which in the post reform period declined to 9 percent. Similarly distribution 
as percentage of net availability also declined from 12.44 in eighties to 10.56 in the 
post reform period (Table 5.23). Coixelation between production and distribution 
shows a negative relationship between them in the post reform period (-0.41) as 
against positive relationship between them in eighties (0.15). Contrarily, we find 
negative correlation between procurement and offtake during eighties (-0.19) as 
against positive relationship between them in the post reform period (0.34). 
After the structural adjustment programme there was an overhaul of India's 
food policy, which had a significant impact on procurement, offtake as well as public 
distribution. Since government was strained to cut down public expenditure. It started 
looking for ways and means to cut down its expenditure on food subsidy. An obvious 
option was to naiTow down the scale of PDS, which by now had become too massive 
for the government to carry on in its present form. A number of studies on the 
functioning of the PDS had shown that under the existing arrangement really 
vulnerable areas and people were not getting the desired benefits due to their 
disadvantaged geographical location, weak PDS infrastructure and low purchasing 
power. Thus, the government thought it prune to reorient PDS to ensure effective 
reach to the most disadvantages areas of the country. Thus, government introduced 
the new scheme called Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS), which focused 
on targeting people in poorer, tribal hilly and other disadvantageous areas. 
5.2.2.1.1 Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS): 
Launched in January 1992, the scheme specially targeted 1775 blocks located in most 
difficult areas of the country such as drought prone, desert, tribal and urban slums. 
Infrastructural facilities were enhanced to support these operations. Foodgrains were 
allocated to these blocks at Rs 50 per quintal lower than the normal issue price. 11000 
more fair price shops were added in the selected blocks to the already existing 78000 
ration shops. Over 23 lakh more ration cards were issued taking the total to 280 lakh 
ration cardholders in these blocks. Additional storage capacity of 3.2 lakh metric 
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tones of foodgrains was created making a total capacity of over 40 lakh metric tones. 
Mobile vans were used to ensure proper supply of foodgrains in these areas. Offtake 
under RPDS shows that the scheme was largely a success. 
Tabic; 5.24 Offtake of Foodgrains from Central Pool under RPDs 
(Million Tones) 
Rice 
Wheat 
PDS 
RPDS 
PDS 
RPDS 
1992-93 
7.72 
1.97 
6.32 
1.53 
1993-94 
6.73 
2.38 
4.31 
1.78 
1994-95 
5.54 
2.57 
3.32 
1.79 
1995-96 
6.62 
3.13 
3.91 
1.89 
1996-97 
7.92 
3.22 
6.23 
2.29 
Source: Taimni, Brij K. 2004, p. 79 
As the Table 5.24 shows that the offtake of foodgrains under RPDS increased 
over the years, whereas, the offtake from general PDS kept declining during the 
period of RPDS. Beginning from mere 3.5 million tones offtake of rice and wheat in 
1992-93, the offtake under RPDS had risen to over 5.51 million tones at the end of the 
scheme. The offtake of foodgrains under general PDS remained constant during the 
period from 14.04 million tones in 1992-93 to 14.15 million tones in 1996-97. In 
between these years the offtake under general PDS had come down to 8.86 million 
tones in 1994-95. 
Despite impressive increase in the offtake of foodgrains from central pool 
under RPDS, certain other policy changes in the food management during the period 
tended to nullify what govermiient had aimed to achieve through the RPDS. Almost 
40 percent increase in the central issue prices of foodgrains under general PDS did the 
damage to other poor who were not supposed to be targeted under RPDS. 
Consequently, the offtake of PDS foodgrains lowered down. And lifting of foodgrains 
quantities by the state, allotted to them also reduced substantially. As against the 
allocation of 11.36 million tones of rice in 1991-92, the offtake was 10.17 million 
tones implying that offtake was 90 percent of allocation. The offtake of wheat, as 
against the allocation of 10.56 million tones in 1991-92 was 8.83 million tones 
implying that offtake was 83.6 percent of the allocation. The combined offtake of rice 
and wheat was 86.7 percent of allocation in 1991-92. In 1992-93, the offtake of rice 
was 83.19 percent of allocation, which reduced to 71 percent in 1993-94, 60 percent 
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in 1994-95, and 64 percent in 1995-96. It was only in 1996-97 when the offtake was 
73.7 percent of its total allocation. Like wise offtake of wheat has also been badly 
affected. It declined from 84.8 percent in 1992-93 to 61.8, 44 and 46 percent in 
succeeding three years. It also increased in 1996-97 to 79.4 percent of its total 
allocation. Another counter productive decision of the government, from the point of 
view of reducing subsidy burden, was continuous increase in the minimum support 
prices. Perhaps the then Prime Minister, who himself happened to be from the 
farming community, could not resist the temptation and thus regular increase in the 
minimum support prices to the farmers started eating chunk of government's food 
subsidy bill (meant for consumers) in the form of spending on food stocks. 
Thus, Government's policy of reducing food subsidy bill by narrow targeting 
was countermanded by government's another decision of increase in the minimum 
support price and increase in the central issue price. Both had its toll on poor who fell 
outside the area of target. Some other problems identified with the RPDS were as 
follows. 
> Proliferation of bogus ration card 
> Inadequate storage arrangements 
> Ineffective functioning of vigilance committee and 
> Failure to issue ration cards to all eligible households. 
Thus, despite its wide coverage and higher offtake, the RPDS as a whole had 
widely been seen as failure in achieving the stated objective of serving the most 
disadvantaged. Further, RPDS was accused of its urban biased, negligible coverage in 
the states with highest concentration of the rural poor and lack of transparent and 
accountable arrangement for delivery. Keeping this in view, the government 
introduced a new scheme called Targeted Public Distribution System through 
differential pricing system for population below and above poverty lines. 
5.2.2.1.2 Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS): 
Launched in June 1997, this scheme was an improved version of the erstwhile RPDS. 
As against the RPDS which targeted all in certain identified poor areas, the TPDS 
targeted poor in all areas by dividing the population into two major groups i.e. 'above 
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poverty line" (APL) and 'below poverty line' (BPL). The scheme sought to help the 
'below poverty line' segment by providing them cheaper food than those falling in the 
'above poverty line' category. Each state was allotted certain quota based on its 
estimate on BPL population. States were required to identify the BPL families and 
issue them a particular ration card. Initially each BPL family was entitled to 10 kg. of 
foodgrain per family per month. Any additional requirements desired by the states 
were allotted at a higher price. The intention was to limit the PDS only to the poor and 
phase it out to the non-poor over a period of time. The TPDS introduced a dual price 
system with an initial price for BPL households that was lower than the price paid in 
the general PDS and a price for APL households that was higher than the price paid in 
the general PDS. The gap between the two sets of prices increased in 1998 and 1999 
as BPL prices were kept constant whereas, APL prices were raised. 
In the Budget 2000-01, per family quota of foodgrain to BPL families was 
raised to 20 kg. Further it was decided in the same budget that foodgrains distributed 
to APL family would no longer carry any subsidy. This meant that APL families 
were now required to pay equal to the economic costs of foodgrains. BPL foodgrains 
prices, on the other hand, were set at 50 percent of the economic cost benefiting an 
estimated 65.2 million poor families. However, increase in APL prices of foodgrains 
sharply reduced the offtake of foodgrains from central pool. Even state governments 
avoided lifting their quota. This made central government rescind its food 
management policy. Consequently, A High Level Committee was constituted to 
advise government on its food management. In its interim report the committee asked 
the central government to reduce the hike in foodgrains prices for APL family, which 
the government did in two phases i.e. July 2001 and April 2002. Indeed, APL prices 
are still much closure to the market prices, which is forcing a large number of APL 
families to get out of the PDS net. From April 2002, BPL quota of foodgrains was 
further raised to 35 kg per family per montli. 
5.2.2.L3 Antayodya Anna Yojna (AAY): 
In order to make TPDS more focusscd and targeted AAY was launched in March 
2000. The scheme basically aimed at reducing hunger among the poorest one crorc of 
the total 6.52 crores BPL families. As National Sample Survey (NSS) in its exercise 
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had pointed towards the fact that about 5 percent of the total population in the country 
sleeps without two squire meals a day. Under the schemes foodgrains are provided at 
highly subsidized price of Rs 2 per kg for wheat and Rs 3 per kg for rice to the 
identified one crore poorest families. The offtake under AAY has been quite 
impressive. 
Despite identification of poor and issue of distinctive ration cards still 
remaining a herculean task in 14 out of the total 35 States and Union Territories 
(UTs), AAY has been received well in all the States and UTs. After assessing the 
performance government expanded the scheme to another one crore BPL families in 
two phases, (i.e. 50 lakhs in June 2003 and 50 lakhs in the union budget 2004-05). 
While observing the trend in TPDS offtake, we find that in 1997-98 the 
offtake was 13.15 million tones, which in the next year rose to 18.47 million tones. 
Thereafter, offtake ranged between 11 and 19 million tones in subsequent years. In 
the current year, offtake was recorded highest at 22.52 million tones. In percentage 
terms offtake was above 70 percent in the initial three years and after that it remained 
below 45 percent of the total allocation. Trend of BPL offtake shows that with gradual 
increased of quota from 10 to 35 kgs per family per month, the total offtake under 
BPL increased form 4.4 million tones in 1997-98 to 14.75 million tones during 2003-
04. In percentage terms the offtake during first two years of scheme was above 80 
percent and thereafter it varied between 59 to 65 percent. Likewise, during the first 
two years, the offtake under APL was 80 and 60 percent of its total allocation but 
after the increase in APL prices the offtake as a percentage to total allocation has 
come down to as low as 5 percent in 2002-03 and 8 percent in 2003-04. In absolute 
term, the offtake under APL has come down from 12.47 million tones in 1998-99 to 
just 1.84 million tones in 2001-02. After reduction in central issue price for APL 
families, it has again picked up. In the current year offtake was recorded at 3.95 
million tones as against 2.8 million tones in 2002-03. The most satisfactor}' 
performance under TPDS is of Antayodya Anna Yojna (AAY) where except in the 
launching year, the offtake has always been above 80 percent of the total allocation to 
the scheme (Table 5.25). 
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Tabic: 5.25 Offtake of Foodgrains under Targeted Public Distribution System 
(Million Tones) 
Year 
1997-98* 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
BPL 
4.40 
5.97(83.9) 
6.99(91.31) 
9.65 (60.44) 
10.05(52.26) 
13.51 (59.34) 
14,75(65.42) 
APL +Additional 
12.47(80.16) 
9.81 (60.42) 
2.11 (18.46) 
1.84(18.04) 
2.80(5 91) 
3.95 (8.96) 
AAY 
0.024 (42.86) 
1.68(85.61) 
3.54(85.73) 
3.82 (83.93) 
TPDS 
13.15(72.72) 
18.47(81.34) 
16.80(70.32) 
11.79(42.93) 
13.57(45.21) 
19.85(26.71) 
22.52(31.63) 
Source: Various Foodgrains Bulletin. 
*June to March, as the scheme was launched in June. 
Figures in parenthesis represent percentage to total allocation to the scheme. 
While assessing the overall performance of TPDS, two major problems are 
worth noting. Firstly, a large section of the population comprising poorest, illiterate 
and migratory' had no access to PDS for want of ration cards. Secondly, the problem 
of bogus ration cards aggravated in the TPDS era. Resourceful persons managed to 
obtain more than one ration cards, thus depriving the genuine targeted group of access 
to PDS. Further, in offtake there are a lot of regional disparities. Under the scheme 
states were required to identify the BPL families but a majority of the states have not 
yet completed the identification tasks. It is also observed that overall 18 percent of the 
total BPL households have not yet been issued the ration cards thus being deprived of 
access to PDS. The number of BPL families who are yet to be issued ration cards are 
21 percent in Andhra Pradesh, 50 percent in Meghalaya, 23 percent in Jammu and 
Kashmir, 35 percent in Assam. 21 percent in Bihar, 20 percent in Chandigarh and 88 
percent in Nagaland. It is also found that the lowest expenditure group with monthly 
expenditure level of less than Rs. 1000 per month was having lowest ration card 
ownership at 16 percent. The ration card ownership increases with increasing monthly 
expenditure and for the highest group of expenditure level above Rs. 4000 per month, 
the rations card ownership increased to 89 percent. Reach of the TPDS is further 
inhibited due to infrequent opening of the ration shops. " 
Taimni, K. Brij, op. oil, p. 83. 
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5.2.2.1.4 Disparities in Offtake of Foodgrains: 
There has been quite large variation in offtake of foodgrains among states. There are 
richer states that managed PDS well in comparison to the poorer states who could not 
manage PDS as desired. This variation led to further worsening the situation of food 
security in many of the poorer states like Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pardesh etc. For 
example, during nineties, Karnataka and Kerala showed a good average percentage 
offtake of 81 and 83 percent respectively whereas, Bihar and Rajasthan showed 
lowest average percentage offtake of rice at 31 percent and 24 percent respectively 
despite the fact that the overall allocation to these states was increased by the 
government. And in case of wheat Karnataka and Kerala showed average percentage 
offtake of 82 and 89 percent whereas, the same for Bihar and Rajasthan was 67 and 
57 percent respectively.''' Further, the allocation of foodgrains under PDS has not 
been fairly linked with the extent of poverty. The poorer states like Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh Orissa. Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, which have a high concentration of 
poverty, received very low PDS allocations in comparison to some developed states. 
There is also a substantial regional variation in the quantities of different commodities 
sold through the PDS. In 1990, for instance, the four states of Kerala, Maharashtra, 
Vv'est-Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh accounted for over 40 percent of the total 
foodgrains supplied. The rations for which a family is eligible usually vary with 
family size with a ceiling in certain cases. There is a large variation in the ration scale 
across the states for example; the monthly entitlement of foodgrain per adults is 13.8 
kg in Kerala, 10 kg in Maharashtra and 8 Kg in Bihar. Among these states Kerala 
scale satisfies the minimum requirement of 370 gms of cereals per person per day, 
whereas, in many other states ration scales were inadequate according to the 
minimum cereal requirements. PDS in many states is highly concentrated in urban 
areas for example, in Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal 
the per capita purchases from the PDS as well as their share in the market purchase of 
cereal were quite higher in the urban areas. 
Poor functioning of PDS has been an issue of interest to many researchers who 
from time to lime have taken great pains in explaining the inadequacies in functioning 
Report of the High Level Comiiuliee on Long Term Grain Policy, July, 2002, Ministry of 
Cisisumer Affairs, Food and i'ublic Distribution, Government of India. 
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of the present food management. Table 5.26 shows poverty wise ranking of some 
states as well as the ranking of the public distribution system in the same. According 
to the table, Orrissa is the most poor state ranked at one but its ranking in the public 
distribution is lO'*^ . On the other hand Kerala which stands first in PDS operation is 
ranked 11'^ in poverty. Likewise Bihar ranked second in poverty whereas, its public 
distribution performance is ranked 11"'. Punjab, Haryana, Utlar Pradesh and Madhya 
Pradesh, which are considered to be poorer states, have been given lower ranking in 
PDS. The table also explains why the PDs, which is an important ingredient of 
government's poverty alleviation programmes, has failed in reducing poverty. 
Table: 5.26 PDS and Poverty: State-wise Ranking of Selected States 
States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Karnalaka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
PDS (Ranking) 
5 
11 
4 
12 
7 
] 
9 
6 
10 
13 
8 
•^ J 
14 
2 
Poverty (Ranking) 
12 
2 
10 
13 
8 
11 
5 
7 
1 
14 
9 
3 
6 
4 
5'ow7-ce:Mooij(1999). 
Table 5.27 shows compound growth in procurement and public distribution. 
During 1950 to 1980 growth in procurement was almost double than the grov»1h in 
public distribution. Higher growth in procurement is understandable from the fact that 
the period of 1950s to 1980s was marked with high uncertainty in food production 
and thus it was one of the prime objectives of the government to increase stocks of 
foodgrains through high procurement. However, after India gained self-sufficiency in 
food production during 1990s the growth in procurement and public distribution came 
to be equal. But after the structural adjustment programme we find a negative 
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relationship between procurement and public distribution while the former grew at 
6.56 percent the later recorded a negative growth of-2.51 percent. 
Table: 5.27 Growth Rates of Procurement and Public Distribution 
(Percent/annum) 
Year 
1950 to 1981 
1981 tol991 
1991 to 2001 
Procurement 
11.20 
3.32 
6.56 
Public distribution 
5.21 
3.27 
-2.51 
Source: Vanous Economic Survey Reports, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. 
Since independence India has successfully been averting large-scale famines 
although the country did face some severe droughts from time to time but overall 
there has been marked improvement in the physical and economic access to food. 
However, an evaluation of the PDS shows that it has not been successful in 
eradicating the hunger and malnutrition wide prevalent in the poorer and tribal areas 
of the country. Furthermore while the system is ostensibly for the benefit of the poor 
it did not succeed in ensuring reasonable prices to the most vulnerable sections of the 
society. It is reported in the India Development Report 2002 that government is 
spending almost five Rs. to reach the benefit of one Rs. to the consumer. 
Simultaneously, we also find spiraling of the food subsidy bill of the government in 
recent years. Launching of a number of scheme ostensibly to ease the government's 
fiscal burden has either been achieved through cuts in the value of subsidy per person 
or by means of targeting and a reduction in the number of beneficiaries or by both 
means tighter. 
As a whole, we find (hat during the structural adjustment programme there has 
been improvement in the allocation of foodgrains to the poor families but the 
foodgrain price policy pursued during the structural adjustment programme era has 
taken much of the shine. Mike in issue prices of foodgrains had a significant impact on 
excluding the APL families from the PDS network and mounting of the food stocks. 
Increasing food stocks in turn had a huge carrying cost leading to eating up of 
subsidies and investment in agriculture. 
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5.2.3. Price Position of Foodgrains: 
5.2.3.1 Minimum Support/Procurement Price: 
II is another very important constituent of government's food management. It assures 
farmers a minimum price of their produce so that they are not to worry about glut in 
the market. This encourages producers to pursue their effort with the assurance that 
the price of their produce would not be allowed to fall below the level fixed by the 
government. The fixation of MSPs and elaborate aiTangement for procurement of 
foodgrains and other commercial crops have helped in achieving quantum jump in 
production of various crops over the years. 
During the post reform period there has been major changes in the price 
structure. Government increased the minimum support prices for various crops. For 
example, the minimum support prices of wheat have increased very fast during the 
period of nineties as compared to the eighties (Table 5.28). During 1991—92 and 
1992-93 there was over 40 percent increase in MSP wheat. Throughout the post 
reform period there was an average increase in MSP of wheat for over 8 percent per 
amium. Overall, there was an increase in MSP of wheat in nineties by 180 percent as 
compared to 65 percent in eighties. Prices of rice, on the other hand, increased about 
168 percent in the post reform period as compared to 76 percent in the eighties. 
Average wise MSP of rice increased by 8.19 percent in the post reform period as 
against 6.57 percent in eighties. Total increase in the minimum support price for 
wheat and rice was to the tune of Rs. 405 and 345 per quintal respectively during 
1991-2004, as against a moderate increase of Rs 85 and 80 per quintal of the same 
during 1981-1990. MSP for some other items such as oilseeds (rapeseed/mustard and 
safflower), gram and masur were raised by a substantial Rs. 100 per quintal to Rs. 
1,300, Rs. 1,200 and Rs. 1,300 respectively, while keeping the MSP for barley at 
(1999-2000) level of Rs. 500 a quintal. Between 1990-91 and 1999-2000, the MSPs 
for cotton, coarse cereal, pulses, and groundnut have increased by 137, 131, 130, and 
99 percent respectively. Large increase in MSPs have caused procurement to rise 
much above the stipulated buffer norms. Moreover, farmers are now more interested 
in selling their produce to the government than in the open market, which has reduced 
the market supply of such grains leading to higher open market prices. 
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Tabic: 5.28 Minimum Support and Central Issue Prices of Wheat and Rice 
(Rs./quintal) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
Average 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Average 
MSP 
130 
142 
151 
152 
157 
162 
166 
173 
183 
215 
163.10 
225 
275 
330 
350 
360 
380 
475 
510 
550 
580 
610 
620 
620 
630 
465.36 
Wheat 
Percentage 
Change 
9.23 
6.34 
0,66 
3.29 
3.18 
2.47 
4.22 
5.78 
17.49 
5.85 
4.65 
22.22 
20.00 
6.06 
2.86 
5.56 
25.00 
7.37 
7.84 
5.45 
5.17 
1.64 
0.00 
1.61 
8.25 
Central Issue 
Price 
160 
160 
172 
172 
190 
190 
195 
195 
204 
182.00 
234 
280 
280 
330 
402 
402 
402 
250/450 
250/650 
250/682 
450/900 
415/610 
415/510 
415/610 
341.07/481.57 
MSP 
105 
115 
122 
132 
137 
142 
146 
150 
160 
185 
139.40 
205 
230 
270 
310 
340 
360 
380 
415 
440 
490 
510 
530 
530 
550 
397.14 
Rice 
Percentage 
Change 
9.52 
6.09 
8.20 
3.79 
3.65 
2.82 
2.74 
6.67 
15.63 
6.57 
10.81 
12.20 
17.39 
14.81 
9.68 
5.88 
5.56 
9.21 
6.02 
11.36 
4.08 
3.92 
0.00 
3.77 
8.19 
Central Issue 
Price 
188 
188 
208 
217 
231 
239 
239 
239 
244 
221.44 
289 
377 
377 
437 
537 
537 
537 
350/700 
350/905 
350/905 
590/1135 
565/795 
565/695 
565/795 
459.00/644.36 
Source: From Various Eco?wmic Siirvey 
Note: For rice fair and average quality 
From year 1997-98, government 
Line (BPL) and Above Poverty 
shown as BPL/APL. 
Reports, and Foodgrains Bulletin 
is taken into account. 
declared two central issue prices for Below Poverty 
Line (APL) customers. In this table these prices are 
One the other hand substantial increase in MSPs have mainly benefited the 
surplus producing farmers of Punjab, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh, which accounts 
for nearly 80 percent of wheat and rice procurement. Procurement operations are 
concentrated mostly in surplus stales. Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana are the 
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major rice procuring states while Punjab Haryana and Uttar Pradesh account for the 
bulk of the wheat procurement. Over the years procurement of wheat and rice has 
increased from 11.2 million tones in 1980-81 to over 24 million tones in 1990-91. 
Current year combined procurement of tice and wheat has crossed over 41 million 
tones (Table 4.2). Overall procurement of foodgrains by government, which averaged 
17 million tones in eighties jumped to over 28 million tones during nineties (Table 
5.23). During later years of the nineties large and subsequent increase in the minimum 
support prices have mainly been responsible in shooting up the food stocks with 
government. Only a handful of large farmers benefited from the higher MSP. On the 
other hand small and marginal farmers suffered most due to decline in the public 
investment in agriculture. 
5.2.3.2 Central Issue Prices: 
After the structural adjustment, the central issue prices of commodities, supplied 
through the PDS have been raised regulaiiy. Issue prices of foodgrains were nearly 
doubled between 1991 and 1994, and thereafter increased throughout the decade. 
Between 1991-94 the issue price of common variety of rice rose by 85.8 percent and 
the issue price of wheat rose by 71.8 percent. Against the background of falling state 
developmental expenditures in rural areas and declining non-farm and other 
employments, issue prices were raised more than the procurement prices by 
government in an effort to cut the food subsidy, but this predictably backfired with the 
poor being priced out, sales dropping, stocks building up in excess of buffer norms, 
and a higher share of the subsidy simply going towards the cost of stocks holding. 
Central issue price of wheat, which was Rs. 160 per quintal in 1981-82, rose to over 
Rs. 200 per quintal by the end of eighties. Overall, there was 27 percent increase in 
the central issue price of wheat during eighties, which after the economic reforms shot 
up to over 100 percent for BPL customers and about 200 percent for APL customers. 
Like wise central issue price of rice increased by 29 percent in eighties, whereas the 
same for BPL customer in nineties increased to over 130 percent and for APL 
customer the increase was recorded at 225 percent during the period (Table 5.28). 
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5.2.3.3 Trends in Price Changes: 
As prices are the ultimate indicators of the direct and indirect measure which can 
affect the consumption and nutrition, here we observe the trends in different prices 
during the last two decades. It can be seen from the table 5.29 that the minimum 
support prices of wheat and rice increased at faster rate after the economic reforms 
than eighties. Even MSP of other crops were also raised quite sharply during the post 
reform period. The table also shows a large variation in MSP during the post reform 
period than eighties. 
Table: 5.29 Compound Growth of MSP, Procurement and Central Issue 
Prices 
(Percent/annum) 
Crop 
Wheal 
Rice 
Period 
1980-81 to 1990-91 
1991-92 to 2003-04 
1980-8! to 1990-91 
1991-92 to 2003-04 
MSP 
4.93 
7.40 
5.97 
7.24 
Procurement 
3.66 
7.59 
5.88 
5.32 
Central Issue Price 
3.51 
2.31/8.05 (BPL/APL) 
3.97 
2.49/7.84 (BPL/APL) 
Source: Various Econoinic Sun ^y Reports, MinisU'y of Finance, Government of India 
hi the post reform period MSP of wheat recorded 7.40 percent growth as 
against 4.93 percent during 1980-91. Similarly, MSP of rice recorded growth of 7.24 
percent in the post reform period against 5.97 percent growth in the eighties. Due to 
continuous rise in minimum support prices there is increase in procurement. Annual 
procurement of foodgrains had averaged 17.52 million tones during eighties which 
increased to 28.28 million tones during the period of 1991-2003. However, in the last 
two years we do find some deceleration in the procurement levels. An interesting 
thing to note from the table 5.29 is that wheat procurement recorded a growth of 7.59 
percent in the post reform period from 3.66 percent in eighties, so the increase was 
more than twice. But growth in rice procurement actually declined in the post reform 
period from 5.88 percent in eighties to 5.32 percent in the nineties. Meanwhile, annual 
PDS offtake, which averaged 16 million tones during eighties, declined steadily from 
20 million tones in 1990-91 to 13 million tones in 2000. This imbalance between 
procurement and offtake essentially reflects unrealistic administered price at both 
points of the system. Minimum support price increased in ways that have caused more 
output to be sold to the FCI regardless of the public requirements. That is why the 
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average share of public distribution as proportion to domestic production has declined 
from 11 percent in eighties to 9 percent in the post reform period. PDS share as 
percentage of net availability also declined from 12 percent in eighties to 10 percent 
in the post reform. 
Reduced offtake over the time is observed due to raising of issue price of 
foodgrains at fair price shops. During eighties (1980-81 to 1990-91) central issue 
price of wheat recorded a grov l^h of 3.51 percent, which in the nineties grew at 2.31 
percent for BPL population and 8.05 percent for APL population. Similarly, central 
issue price of rice recorded annual growth of 3.97 percent in eighties, v/hich came 
down to 2.49 percent for BPL population and jumped at 7.84 percent for APL families 
in the post reform period (Table 5.29). The introduction of TPDS in 1997 made PDS 
less attractive to those 'above the poverty line'. While the subsidy for the BPL people 
increased but reduction in their quota to only 10 Kg per household per month 
immediately reduced the offtake from 19.7 million tones in 1996-97 to an average of 
17.5 million tones for the next three years. Another increase in the issue prices in 
April 2000 for the 'above poverty line' population to the full economic cost and for 
'below poverty line' population to half of the economic cost reduced the offtake 
further. This increased the procurements further by moving away the foodgrains from 
market to the godowns of FCI causing higher inflation for food items during the post 
reform period (1997-2000) as compared to for all commodities. 
5.2.3.4 Trends in Agriculture Prices: 
Prices of agricultural commodities have witnessed a continuous and steady rise since 
second five-year plan in 1956. By the year 1970-71 agriculture prices had doubled as 
compared to 1960-61 and more than doubled in 1981-82 as compared to 1970-71. In 
2002-03 they were higher by over four times over the prices in 1982-83. A 
comparative study of the Wholesale Price Indices of agricultural commodities shows 
that over the entire period from 1950-51 to 2002-03, the index of wholesale prices of 
agriculture commodities increased from 100 to 2362 i.e. an increase of over twenty 
three times. Steep rise in the prices of agricultural commodities over the years has 
Mishra, R.K and Puri S '< , Indian Economy, Himalaya Publishing House, 2000, p. 487. 
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had many adverse effects. Firstly, due to the heavy weightage assigned to the 
agricultural commodities the overall index of wholesale prices in India has 
contributed considerably to overall increase in prices over the decade, which in fact 
has mainly been responsible for erosion in purchasing capacity of a large section of 
the poor population. Secondly, persistent rise in prices of most of the agricultural 
crops have contributed their share in further pushing up the index of agricultural 
prices, for example, during the period, 1982-83 to 2002-03. The index number of 
wholesale prices of rice and wheat registered over four-time increase. While that of 
pulses recorded an increase of over five-time (base 1981-82=100). Prices of most 
other crops like raw cotton, groundnuts, raw jute etc also showed considerable 
increase. Thirdly, a noticeable point of these trends is wide fluctuation observed in 
prices of several agricultural commodities during a single year. For example, the 
index of rice rose by over 30 percent in a single year in 1991-92 over 1990-91. 
Further in 1998-99 the price of rice rose by 15.4 percent over 1997-98. The index of 
wheat rose by as much as 18.6 percent in 1993-94 over 1992-93. In 1996-97, the 
prices of wheat rose by 31 percent over 1995-96 only to witness another fall of 11 
percent in 1997-98. In 1998-99 it again rose by 23 percent. Pulses too were no 
exception. It witnessed a rise of 26.5 percent in 1993-94 over 1992-93 and 16.6 
percent in 1995-96 over 1994-95. Similarly, the price of raw cotton shot up by as 
much as 93.7 percent in 1993-94 as compared with 1992-93. It went down by 32.5 
percent in 1995-96 than the prices in 1994-95. In 1997-98 the price of raw cotton 
increased by another 21.3 percent over the price of it in 1996-97 and witnessed 
another fall of 8.0 percent in 1998-99.'' During the period of 1991-94, the index of 
wholesale prices rose by 44.4 percent between 1990-91 and 1994-95, the consumer 
price index for agricultural laborers (CPIAL) rose by 53.1 percent. Wholesale price 
index of wheat increased with the annual compound growth rate of 10.26 percent in 
nineties compared to 4.70 percent in eighties. 
This shows that the cumulative increase in the prices of major foodgrains sold 
through the PDS was higher than the corresponding increase in other general price 
indices which is contributing to the burgeoning food stocks held by the FCl. There 
was a great increase in the stocks held by FCI and therefore to a higher carrying cost 
'^  Ibid,, pp. 487-
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for FCI for holding all this excess foodgrains. Thus despite India's past record in food 
price stabilization being satisfactory, instability has increased very markedly in the 
post reform period as over the 1970s and 1980s. Spiraling prices of foodgrains have 
been a big obstruction in attaining the original objective (i.e. stability of food prices) 
of India's public food management system in the post reform period. Thus, price 
inflation had adversely affected specially the rural poor, as it were they who paid 
more for their survival. 
5.2.4 Food Stocks: 
Maintenance of buffer and operational stocks is the third important component of 
food management. The purpose of these stocks is to ensure a continuous supply of 
foodgrains through the PDS throughout the year. The buffer stocks are aimed at 
insulating the distribution system from the large year-to-year fluctuations that 
characterize Indian agriculture. Up till mid seventies most of the stocks were built out 
of imports. During those period wheat constituted the largest component of these 
stocks. However, with the rapid increase in output and productivity of rice and wheat 
after the green revolution, rice has also started emerging as a major contributor to 
foodgrains stocks. Since 1980-81 we see that the stock of rice has been greater than 
the stock of wheat except in 1984-85 and 2001-02. 
Throughout nineties especially in the latter years the food stock grew rapidly, 
about 51.02 million tones much above the buffer stocks norms of 15.8 million tones. 
Against the minimum buffer norm of rice at 8.4 million tones on January 1, rice stock 
was 25.6 milHon tones. Fresh procurement of 13.33 million tones up to end January 
further added to the rice stock position. As for wheat's minimum buffer nonn of 8.4 
million tones, the actual stock was 32.4 million tones, as on January 1, 2002. Stocks 
with government which had negative growth during eighties, sharply increased in the 
post reform years with the speed of 8.37 percent compared to -0.55 percent. In the 
post reform period there has been disproportionate increase in the stocks of foodgrain 
particularly during 1999-2000 to 2001-02, when stocks have been excess to the tune 
of over 35 million tones. However, thereafter government took some radical measures 
to reduce the overflowing stocks (Table 5.30). 
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Table: 5.30 Stocks, Buffer Norms and Excess of Foodgrains 
(Million Tones) 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Stocks (as on 1" April) 
Rice 
6.69 
6.36 
5.24 
5.24 
8.58 
10.34 
10.04 
5.91 
3.86 
7.06 
10.21 
8.86 
9.93 
13.55 
18.08 
13.06 
13.17 
13.05 
12.16 
15.72 
23.19 
24.91 
17.16 
13.07 
Wheat 
3.07 
4,55 
5.64 
9.62 
12.47 
10.21 
9.44 
3.34 
2.31 
3.46 
5.6 
2.21 
2.74 
7.00 
8.72 
7.76 
3.24 
5.08 
9.66 
13.19 
21.50 
26.04 
15.65 
6.93 
Total @ 
9.87 
11.07 
11.10 
14.92 
21.20 
20.75 
19.53 
9.43 
6.18 
10.52 
15.81 
11.07 
12.67 
20.54 
26.8 
20.82 
16.41 
18.12 
21.82 
28.91 
44.98 
51.02 
32.81 
20.64 
Buffer Norms 
(as on r ' April) 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
14.50 
15.80 
15.80 
15.80 
15.80 
15.80 
15.80 
Excess Stocks 
1.31 
-3.43 
-1.83 
6.04 
12.30 
6.32 
1.91 
3.62 
6.02 
13.11 
29.18 
35.22 
17.01 
4.84 
Source: Foodgrains Bulletin, (Various Issues) Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public 
Distribution, (a);. Includes Coarse Cereals. 
As pointed earlier that large stocks of foodgrains with the government were 
mainly a consequence of the price support operation. Higher price set by the 
government could not make the effective demand of foodgrains. Consequently, high 
grain reserve in public storage, coupled with government's effort to protect the 
farmers with high procurement prices of grains put heavy drains on the exchequer. 
Besides, excess procurement due to higher MSPs and mounting stocks of foodgrains 
much above the required norms, have led to elimination of private trade and even 
higher commitments for government subsidy. The food subsidy, which was Rs 2850 
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crore in 1991-92 increased to over Rs. 25000 crore in 2003-04. The buffer subsidy 
which was Rs 1,494 crore in 1995-96 had risen to Rs 4,233 crore in just 5-6 years 
indicating a rise of about 200 percent. ^ Thus much larger buffer stocks, entailing 
much larger buffer canying costs. FCI's economic cost of rice and wheat as in 1997-
98 the buffer component of the food subsidy bill was only 13 percent which had risen 
to an alarming 42 percent by 2001-2002. In 1994-95, the carrying cost of buffer 
stocks amounted to 41 percent (Table 5.31). Thus, unsold food stocks of foodgrains 
pushed up the carrying cost, which in turn had further raised the subsidy burden. 
Government in an attempt to tackle the problem of bulging food stocks has 
now resorted to export of foodgrains at even below the economic cost. 
Simultaneously, it also launched a number of food distribution schemes to make a 
trim in the burgeoning public expenditure. Current figures show that govermnent has 
been successful in its attempt. However, how far these attempts have been fruitful in 
securing the food security objective is another matter. For example, government did 
not provide food below economic costs to its own people falling in the above poverty 
line category, whereas it agreed to export food below the economic costs to other 
countries. Also a number of schemes launched in recent years are yet to be evaluated 
on the food security parameters. The haste with which government has acted to reduce 
the food stocks smacks dumping of food stocks with a purpose to reduce expenditure 
than to serve the poor. Reports of hunger, malnutrition and farmers suicides from 
various nooks and corner of the country is just a pointer in that direction. 
5.2.5 Subsidies: 
Budgetary subsidies of the central and state governments have witnessed a 
phenomenal grouch both in terms of volume and diversity. The major categories of 
agriculture subsidies are food, fertilizer, irrigation, power and credit. Food and 
fertilizer subsidies are provided by the central government, whereas, irrigation and 
power subsidy is mainly incurred by states go\'ernments. The cost of credit subsidy is 
born by the banking system where central government has a major stake. Measuring 
true economic costs of these subsidies is complicated as it is not only the burden on 
Economic Sun'ey 2001-2002, Ministry otTinaiice, Government of India, New Delhi, p. 125. 
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exchequer but also hidden economic costs that are difficult to measure. There are 
genuine concerns that in recent years many of the subsidies have reached 
unsustainable levels. 
5.2.5.1 Food Subsidies: 
Food subsidy represents the expenditure incurred on procurement of foodgrains, 
warehousing, storage, and distribution through the public distribution system. It 
comprises two components (i) the cost incurred on managing the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) and (ii) the benefits extended to the end consumer who is able to purchase 
foodgrains at less than the market prices. Food subsidies have been granted since the 
commencement of planning from 1950-51. And today it is one of the most important 
subsidies of the central government. Based on the recommendation of the 
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) procurements and sale price of 
the foodgrains from the central pool is fixed by the government. Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) assists the government in procurement, storage and distribution and 
import of foodgrains Food subsidies is paid to FCI by the government for the 
reimbursement of: 
(1) The difference between the economic cost of different foodgrains and their 
issue prices and 
(2) Cost of carrying the buffer stocks. 
While the former comes under the consumer subsidy latter is the cost of 
carrying the buffer stocks, which consists of handling, storage, interest and 
administrative charges, incurred by FCI for maintenance of these stocks. 
There is an exponential rise in food subsidy bill from Rs. 662 crore in 1980-81 
to Rs. 2,450 crore in 1990-91 and to over Rs. 25000 crores by 2003-04. Table 5.31 
shows changes in the go\'ernments' expenditure on food subsidy. We see a 
phenomenal growth in the food subsidy of the government from Rs. 2450 crores to 
over Rs. 25160 crores. In 1993-94 alone the food subsidy doubled from Rs. 2785 
crores to Rs. 5537 crores. In proportion to GDP food subsidy bill remained constant at 
around 0.5 percent except in 1993-94 (0.7 percent), which indicates that the burden of 
food subsidy in terms of (}DP has not risen but on few occasions. However, in the 
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later two years food subsidy has picked up at 0.63 percent and 0.84 percent of the 
GDP respectively. On the other hand, buffer subsidy as percentage to total food 
subsidy shows two trends. In the first phase, which starts from 1992-93, it increased 
from 16.2 percent to over 40 percent than it started declining and reached at 12.5 
percent in 1997-98. Thereafter its share has again started picking up, which in the year 
2001-02 had ri.sen to over 40 percent. Thus, a significant part of the food subsidy bill 
is eaten up by the bulging buffer stock. 
Table: 5.31 Food Subsidies of the Central Government 
(Rs. Crore) 
Year 
1990-91 
1992-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
Total 
Subsidy 
2450 
2850 
2785 
5537 
4509 
4960 
5166 
7500 
8700 
9200 
12010 
17494 
24176 
25160 
Subsidy on 
Buffer 
Stocks 
~ 
-
451 
1246 
1853 
1419 
763 
937 
1596 
1894 
4233 
5680 
NA 
NA 
Buffer subsidy 
as % of total 
food subsidy 
-
-
16.2 
22.5 
41.1 
28.6 
14.8 
12.5 
18.3 
20.6 
35.1 
41.5 
NA 
NA 
Food subsidy as 
% of total 
expenditure 
2.33 
2.56 
2.27 
3.9 
2.8 
2.78 
2.46 
3.23 
3.11 
3.03 
3.4 
-
NA 
NA 
Food subsidy 
as % of GDP 
0.48 
0.48 
0.41 
0.70 
0.49 
0.46 
0.42 
0.54 
0.53 
0.51 
0.63 
0.84 
NA 
NA 
Source: Report of High Level Committee on Long Term Grain Policy, July 2002, p. 157 and 
Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Food. Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution. 
5.2.5.2 Input Subsidies: 
Input subsidies in agriculture can be broadly classified under the heads of fertilizer, 
irrigation, power and credit. Fertilizer subsidy is the difference between the price paid 
to manufacturers of fertilizer (domestic or foreign) and price received from farmers. 
The irrigation subsidy is derived as the difference between the gross recurring 
expenditure in the sector and the receipts from user charges. The power subsidy is 
calculated as the difference between the average cost of production and unit 
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realization from sale of electricity to agricultural consumers, multiplied by the 
quantity estimated to be sold to such consumers. And credit subsidy is the difference 
between interest charged to farmers and actual costs of credit to banks, plus other 
costs such as write-offs etc. 
Public expenditure on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, electricity and 
irrigation has also increased over the years. Total input subsidy for agriculture has 
increase from Rs. 14000 crores in 1993-94 to over Rs. 34000 crores in 2000-01. Bulk 
of the total input subsidy is shared by fertilizer and irrigation, for example, fertilizer 
subsidies which was just Rs. Rs 515 crore in 1980-81 rose to over 4000 crores in 
1993-94. In 1993-94 irrigation subsidy recorded highest of the input subsidy at over 
Rs. 5000 crores. Electricity subsidy recorded highest in the year 1996-97 when it 
touched the figure of Rs. 8000 crore. In the current year fertilizer and irrigation 
subsidies constituted to over Rs. 26000 crores. (Table 5.32) 
Year 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
Table-
Fertilizer 
4562 
5769 
6735 
7578 
9918 
11596 
13244 
13800 
5.32 Input Subsidy on Indian Agriculture 
Agriculture Subsidies (R; 
Electricity 
2400 
2338 
1977 
8356 
4937 
3819 
4276 
6449 
Irrigation 
5872 
6772 
7931 
9221 
10318 
11827 
11487 
13681 
i. Crores) 
Others 
1235 
1246 
1034 
895 
983 
1182 
1937 
854 
Total 
14069 
16125 
17677 
26050 
26156 
28424 
30944 
34784 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation, New Delhi 
Government in an attempt to cut down the burgeoning burden of fertilizer 
subsidies decontrolled the prices of phosphatic and pottasic fertilizers in August 1992. 
However, this has resulted in price and use distortion leading to heavier utilization of 
nitrogenous fertilizer compared to non-nitrogenous fertilizers. Economic Survey 
1995-96 admits that NPK ratio, which was almost at an ideal level prior to the 
decontrol in August 1992. witnessed steep deviation after the decontrol. Increased 
prices of fertilizer have adversely affected particularly small and marginal farmers 
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resulting in loss of income due to fall in production.'^ A survey conducted by Raghav 
Ghai in 1994 in Andhra Pradesh. Maharashtra, and Kamataka indicated a significant 
fall in the consumption of fertilizer per hectare, reduction in foodgrain production and 
consequently aggravating rural poverty. 
An expert summed up the problems faced by Indian agriculture in these 
words, "India's current agrarian crisis has multiple causes, the chief among these 
being, first the sharp cut-back in Governments' developmental expenditures in the 
nineties, especially in rural areas, leading to falling growth rates of employment and 
income; and second, trade liberalizing policies entailing the removal of quantitative 
restrictions and subsidies."'^ 
5.2.6. Purchasing Power: 
Purchasing power is another very important component of food security after the 
availability of food. Purchasing power increases with the increase in income of the 
people. Rise in percapita income increases the purchasing power of the people which 
results not only in direct increase in demand for cereals but more importantly it leads 
to much larger increase in derived demand for cereals which, improves the food 
security. It has been well observed that with a rise in percapita income, there is a shift 
of expenditure from cereals to superior foods like meat, milk, fish and other animal 
husbandry products. Net national product in the country had grown at a modest rate of 
3.8 percent per annum between 1950-51 and 1992-93. During 1992-97 national 
income rose at the rate of 6.6 percent per annum, thereafter, the inflow of foreign 
capital played an important role in generating growth in the country. However, despite 
that the rate of growth in net national product was lower than rate of the population 
growth, consequently percapita income showed a declining trend in these years. 
Percapita income, which rose at a rate of 1.3 percent during the period (1960-70), 
" Gupta, S.R., "Recent Economic Reforms in India and tiicir Impact on the Poor and Vulnerable 
Sections of the Society" in Rao.C.H.H. and Linemann, H. (ed.). Economic Reforms and Poverty 
Alleviation in India, Sage Publications, 1996 
18 Ibid, p 135. 
' Patnaik, Utsa "Deflation And Deja Vu, Indian Agriculture in The World Economy, Centre For 
Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharla! Nehru University, January 3-6,2002. 
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recorded an impressive grovAlh of 3 percent during 1980-88. But, during 1988-2000 it 
declined to 1.8 percent."" 
Household food security is not merely a function of availability of food but 
also of the purchasing capacity of each household. The poor usually lack adequate 
means to access food especially when the income generated in the countiy is not 
equally distributed. According to the latest available estimates (2000), poorest, 10 
percent of the population consumes less than 3.5 percent of the total consumption, 
whereas the richest 20 percent consumes over 46 percent. Likewise poorest 20 percent 
population share less than 8 percent in the total consumption whereas, the richest 10 
percent consumes more than 33 percent. 
5.2.6.1 Povert}': 
At the dawn of independence, India inherited an economy marked by extremely low 
level of percapita income and abject poverty. So the alleviation of poverty has been 
one of the main objectives since the beginning of the economic planning in India. The 
official poverty estimates shows that the percent of population living below poverty 
line has been declining steadily in recent years. For the country as a whole, the 
poverty numbers since 1977-78 have been diminishing: as shown in the table 5.33. 
The head count ratio for rural and urban India combined halved during 1977-78 to 
1999-2000. In terms of absolute number as well the number of poor has declined from 
329 million in 1977-78 to 260 million in 1999-2000. The incidence of poverty has 
historically been higher in rural areas as compared to the urban areas because still 
about 74 percent of the population classified as poor lives in rural areas. Lack of 
access by the rural masses to productive assets such as land and low and stagnating 
productivity in agriculture contributes greatly to existing poverty and food insecurity. 
As per the results of 57"^  NSS round, at the all India level the proportion of 
chronically hungry households (not getting enough to eat during any month of the 
year) has declined to 0.5 percent in rural areas and 0.1 percent in urban areas. As for 
Blialla, G.S. "Policy for Food Security in India" in: Blialia, G.S. (Ed.), Economic Liberalizalion 
and Indian Agriculture, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, 1994, 
p.140. 
Taimini, K, Brij, 2004, op. cit. p, \vi. 
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seasonal hunger, 16 per thousand households in rural areas and 3 per thousand 
households in urban areas reported getting enough food only in some months of the 
year. 
22 
Tabic: 5.33 Estimates of Incidence of Povertj' in India 
Year 
1977-78 
1983 
1987-88 
1993-94 
1999-2000 
Poverty Ratio (Percent) 
Rural 
53.1 
45.7 
39.1 
37.3 
27.1 
Urban 
45.2 
40,8 
38.2 
32.4 
23.6 
Combined 
51.3 
44.5 
38.9 
36.0 
26.1 
Number of Poor (Million) 
Rural 
264.3 
252.0 
231.9 
244.0 
193.2 
Urban 
64.6 
70.9 
75.2 
76.3 
67.1 
Combined 
328.9 
322.9 
307.1 
320.3 
260.3 
Source: Economic Survey 2003 - 2004, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New 
Delhi. 
The mid-1980s appears to be a significant watershed in the evolution of living 
standards in India when there was a marked decline in both rural and urban poverty 
rates. However, situation after that almost remained unchanged. For rural India, 
virtually no change in the pre- and post-reform poverty measures were seen as all 
poverty measures, the percentage change ranging between 3.1 percent for the 
headcount index, -0.2 percent for the poverty gap inde.x and -4 percent for the 
squared poverty gap index. This relative lack of change in the poverty rates is also 
reflected in the rural real mean consumption, which also remained virtually 
unchanged over this period. In contrast, there was about a 10 percent increase in the 
urban real mean consumption. This growth in average living standards is also 
reflected in a decline in the urban poverty measures. For instance, the urban 
headcount index declined by about 12 percent, the urban poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap indices declined somewhat more rapidly, by about 15 and 20 percent, 
respectively. As a whole India could barely maintain its 1980s rate of poverty 
reduction in the post reform period, as no faster decline over the 1990s could be 
observed. From 1960 to 1990 the ratio of the rural poverty rate to the urban poverty 
rate hovered in the range of 1.1 to 1.2. However, over the 1990s, the ratio of rural-to-
urban poverty rates leaped up to 1.4. The 1990s have seen rising rural incidence 
relative to urban mainly due to increase in the prices of foodgrains. Though it also 
Economic Survey 2003 - 2004, Ministr\' of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi. 
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broLiglil some improvement in ihc agricultural terms of trade and led to higher private 
investment but only at the cost of declining real wages for agricultural laborers 
leading to erosion in their purchasing power, hi the post reform period, the slowing 
down of rural employment growth affected the pace of decline in rural poverty and 
widened rural-urban disparities."^ Also in the post reform period relative prices of 
foodgrains particularly cereals moved faster making the poor affected more adversely 
and bringing somewhat higher inequality within the sector. That is why real mean 
consumption of the bottom 40 percent of the rural population recorded negative 
growth. 
However, failure of the rural poverty measures to decline cannot be squarely 
blamed on structural adjustment policies only as the stagnation in rural poverty could 
also be caused by the lack of over all grouth in the sector. Moderate improvement in 
urban living standards appears to be due to the decline in urban poverty rates. 
5.2.6.2 Employment in Agriculture: 
Another aggravating factor impairing the purchasing power of the hidian household is 
the large-scale prevalence of unemployment along with rapidly growing working 
population. Under such circumstances, many a times families are forced to acquire 
purchasing power at a certain social cost like child labor. The magnitude o[ the 
problem can be gauged from the fact that unemployment which was of the order of 2-
3 crores (20-30 million) at the beginning in 1992 added another 3.5 crores (35 
million) by the year 1997. 
The 55"' round of the National sample survey (1999-2000) showed some 
major shift in the pattern of employment especially in the rural areas. The survey 
showed a substantial decline in the share of agriculture and a rise in the share of non 
agriculture in employment which resulted a large drop in work participation rates of 
both men and women indicating a deceleration in aggregate employment growth and 
even sharpei" drop in rural cmplo_ymenl growth. It can be seen from the table 5.34 that 
there is a marked deceleration in employment generation during the post reform 
' ' Economic andPolilical Weekly. Mumbai, January 19, 2002. 
~' lliiinan Development in Soiiih Asia. 2002. Oxford University Press, Kar;iclii, p.142. 
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period, however, deceleration in rural employment is more severe as compared to the 
urban. Thus, the combined estimates viewed as an average annual rate of growth of 
aggregate rural employment recorded 0.58 percent improvement over the period 
between 1993-94 and 1999-2000, which is around one fourth of the previous period's 
rate. 
Tabic: 5.34 Growth of Employment in India 
Year 
1983 to 1987-88 
1987-8810 1993-94 
1993-94 to 1999-2000 
Rural 
1.36 
2.03 
0.58 
(Percent/annum) 
Urban 
2.77 
3.39 
2.55 
Source: National Sample Survey Rounds on Employment and Unemployment 
Table: 5.35 Rural Employment Growths by Reference Periods 
(Usual Stains) 
Total Cinplovmcnl (PS) 
Total Employment (PS + SS) 
Agriculture Emplovment (PS) 
Agriculture Emplo '^ment (PS + SS) 
Non-Agriculture Employment (PS) 
Non-Agriculture Employment (PS > SS) 
1978-78 to 
1983 
1.6 
1.89 
l.il 
1.45 
3.73 
3.97 
1983 to 
1987-88 
1.45 
1.23 
0.43 
0.33 
5.27 
4.86 
1987-88 to 
1993-94 
2.01 
2.14 
2.08 
2.17 
1.76 
2.02 
1993-94 to 
1999-2000 
1.23 
0.66 
0.8 
0.18 
2.6 
2.34 
Source: Sarvekshana, various issues, (as quoted in Huinau DevelopiiienI in South Asia, 2002. 
p. 138) 
Note: National Sample Sin-vcy (NSS) collects emploxment data by three reference periods: 
(i) one year i.e. Usual Status (ii) one week and (iii) every day of the reference week. Within 
usual status Principal Status (PS) refers to main employment over the year and Subsidiarv 
Workers (SS) refers to gainful emplo>menl for some part of the year. 
Tabic 5.35 shows that there is a signillcant deceleration in rural job creation in 
both agriculture and non-agriculture over latest period 1993-94 to 1999-2000. 
although the slowdown is sharpest for agricultural employment. All agricultural 
employment (Principal Status and Subsidiary Status) recorded the sharpest slowed 
down. In general therefore there is a substantial decline in the rate of employment 
growth in agriculture. The growth rale of all India rural emplo3'mcnt is described by 
three different reference periods collected b)- the NSS in India. That are Usual Status 
-' Ibid p 137. 
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(one year), every day of the reference week, within Usual Status, Principal Status (PS) 
refers to main employment over the year. It is observed that growth rate of daily status 
is generally lower than by the usual weekly status after 1987-88, having been higher 
earlier clears that daily status unemployment increased between 1987-88 and 199.3-94 
and increased further in 1999-2000. Also post 1987-88, the weekly status growth rate 
is higher than usual status for agriculture but lower for non agriculture work." 
No doubt structural adjustment policies have created the vistas of new 
opportunities in many sectors like IT. biotech, travel and tourism, transports etc. 
leading to generation of a large volume of employment resulting higher purchasing 
power but at the same time it has ceased the employment generation opportunities in 
the government sector and in private sector too increasing competition has forced 
many to adopt more sophisticated & modern technologies to remain competitive at the 
costs fronts. This has adversely affected the overall employment scenario in the 
country, particularly the rural sector, which has witnessed striking fall in the 
employment levels during the pciiod of economic reforms and thus a lower 
purchasing power for a large section of the rural population. Rural unemployment in 
all the reference period i.e. usual, weckh and daily status has worsened after the 
economic refornns. Now average worker in the agriculture sector is much poorer as 
compared with his counter part in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
5.2.6.3 Real Wages in Agriculture: 
The National Account Statistics provides estimates of rural-urban breakdown of 
national income. These show that the importance of agriculture in total rural incomes 
has been declining over the decades. llowe\er, still the Net Domestic Product (NDP) 
from agriculture is about 55 percent of rural NDP. The real wages for agricultural 
laborers witnessed a significant growlh in the 1970s as well as in the 1980s but the 
growth of real wages during nineties was less as compared to the previous two 
decades. One of the reasons for low growlh in real wages could be the increase in 
food prices after liberalization cau.sed b\ successi\e increase in the administered 
procurement prices of foodgrains. 
"" Ibid p. 138 
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According to the latest a\ailablc information the terms of trade moved in favor 
of agriculture during 1980s as well as 1990s, causing real incomes in agriculture to 
grow faster than physical production. howe\er. the rate of growth in 1990s has been 
recorded lower than the previous decade. Another important aspect to note is that 
there is virtually no growth in pcrcapita income and output after 1996-97. In fact the 
percapita agriculture real incomes have actualK declined after 1996-97 mainly due to 
very low yield growth for most of the crops and substantial terms of trade loss for 
non-cereal crops. This implied a significant shift in income distribution in the 
economy away from agriculture. Based on the estimates of 14 major states in the 
countr}' it is observed that growth in real agriculture wages in the country has declined 
from 4.66 percent during 1981-82 and 1990-91 to 2.14 percent during 1990-91 and 
1999-2000. Similarly, on the basis of cost of production surveys too there is 
remarkable decline in the post reform period from 4.13 percent in 1980-81 to 1990-91 
to 2.24 percent during 1990-91 and 1999-2000.'^ 
5.3 WTO and the Indian Agriculture: 
Apart from the impact of x'arious unilateral economic reforms undertaken since 1991, 
there is a growing concern to\\ards multi lateral trade according to which the 
economy had to reorient itself to the changing multilateral trade disciplines within the 
nevvi) written framework of the General .Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the World Trade Organization {W f0). 'fhe unilateral policy measures encompassed 
the exchange rate regime, foreign in\estment. external borrowing, import licensing, 
import tariffs, and export subsidies. Whereas, the multilateral trade policy included 
India's WTO commitments regarding trade in goods and services, trade in agriculture, 
trade-related investment measures and intellectual property rights. Thus, agriculture in 
India was first time brought into the ambit of multilateral trade regime in 1995. 
5.3.1. Uruguay Round of Agreement on Agriculture (AoA): 
Agriculture was first time brought under the G.A'f f disciplined after the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture concluded in Marrakesh in April 1994. The 
'" Ibid p,l^i6 
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Agreement came into force in India from January 1, 1995, when Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (UiMA) signatories became liable to remove all 
quantitative restrictions from agricultural and consumer goods. The Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) revolved around four key areas. 
1. Hnhanced market access; 
2. Reduction in farm subsidies; 
3. Sparing use of sanitary and phytosanitary import barriers and 
4. Introduction of intellectual property rights. 
After the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) became operative since Januaiy 1, 
1995, India had to remodel its restrictive trade policies by opening its domestic 
market to global trades. The declared objective of the AoA was to correct and prevent 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets through progressive 
reductions in agriculture support and protection within an agreed period of time. 
However, one of the contentious issues that still plagues the proper liberalization of 
the sector is the agreement that permits the use of subsidies in developed countries 
under some other pretext, whereas, limiting the options available to developing 
countries. This issue has triggered great rift in the developed and developing countries 
and thus posing a threat to the liberalisation of agriculture and the food trade. 
5.3.1.1 Market Access: 
It aims at complete freeing of imports from quantitative restrictions and introduction 
of tariff with specified upper bounds. The agreement under market access has two 
measures; tariffication and reduction of tariff Removal of all kinds of quantitati\'e 
restrictions like import quotas, minimum import prices, discretionary licensing, state 
trading, total ban of certain imports and switching towards tariff in the place of these 
measures is called tariffication. Regarding the reduction of tariff the AoA stipulates 
that developed countries should reduce their tariffs by 36 percent by the year 2000, 
whereas the less developed countries are required to reduce the same by 24 percent b\ 
\ear 2004. Apparently it looks as il' the less de\'eloped countries are permitted to 
retain higher tariff since the reduction requirements is 24 percent for them compared 
to 36 percent for developed countries. llo\\e\er, the fact is that developed countries 
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have been protecting their agriculture products for long time by retaining a very high 
tariff and thus even by making 36 percent reduction the remaining tariff in these 
countries will still be very high. On the other hand most of the less developed 
countries do not have much experience in protecting their agriculture commodities 
thus, field very low tariff. Therefore, the net result is that even after meeting the 
reduction requirements, developed countries end up with high tariffs whereas, less 
developed countries with low tariffs after the implementation of AoA. FAO (1999) 
reports that the agricultural tariffs of the developed countries remain six times higher 
than industrial tariff and there is a little impact of AoA on promoting developing 
countries excess to agricultural trade. Thus, market access clause is alleged to be a 
facilitator of the rich countries to the markets of the poor countries and not the vice 
versa. There are four significant issues regarding the market access, 
i. Tariff 
ii. Tariff quotas 
iii. Special safeguard provisions 
iv. Tariff peaks and escalation. 
5.3.1.1.1 Tariff: 
The AoA requires all non-tariff barriers to be eliminated or converted into their tariff 
equivalents. Non-tariff measures were to be converted into advolarum equivalents 
based on the price gap in the base year period i.e. 1986-88 between the administered 
price and (c.i.f) import price of the concerned product. Such exercises for arriving 
tariff equivalents has quite often resulted in prohibitively high tariff rates, thus 
providing an even higher level of protection than under multi lateral non-trade 
measures. The initial tariff binding in many cases are far higher than the actual tariff 
equivalents in 1986-88. The bound tariffs on the other hand were required to be 
reduced by 36 percent on average over six years by (January 1, 2000 by developed 
countries) and 24 percent over ten years ((January 1, 2005 by developing countries). 
An interesting aspect of this clause was the fact that tariff reduction were aggregated 
that introduced a bias in favour of lowering the higher tariff rates on sensitive 
products by the minimum levels of around 15 percent and by effecting larger cuts on 
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low tariffs, thereby leading to the maintenance of the high tariffs on some products 
like sugar, rice, dairy products etc. by meeting substantial reductions on less sensitive 
tariffs lines in which there is little trade. 
5.3.1.1.2 Tariff Quotas: 
Under the tariffication package, the AoA provisioned to ensure that the current and 
minimum market access opportunities that together represented at least 3 percent of 
the base period consumption in 1995 vv'ere progressively raised to reach 5 percent of 
that consumption by the year 2000 for developed countries and 2004 for developing 
countries. Two measures were required for the purpose; first, to maintain current 
access opportunities in products previously subject to non-tariff measures, imports 
were required to be maintained through explicit quotas at level prevailing in the 1986-
88 base period. Second, in products where current access had been les than 5 percent 
of the domestic consumption, the agreement required an additional minimum access 
opportunity on a most favored nation basis (MFN). However, no provision was made 
for minimum access for products where previous tariff had been at prohibitively 
higher levels. Two tier tariff structure was introduced (i) lower tariff rate for the in 
quota imports and (ii) a higher 'bound rate' for the rest of the imports. 
5.3.1.1.3 Special Safeguard Provisions: 
This provision was incorporated in the AoA to address the concern that tariffication 
would bring about massive of imports leading to decrease in prices of domestic goods. 
This clause allows an importing country to impose additional duties up to a specified 
limit in case of a precisely defined surge of import quantity, or case of imports at 
prices below a precisely defined reference levels. It has been proposed that 
developing countries and least developed countries should also have the right to 
recourse to the special safeguard pro\isions. As seasonal and perishable agriculture 
products have difficulty in inventory adjustments and although consumption remains 
stable, prices are elastic. These products are more susceptible to a sharp fall in prices, 
resulting from an increase in imports, thus having a huge impact on producers over a 
short period of fime. 
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5.3.1.1.4 Tariff Peaks and Escalation: 
Agriculture still remains one of the sectors that are most affected by tariff peaks and 
tariff escalations. A study by IJNCTAD in 1999 showed that more than half of the 
peak tariffs of developed countries are found in the agriculture and the fishery sector. 
One seventh of the peak tariff of Canada, one fifth of the US, a quarter of those of EU 
and about thirty percent of those of Japan exceeded thirty percent limits. The study 
further reported that most important areas with the highest tariff rates include the 
major agriculture staple food, cereals, meat, sugar, tobacco products and cotton. Tariff 
escalation^^ persists in a number of products that are important to developing 
countries such as coffee, cocoa, oilseeds, vegetables, fruits and nuts. This provides 
extra protection for processing industries in the importing counti-y, and is particularly 
perverse for developing country since it virtually taxes efforts to diversify production 
and to move into higher stage of processing. 
As far as hidia's commitment in regard to the market accesses are concerned, 
India has undertaken to bind its primaiy agricultural products at 100 percent, 
processed food at 150 percent and edible oils at 300 percent. For some agricultural 
products like skimmed milk powder, maize, rice etc which had been bound at zero or 
at low bound rates were successfully completed on December 1999. Since then the 
bound rates have been raised substantially. The present rates applied are lower than 
the bound rates in case of several agricultural commodities, implying that rates can 
further be raised up to bound levels if the need arises in future for protection of 
agriculture. For 2000-01 the average basic duty rate for all agricultural tariff lines is 
34.9 percent as against the negotiated bound rate of 114.9 percent. Against 686 
agricultural commodities for which India stood committed for tariff reductions, 2000-
01 levels of its MFN tariff rate are lower than those of Uruguay round final bound 
rates for as many as 676 commodities. After the WTO ruling that quantitative 
restrictions maintained by India on balance of payments considerations are not 
justified, India had to dismantle its remaining quantity restrictions in two phases. The 
Export Import Policy (Exim) 2001-02 remo\'ed all the remaining import restrictions 
on the final batch of 715 goods, including a large number of agricultural products. In 
'^ Tariff escalation occurs when tarifls are increased as a level of processing in a production stage 
in increased. Tariff escalation prevent development of value added activities in developing 
countries and also leads to more pollution due to higher weight transport. 
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addition to tariff protections announced in tiie Union Budget, the Exim Policy has 
instituted some WTO compliant restrictions so that highly subsidised foodgrains and 
other food products do not enter indiscriminately and pose a threat to domestic small 
farmers in the post quantitative restriction regime. 
5.3.1.2. Domestic Support: 
Domestic support also called 'Aggregate Measure of Support' (AMS) is calculated in 
terms of product and input subsidies provided by the govermnent to the agriculture 
sector as a proportion of the total value of agriculture output. It was understood that 
the product specific input subsidies like fertilizer, credit, power and irrigation will 
distort the real resource costs causing inefficient allocation of resources and loss of 
welfare. Thus, under the AoA member counties are asked to undertake reduction 
commitment on the aggregate measure of support (AMS) by 20 percent over a six 
years of time for developed countries and 13 percent over a ten years period for 
developing countries. Moreover, certain de minimis level is fixed on the agriculture 
production and investment subsidies. For developed countries, the de minimis level is 
fixed at 5 percent of the value of total agriculture production and for developing 
countries this level is fixed al 10 percent. The subsidies have to be reduced to these 
levels i.e. year 2000 for developed countries and year 2004 for developing countries. 
The shorter time limit and higher level of reduction subjected to developed 
countries is apparently to show that they are put to more discipline than developing 
countries, however, a closure look at the clause reveals that the definition of subsidies 
under the AoA differentiates between production promoting subsidies and certain 
other expenditures on farms or payments made to farmers by the government which 
are termed as "Green Box Measure\ fhese green box measures include expenditure 
on research and extension, pest and disease control, public stocking for food security 
purposes, structural adjustment programmes, environmental programme, crop and 
income insurance schemes and certain other direct payments and income supports to 
agriculture production. These expenditures are exempt from calculation of subsidies 
1 lie product specific AMS is calculated by subtracting the domestic price from the international 
price and than multiplying the resultant figure by the quantity of production. Non product 
specific subsidy is calculated by taking into account subsidies given for the fertilizer, water 
seeds credits and electricity 
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under the AoA on the ground that they are not meant to promote production and 
therefore do not distort trade. Since these payments are supposed to be production 
neutral therefore exempted from being counted as subsidies. However, the fact is 
different, as is well known. Substantial increase in agriculture production in European 
Union (EU) is mainly due to the green box payments. 
As far India is concerned it does not provide any product specific support 
other than market price support. During the reference period 1986-88 India had 
market price support programme for 22 percent product, out of which 19 were 
included in the list of commitments fielded under GATT. In 1996, developing 
countries provided only 12.5 percent of all Green Box support, while developed 
countries provided the remaining 87.5 percent. The majority of developing countries 
do not provide even 0.5 percent of total Green Box support. The budgetary constraints 
in developing countries make it further difficult to utilize some of the existing 
exempted provisions. For example, following programmes are exempted from the 
reduction commitments under the Green box measures.^ 
1. General services including research, training, inspection, extension and 
advisory services, pest control, marketing and promotion services, capital 
costs of infrastructural services. 
2. Public stockholding for food security purposes, public distribution system for 
urban and rural poor in de\'eloping countries. 
3. Decoupled income support. 
4. Income insurance and safety net programmes. 
5. Crop insurance. 
6. Structural adjustment assistance through producer retirement, resource 
retirement and investment aids. 
7. Payments under environmental and regional assistance programmes. 
'" Mehta, V.K., "Implication of WTO on Food Security", in Asthana, M D and Madrano, Pedro 
(edits.), (2001); Towards Hunger Free India Agenda and Imperatives, Manohar Publishers. 
New Delhi, pp. 426-427. 
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5.3.1.2.1 Export Subsidies: 
The commitment on export subsides is on two themes; reductions in the total 
budgetary outlays on export subsidies and reduction in the total quantity of exports 
covered by the subsidies. These reductions are on product specific basis. Developed 
countries were required to reduce the budget outlay on export subsidies by 36 percent 
and reduce the volume of subsidised export of each commodity by 21 percent within 
six years (i.e. 2000). Whereas, for developing countries the corresponding reduction 
requirements were 24 percent of budget outlays and 14 percent of the volume over 10 
years of period (i.e. 2004). For the least developed countries there was no restriction 
and longer implementations were provided. Subsidies given on transport, processing 
and packaging of agriculture export of both developed and developing countries were 
exempted from the reduction requirements. But the facts on agriculture export show 
that while developed countries subsidised their exports heavily, there were hardly any 
subsidy provided by the developing countries for agriculture exports.''' Therefore, 
even after meeting the reduction requirements the developed countries will still be left 
with substantial subsidisation of their agriculture exports. The export subsidies 
subjected to reduction commitments included.''^  
1. Direct subsidies, in cash or kind, contingent on export performance to a firm, 
industry, producers, marketing board etc. by the government or its agencies. 
2. Export at prices lower than domestic prices of non commercial stocks of 
agricultural products by the government or its agencies. 
3. Payments on the export of agricultural products financed by government 
action including levy. 
4. Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in 
exported products. 
5. Subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing export of agricultural products 
including the handling, upgrading and processing costs. 
6. Subsidies on the internal transport of exports. 
'' For instance, subsidies provided b> six industrial countries in 1995 accounted for more tiian 75 
percent of tlie global value of the export subsidies, whereas, the share of all developing 
countries combined accounted for just over 20 percent. 
' ' Mehta, V.K., op cil. p.428 
156 
5.3.1.3.Sanitary and Phytosanitarj' Agreement (SPS): 
The WTO agreement on SPS pose a greater challenge to developing countries in 
terms of raising the quality of their produce to internationally recognised levels. This 
agreement becomes a serious impediment to food trade of developing countries when 
developed countries adopt even higher standard than presently recognised by the 
international bodies. A number of developing countries' exports are encountering 
additional difficulties in the form of SPS and Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT). Trade 
harassment through arbitrary use of such measures is reported to be growing. It has 
been observed that many a times developed countries adopt SPS measures only for 
protectionist purposes by prescribing overly stringent quality standards.^^ 
The agreement on agriculture and related agreements have so far failed in 
implementing the market access for developing countries. Thus, it raises serious 
doubts about free trade based food security. On the contrary, developing countries as 
a whole experienced increased food imports, loss of domestic markets due to import 
competition and lost of public sector institutional capacity. The FAO (1999) case 
study of 14 developing countries has shown that whatever the so called productivity 
and competitiveness has been achieved is at the cost of marginallisation of small 
producers and added unemployment and misery. 
5.3.1.4.Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates members to 
provide for the protection of plant varieties, either by patent or by an effective sui 
generis system such as the plant breeders rights established in the international union 
for the protection for new varieties for plant convention. The agreement, which deals 
with the patents or effective sui generis legislation on property rights to plants and 
animal varieties as well as to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), is also 
relevant in the contest of food security. Developing countries face two kinds of 
disadvantages. First, these countries lack the scientific capability to innovate and 
patent new material. In fact they are not always in a position to even fully catalogue 
Touring 1996-97, the US Food and Drug Administration detected 11,1666 contravention of 
imports, of which 44 percent were not on any technical grounds, but just on filth and 
microbiological contamination (FAO 1999). 
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the natural resources or material they currently poses. Second, there is growing 
concentration of the transnational and multinational corporations in biotech industries. 
The concentration of these multinational industries has enabled them to exact the 
monopoly rents from the farmers worldwide. 
Present day agriculture is under strain as the arable land area has been 
shrinking with urban development and, productivity growth is levelling off due to 
diminishing potential of traditional breeding technologies. In such a situation GM 
technologies offer the potential of providing solutions. Since Indian farmers encounter 
serious disease problems such as blast in rice, rust in wheat, leaf rust in coffee, viruses 
in tomatoes, shoot borers in brinjal and boUworm in cotton etc. where use of 
chemicals provides little ammunition to deal with such problems in an expedient and 
efficient manner. These problems can effectively be tackled by using genetically 
reprogrammed seeds designed to resist such disease attacks, while economising on 
costly and harmful pesticides sprays. However, India has to face a number of issues 
that have emerged in recent past concerning production, exports/imports, labelling the 
protection of intellectual rights for GMO, 
5.3.2. AoA and its Impact on Food Security of India: 
Implementation of AoA was supposed to bring structural changes in the world 
foodgrains market. India was positioned to exploit its comparative advantage in a 
number of agricultural products including wheat and rice, however, due to decline in 
the world cereal prices, particularly wheat's by over 56 percent between 1994 and 
1999, India's comparative edge in wheat production drastically eroded.^'' As far the 
production and demand for rice is concerned India is still globally competitive in it, 
although, it is projected that surplus production of rice in the country may not lost 
longer. Thus, in the event India becoming net importer of rice domestic market prices 
of rice will shot up, as the international prices of rice are significantly higher at 
present. It is also observed that world food prices are considerably more volatile than 
"' Bhallacharyya B. and Pal, Parthaparliii, "Food Security in India in the Context of Agreement on 
Agriculture'", in: B. Bhallacharyya, (Ed.) "Seattle and Beyond: The Unfinished Agenda", hidian 
histitutc of Foreign Trade", 1998. p. 12 
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35 domestic prices. " Therefore, instability is likely to increase unless some tariffs and 
non-tariffs wedge is retained between the world and domestic rice prices. This rise 
and volatility in foodgrains prices is bound to adversely affect the poor because 
cereals are by far the major and cheap source of calories to them. Recent estimates 
suggest that poor spend about 40 percent of their budget on cereals thus well being of 
the poor in India is directly related to foodgrains prices. 
Parikh^^ has tried to find out the likely impact of changes in the world food 
prices due to India's entry into the world markets. Results as shown in the table 5.36 
found that India's entry into wheat market does not produce any major change, 
however, rice trade could bring significant impact on world rice market. According to 
the model, the price of rice will change substantially either way, for example, 5 
million metric tones of rice import will push the world rice prices up by over 72 
percent, whereas, the same quantity of export would bring the world rice prices down 
by over 20 percent. 
Table: 5.36 Changes in World Price Due to India's Trade in Rice and Wheat 
(Percent) 
Quantitj' Traded 
Million Metric Tones 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
Rice 
Import 
4.02 
8.18 
12.47 
18.31 
24,01 
32.46 
40.24 
51.84 
59.96 
72.10 
Export 
-3.69 
-7.11 
-10.26 
-11.87 
-12.94 
-14.42 
-16.16 
-17.64 
-19.05 
-20.52 
Wheat 
Import 
0.57 
1.56 
2.27 
2.98 
3.55 
4.26 
4.97 
5.68 
6.53 
7.24 
Export 
-0.57 
-1.11 
-1.70 
-2.70 
-2.70 
-3.27 
-3.84 
-4.40 
-4.83 
-5.40 
Source: Parikii, K.m\, Food Security: Individual and National, 1998. 
Nayyar, Deepak and Sen, Abhijit, "International Trade and Agriculture Sector in India", in: G.S. 
Bhalla (ed.) Economic Liberalization and Indian Agriculture, Institute for Studies in Industrial 
Development, New Delhi, 1994, p. 59. 
''' Parikh, Kiril, Food Security: Individual and National, 1998. Based on the Simulation of the 
Basic Linked System (BLS). 
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Complete integration with world food market would further bring instability in 
the foodgrains prices by exposing our products to world price signals, which have 
been found quite volatile and unstable particularly after the Uruguay round 
negotiations. Thus, any significant reliance on food trade to bridge the shortfall 
between production and consumption is not free from risks of uncertain supplies and 
price instability. However, the most detrimental aspect of AoA, which is undermining 
the importance of world trade and also loosing the confidence of a number of 
developing countries, is the clauses that appear to be drafted only to suite the 
developed countries' requirements. Majority of the developing countries are deprived 
of a number of exemptions. Principal agricultural commodities of developing 
countries such as wheat, oilseeds, coarse cereals, vegetable oil and sugar, which have 
high incidence of export subsidies from the developed countries are not only 
hampering the exports opportunities of developing countries but also seen to be 
chiefly associated with the depression of international prices, the lowering of non 
subsidised farmers income, the displacement of the competitive exports and the 
perpetuation of rural poverty in developing countries. So it can be argued that after 
the WTO and AoA food security in India like in many other developing countries is at 
greater risk and in the event of India becoming net importer of foodgrains, which is 
not very unlikely in the near future, the situations may worsen further. 
Chapter Six 
C O N C L U S I O N A N D S U G G E S T I O N 
6.1 Conclusion: 
While the world has been changing fast over the last couple of decades politically and 
economically in unexpected and remarkable ways, food security still remains an 
unfulfilled dream for over 800 million people in the world and over 260 million 
people in India. Ensuring food security for a fast growing population remains a 
herculean task more so because deficits in food security stem from the combined 
effects of factors such as low levels of food production, poverty and diminishing 
environmental quality. In this thesis the concern to food security in India is analysed 
on three grounds i.e. (i) availability of food; (ii) access to food; and (iii) absorption of 
food. In other words major emphasis has been laid on analysing the agricultural 
development in the country and taking stock of the country's economic reform 
policies with particular reference io food security. 
Agriculture is the mainstay of India, in which about 66 percent people of the 
country are engaged for their livelihood. Droughts and other natural calamities have 
been part and parcel of India's rural life since time immemorial of which agriculture 
has been one of the main victims. Therefore, agricultural development has been 
accorded one of the top most priorities in independent India. After independence India 
had to resort to large-scale food import to fill the gap between domestic demand and 
supply and also to build a sufficient food stock for unforeseen circumstances. 
However, this was a temporary solution not a full time goal. The long-term objective 
was to make the Indian agriculture capable enough to fully meet its domesfic 
requirements. It was through the green revolution that India thought of filling the 
buffer stocks through domestic production. It was only after the structural adjustment 
programme in 1992 and more so after the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
in 1995 that India attempted commercialisation of its agriculture. How far India has 
been successful in fulfilling its agricultural priorities is a matter of debate; particularly 
India's latest attempt in commercialisation of agriculture which has not been received 
well in certain sections of the society especially the academic. A number of questions 
could be raised about India's latest adventurism. We have discussed a number of such 
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issues in some detail in the chapter five. We will attempt to summarise the findings 
and conclusion in this chapter. However, what India has achieved should also not go 
unappreciated. 
Agricultural development, particularly in foodgrain production is one of the 
most tremendous achievements in the history of independent India. Through large-
scale public investments in rural infrastructure, new technologies and seeds of high 
yielding varieties, India managed to record a more rapid growth in foodgrain output 
than in population, despite domestic production being sharply below expectations in 
years of drought and its population growing at one of the fastest rates in the world. 
The occurrence of famines in the country has been successfully averted. By the 
decade of eighties, India had become near self sufficient in agriculture, which reduced 
her reliance on food import. The percapita availability of foodgrains has increased 
from less than 400 grams per day in 1950-51 to over 490 grams per day by 2002, thus 
a remarkable increase in the physical access to food. Productivity increase was 
achieved through the use of the high yielding varieties of crops and modem inputs. 
Despite variations in the performance of individual crops and regions, total foodgrain 
production in the country recorded remarkable progress over the years. Apart from 
this India has achieved revolutions in many other sub-sectors also. There is 
commendable progress in the field of dairy, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton and fisheries 
etc. Export of cash crops such as rice, fruits, flowers, vegetables, wheat, sugar, tea, 
coffee and marine products has increased manifold. Genetically modified seeds have 
been introduced to revolutionise the agricultural sector and improving the quality of 
the food. Agricultural price policy, which was set up in 1965 to tune for agricultural 
development, played an important role in increasing the foodgrain production by 
offering remunerative prices to the farmers for their product. Simultaneously, it also 
assured increasing access of the vulnerable sections of the society to food by 
providing heavily subsidised foodgrains and other necessaiy consumer items. 
During the mid nineties, when liberalisation, privatization and globalization 
gained momentum in the country, the farmers in a bid to raise their income, shifted 
cultivation towards commercial crops at the cost of the cereals and pulses. The 
liberalisation process had not reached even its full swing when global prices of many 
agricultural products started moving southward. And it was not long when India lost 
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its global competitiveness in a number of agricultural products ~ A dream India had 
been made to see while signing the Agreement on Agriculture, had shattered even 
before India could wakeup. 
Governments' policy to earn foreign exchange through agriculture export went 
in tattered. Scores of the small farmers who switched to grow cash crops had never 
experienced it before. There was a large area expansion under commercial crops, 
which small farmers could not afford but on the bases of credit. In the hope of earning 
lucrative prices, they took heavy loans to invest in commercial crops, which led them 
to indebtedness and ultimately at the nail of death. Surely many of them, in fact 
thousands, could not sustain miseiy and pain of their families and decided to end their 
lives at their own hands. Thousands of farmers who shifted the area towards non-
foodgrains were most severely affected due to fall in prices. It is observed that after 
the SAP and more particularly after India's entry into the WTO, the area under 
foodgrains has continuously declined as a result foodgrain production has been badly 
affected. But the irony is that even production of non-foodgrains displayed negative 
growth during the post liberalisation and reform period. Thus, affecting the overall 
agricultural growth in the post reform period from 3.19 percent in eighties to just 1.20 
percent in the post reform period. This was the first time since independence when 
growth in population (1.94 percent) exceeded the growth in food production (1.15 
percent). 
Our findings in the thesis contradict the hypotheses of many earlier 
researchers that slow growth of agriculture production (mainly foodgrains) during 
nineties was due to shift of the area towards non-foodgrains. However, our results are 
similar to many that during the structural adjustment programme agricultural 
investments declined, cost of input increased, the area expansion under high yielding 
varieties declined and withdrawal of the subsidies by government on a number of 
items including dismantling of the priority sector lending to agriculture under the 
guise of financial sector reforms badly affected the overall growth of agriculture. 
Decline in agriculture credits from formal sources provided a chance to the local 
moneylenders to play havoc in the society, which they did to the best of their image. 
While government continued watching haplessly, farmers continued eating pesticides 
to end their lives. Decline in public investments in irrigation, fertilizers, research and 
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development and rural infrastructure was achieved but at the cost of sharp decline in 
the yield of almost all major crops, marginalisation of agriculture labours and increase 
in incidence of poverty among the rural poor. 
Misdirected subsidies kept pouring into the coffers of rich farmers and their 
strong lobbies in the form of always increasing Minimum Support Prices of their 
produce whereas, the rural poor who was marginally found above the so called 
poverty line criteria was excluded in the name of pruning government expenditure. 
Even the once supposedly targeted, were not in fact targeted. A large section of the 
population comprising poorest, illiterate and migrants had no access to PDS for want 
of ration cards. Moreover, there also existed the problem of bogus ration cards. 
Resourceful persons managed to obtain more than one ration cards, depriving the 
genuinely targeted families. Government is going full swing in targeting the poor, but 
whom it is targeting is not clear, as a majority of the states have not yet completed the 
task of even identifying the poor. On an average more than 18 percent of the so-called 
BPL households have not yet been issued the ration cards thus being deprived of 
targeting. In some states this number is as high as 88 percent. It was also found that 
over a quarter of the lowest expenditure group with monthly expenditure level of less 
than Rs. 1000 per month were deprived of card ownership. Allocation of foodgrains 
under the PDS has also not been fairly linked with the extent of poverty. A number of 
poorer states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, which 
have a high concentration of poverty, received very low PDS allocations in 
comparison to some developed states. Misdirection of subsidies could be guaged from 
the fact that government is spending ahnost Rs. 5 to provide the benefit of each Rs. 1 
to the end consumer. Consistently increasing procurement prices much above the 
prices recommended by the Commission for Agriculture Costs and Prices (CACP) 
raised the procurement levels as high as three times of the minimum buffer 
requirements. This not only compelled the government to spend more on these stocks 
than on poor but also directed foodgrains from market to the government godowns 
leading to shortened supply of foodgrains in the market and thus higher prices of the 
same, again hurting the poor consumer. Narrow targeting adopted by government, 
cash constraints among poor and infrequent opening and unreliability of foodgrain 
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supply at the fair price shops exacerbated the problem of lower offtake thus making 
government spend still more. 
Thus, macro economic adjustment programme under the direction of the 
Breton Woods histitutions has often not only ignored the interest of the small holders 
but actually worsened their condition. Food security is not merely an urban issue but a 
rural fact. Emphasis on cash crops drove the scarce agricultural inputs away from 
cereals leading to price distortions. In addition, devaluation of rupee led to increase in 
the prices of inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, fuel and other consumer items as 
compared to the prices of traditional food crops. Small holders benefit little from 
increased prices of crop output since they can market only a fraction of their 
production. 
Trade liberalisation and globalisation of agriculture was supposed to increase 
production of food, enhance efficiency of food production, ameliorate the economic 
situation of farmers and improve patterns of consumption. But, in fact trade 
liberalisation has led to a decline in food production, food productivity and 
deterioration in the conditions of farmers not to mention hampering food security 
situation in the country. The consequence of globalisation of agriculture is the 
marginalisation of the small farmer. Agriculture is now being declared as industry. 
Large companies and multi-nationals are being welcomed into agribusiness and 
existing laws are being bent to accommodate them. The small farmer cannot compete. 
Correspondingly, increasing numbers of small farmers are unable to produce enough 
to support their livelihood. They are increasingly finding themselves compelled to 
abandon farming in search of urban employment. Domestic agricultural producers 
have suffered from the liberalisation of agriculture imports and complete removal of 
quantitative restriction in April 2001. Their production has remained unsold or the 
prices of their products have registered sharp falls. Agricultural exports have failed to 
take off, and have remained fixed at around one fifth of the total value of exports. 
With increasing globalization of agricultural trade under the WTO, self-sufficiency 
policies in food are being challenged. Curtailing support to domestic agriculture and 
exposing it to imports have posed a threat to food security for such a large population 
in the country. 
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6.2 Suggestions: 
For a country like India having huge population living under poverty level, the issue 
of food security is extremely sensitive, which could only be secured through 
appropriate combinations of policy measures. In the present world merely achieving 
self-sufficiency in foodgrain production is not the sufficient criteria of food security 
but it is also imperative that food is made available to the undernourished and hungr>'. 
Thus, food insecurity can be removed by, among other things, ensuring sustainable 
livelihood, improving literacy, providing better health care and access to safe drinking 
water and ensuring sufficient micronutrient intake. Thus, strategies to eliminate 
hunger need to be directed more at the individual level, targeting specific persons or 
groups of people, than at the household level. The highest priority in this regard 
should be the elimination of "hidden hunger". Food-based transfer programs like 
Integrated Child Development Programme (ICDP) could play a critical role in 
enabling the poor and vulnerable households to alleviate the gap in short-term caloric 
deficiencies besides easing their constraints in the use of selected health and related 
nutrition services essential to achieving and maintaining long-term nutritional well-
being. In the light of the findings in the thesis, following points are worth noting 
while formulating the appropriate policies and programmes. 
1) Indian government should reconsider its policy of narrow targeting as it has 
proven to be much costlier than expected. Further, this scheme is more 
susceptible to altered entitlements (due to wrong inclusion or exclusion), 
information distortions and high cost of participation. 
2) To mitigate the problem of rural unemployment, investment allocation should 
be raised for small-scale industries and micro enterprises linked to agriculture 
in rural areas, ensuring that they employ simple, labour intensive technologies 
and contribute to food security. 
3) In the face of overall squeeze on domestic credit, efforts should be made to 
design and implement grassroot based credit schemes targeted at small farmers 
for production and marketing. State should also ensure that the poor farmers 
have unstinted and continued access to agricultural inputs at reasonable and 
fair prices. 
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4) Reliance on global buffer for food security, as suggested by a number of 
researchers, can adversely affect India's food security requirements, because it 
is not only the price volatility and instability in the world food market, but also 
the international politics that play a big role in world food trade. Our past 
experience in this regard should be the guiding force. 
5) The AoA has not given adequate attention to food security. Continued 
emphasis on market access has led to relative lack of attention to the problem 
faced by the peasant farming. With opening up of the economy small and 
medium farmers may be hard put to continue their production in order to make 
the production units sustainable in the long run. Thus, the future agricultural 
negotiations in WTO would have to take into account the critical issue of food 
security, which has entirely different meaning in the context of developing and 
developed countries. 
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Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
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2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
REA, PRC 
SI. No. 
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100 25 
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99 59 
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98 44 
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D OF FOODGRAINS AND THEIR T 
Production 
46 50 
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146 80 
Trend Value 
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60 43 
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76 99 
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16164 
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64 20 
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77 70 
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69 40 
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76 60 
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87 80 
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105^0 
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120 60 
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137 80 
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142 00 
146 50 
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148 40 
154 00 
159 80 
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164 80 
150 70 
REND 
Trend Value 
67 28 
68 31 
69 34 
70 37 
7141 
7244 
73 47 
74 50 
75 53 
76 56 
77 59 
78 63 
79 66 
80 69 
8172 
82 75 
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84 82 
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86 88 
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92 04 
93 07 
94 10 
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9616 
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115 56 
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13160 
138 96 
140 69 
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14415 
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147 60 
149 33 
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152 79 
154 51 
156 24 
157 97 
159 70 
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Delhi * Provisional Figure Index (Weigfit 62 92) 
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AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF NON-FOODGRAINS AND THEIR TREND 
Year 
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1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998 99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
2/ 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
66 60 
72 50 
69 40 
68 60 
76 50 
77 60 
8010 
78 40 
80 80 
82 30 
83 80 
88 40 
88 90 
89 40 
92 20 
9100 
90 00 
91 10 
8710 
90 30 
91 10 
93 30 
87 90 
93 70 
93 20 
95 40 
9410 
99 30 
102 00 
96 60 
99-lO 
10410 
10180 
104 40 
103 40 
104 20 
100 70 
10170 
112 80 
11580 
120 00 
124 80 
123 20 
127 30 
126 20 
13180 
134 60 
133 60 
134 80 
130 70 
127 00 
127 60 
11960 
Trend Value 
72 23 
73 21 
7418 
75 16 
7614 
7711 
78 09 
79 07 
80 04 
8102 
8199 
82 97 
83 95 
84 92 
85 90 
86 87 
87 85 
88 83 
89 80 
90 78 
9176 
92 73 
93 71 
94 68 
95 66 
96 64 
97 61 
98 59 
99 56 
100 54 
99 44 
100 64 
10183 
103 03 
104 23 
105 43 
106 63 
107 83 
109 02 
11022 
125 94 
126 25 
126 55 
126 86 
12717 
127 48 
127 78 
128 09 
128 40 
128 71 
129 02 
129 32 
129 63 
Production 
45 80 
46 90 
4410 
46 60 
53 60 
5160 
56 50 
5610 
60 80 
59 60 
67 40 
65 90 
67 50 
6910 
78 20 
68 90 
66 60 
75 20 
73 70 
78 30 
82 60 
83 70 
76 60 
88 60 
89 20 
91 10 
88 80 
99 40 
10160 
90 80 
97 40 
11180 
106 60 
11150 
11860 
113 00 
112 50 
11830 
143 20 
149 70 
156 30 
158 80 
164 00 
169 50 
180 90 
135 50 
200 90 
18160 
200 20 
189 00 
178 20 
187 70 
170 40 
Trend Value 
44 33 
4615 
47 98 
49 81 
5164 
53 46 
55 29 
5712 
58 95 
60 77 
62 60 
64 43 
66 26 
68 09 
6991 
7174 
73 57 
75 40 
77 22 
79 05 
80 88 
82 71 
84 53 
86 36 
8819 
90 02 
9184 
93 67 
95 50 
97 33 
97 90 
102 43 
106 95 
11147 
116 00 
120 52 
125 05 
129 57 
134 09 
138 62 
16619 
168 28 
170 36 
172 44 
174 53 
176 61 
178 69 
180 78 
182 86 
184 94 
187 02 
18911 
19119 
Yield 
7510 
7120 
7010 
77 60 
79 40 
73 70 
77 50 
76 50 
82 00 
77 50 
84 00 
79 20 
8150 
82 60 
89 20 
76 80 
77 50 
87 20 
84 30 
86 30 
9140 
92 20 
86 30 
94 70 
94 00 
97 70 
94 30 
99 00 
10180 
93 90 
99 20 
106 40 
10130 
105 70 
113 60 
108 30 
108 30 
110 20 
124 80 
126 70 
128 00 
123 70 
130 20 
132 70 
138 90 
135 70 
143 80 
132 30 
14130 
136 40 
133 20 
13800 
130 50 
Trend Value 
7148 
72 38 
73 28 
7417 
75 07 
75 97 
76 86 
77 76 
78 66 
79 55 
80 45 
8135 
82 24 
8314 
84 04 
84 93 
85 83 
86 72 
87 62 
88 52 
89 41 
90 31 
9121 
9210 
93 00 
93 90 
94 79 
95 69 
96 59 
97 48 
98 91 
10147 
104 04 
106 60 
10917 
11173 
114 30 
116 86 
11943 
12199 
130 55 
13116 
13177 
132 38 
132 99 
133 60 
134 21 
134 82 
135 43 
136 04 
136 65 
137 26 
137 87 
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agnculture 
New Deltii * Provisional Figure Index (weight 37 08) 
172 
PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (NON-FOODGRAINS) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (NON-FOODGRAINS) 
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AREA PRODUCTION AND Y 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956 57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988 89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995 96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002 2003* 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
7410 
75 60 
77 90 
8190 
83 00 
84 80 
85 80 
84 40 
8810 
89 30 
89 20 
9120 
92 00 
9180 
9170 
90 70 
90 60 
94 60 
93 00 
95 70 
96 30 
95 80 
92 50 ^ 
98 20 
94 80 
99 50 
96 90 
10010 
10160 
9810 
99 70 
102 20 
99 30 
103 60 
100 60 
10160 
100 30 
96 00 
10340 
103 50 
105 20 
102 70 
10310 
103 80 
104 20 
103 80 
106 00 
105 90 
107 00 
104 80 
102 70 
103 30 
96 20 
ELD OF ALL PRINCIPAL CROPS AN 
Trend Value 
79 60 
80 36 
81 12 
8188 
82 64 
83 40 
8417 
84 93 
85 69 
86 45 
87 21 
87 97 
88 74 
89 50 
90 26 
9102 
9178 
92 54 
93 31 
94 07 
94 83 
95 59 
96 35 
97 11 
97 88 
98 64 
99 40 
10016 
100 92 
10168 
100 55 
100 66 
100 76 
100 86 
100 97 
10107 
101 18 
10128 
10138 
10149 
10513 
104 90 
104 67 
104 44 
104 21 
103 98 
103 75 
103 52 
103 29 
103 06 
102 83 
102 60 
102 36 
Production 
46 20 
46 90 
48 90 
55 50 
57 00 
56 20 
59 80 
55 80 
64 60 
63 00 
68 80 
6810 
67 40 
68 30 
76 40 
63 70 
63 00 
7710 
75 30 
80 40 
85 90 
85 20 
78 20 
86 50 
84 00 
96 20 
89 30 
10160 
105 00 
88 70 
10210 
109 20 
104 80 
11860 
11790 
11950 
11520 
115 30 
140 00 
143 00 
148 40 
145 50 
15160 
157 30 
165 20 
160 70 
175 70 
165 30 
178 20 
176 90 
165 70 
177 70 
155 50 
Trend Value 
4716 
48 88 
50 60 
52 32 
54 04 
55 76 
57 48 
59 20 
60 92 
62 64 
64 36 
66 08 
67 80 
69 52 
7124 
72 96 
74 68 
76 40 
7812 
79 84 
8156 
83 28 
85 00 
86 72 
88 44 
9016 
9188 
93 60 
95 32 
97 04 
10144 
105 25 
109 05 
11285 
116 66 
120 46 
124 27 
128 07 
13187 
135 68 
15184 
153 76 
155 68 
157 60 
159 52 
16144 
163 36 
165 28 
167 20 
16912 
17104 
172 96 
174 88 
D THEIR T 
Yield 
67 80 
67 70 
7010 
77 70 
77 00 
73 40 
76 00 
7190 
80 40 
76 40 
82 70 
79 90 
78 30 
79 30 
88 30 
73 20 
73 60 
86 80 
84 20 
8710 
92 60 
9160 
86 00 
91 10 
89 60 
99 00 
9310 
10160 
104 20 
90 60 
102 90 
10610 
103 60 
11330 
114 80 
11600 
11240 
114 40 
130 50 
13190 
133 80 
13100 
137 20 
140 70 
145 50 
139 80 
149 80 
14140 
148 40 
149 60 
144 30 
15310 
14180 
REND 
Trend Value 
68 75 
69 73 
70 72 
7171 
72 69 
73 68 
74 66 
75 65 
76 63 
77 62 
78 60 
79 59 
80 58 
8156 
82 55 
83 53 
84 52 
85 50 
86 49 
87 48 
88 46 
89 45 
90 43 
9142 
92 40 
93 39 
94 37 
95 36 
96 35 
97 33 
10138 
104 32 
107 25 
11019 
11312 
116 06 
11899 
12193 
124 86 
127 80 
135 51 
136 73 
137 94 
13916 
140 37 
14159 
142 80 
144 01 
145 23 
146 44 
147 66 
148 87 
150 09 
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003 Directorate of Economics and Statistics Ministry of Agnculture, 
New Delhi * Provisional Figure 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (ALL PRINCIPLE CROPS) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (ALL PRINCIPLE CROPS) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (ALL PRINCIPLE CROPS) 
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AREA PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF WHEAT AND THEIR 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
9 75 
9 47 
9 83 
10 68 
1126 
12 37 
13 52 
1173 
12 62 
13 38 
12 93 
13 57 
13 59 
13 50 
13 42 
12 57 
12 84 
14 99 
15 96 
16 63 
18 24 
1914 
19 46 
18 58 
18 01 
20 45 
20 92 
2146 
22 64 
2217 
22 28 
2214 
23 57 
24 67 
23 56 
23 00 
2313 
23 06 
2411 
23 50 
24 17 
23 26 
24 59 
2515 
25 70 
25 01 
25 89 
26 70 
27 52 
27 49 
25 73 
25 92 
25 24 
Trend Value 
8 94 
9 37 
9 80 
10 23 
10 67 
11 10 
1153 
1196 
12 39 
12 82 
13 25 
13 68 
1411 
14 54 
14 97 
15 40 
15 84 
16 27 
16 70 
1713 
17 56 
17 99 
1842 
18 85 
19 28 
19 71 
2014 
20 57 
2101 
2144 
22 84 
22 94 
23 04 
2315 
23 25 
23 35 
23 46 
23 56 
23 66 
23 77 
24 36 
24 56 
24 76 
24 96 
2516 
25 37 
25 57 
25 77 
25 97 
2617 
25 37 
26 57 
26 77 
Production 
6 46 
618 
7 50 
8 02 
9 04 
8 76 
9 40 
7 99 
9 96 
10 32 
1100 
12 07 
10 78 
9 85 
12 26 
10 40 
1139 
16 54 
18 65 
20 09 
23 83 
26 41 
24 74 
2178 
2410 
28 84 
29 01 
3175 
35 51 
3183 
36 31 
37 45 
42 79 
45 48 
44 07 
47 05 
44 32 
4617 
5411 
49 85 
55 14 
55 69 
57 21 
59 84 
65 77 
6210 
69 35 
66 35 
7129 
76 37 
69 68 
7181 
69 32 
Trend Value 
2 59 
3 55 
4 50 
5 46 
6 42 
7 38 
8 34 
9 29 
10 25 
1121 
1217 
1313 
14 09 
15 04 
16 00 
16 96 
17 92 
18 88 
19 84 
20 79 
2175 
22 71 
23 67 
24 63 
25 59 
26 54 
27 50 
28 46 
29 42 
30 38 
37 81 
39 35 
40 90 
42 44 
43 99 
45 53 
47 08 
48 62 
5017 
5171 
56 13 
57 67 
59 21 
60 76 
62 30 
63 84 
65 38 
66 92 
68 46 
70 00 
7154 
73 08 
74 62 
TREND 
Yield 
663 00 
65300 
763 00 
750 00 
803 00 
708 00 
695 00 
682 00 
789 00 
772 00 
85100 
890 00 
793 00 
730.00 
913 00 
827 00 
887 00 
1103 00 
1169 00 
1208 00 
1307 00 
1380 00 
1271 00 
1172 00 
1338 00 
1410 00 
1387 00 
1480 00 
1568 00 
1436 00 
1630 00 
1691 00 
1816 00 
1843 00 
1870 00 
2046 00 
1916 00 
2002 00 
2244 00 
212100 
2281 00 
2394 00 
2327 00 
2380 00 
2559 00 
2483 00 
2679 00 
2485 00 
2590 00 
2778 00 
2708 00 
2770 00 
2747 00 
Trend Value 
55511 
586 71 
618 31 
649 90 
68150 
71310 
744 69 
776 29 
807 89 
839 48 
87108 
902 68 
934 27 
965 87 
997 47 
1029 07 
1060 66 
1092 26 
1123 86 
1155 45 
1187 05 
1218 65 
1250 24 
1281 84 
1313 44 
1345 03 
1376 63 
1408 23 
1439 82 
1471 42 
1655 67 
1713 95 
1772 22 
1830 49 
1888 76 
1947 04 
2005 31 
2063 58 
2121 85 
218013 
2306 52 
2347 49 
2388 47 
2429 45 
2470 43 
251141 
2552 38 
2593 36 
2634 34 
2675 32 
2716 30 
2757 27 
2798 25 
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agnculture, 
New Delhi * Provisional Figure 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (WHEAT) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (WHEAT) 
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— Linear (Production) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (WHEAT) 
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Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954 55 
1955-56 
1956 57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976 77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
AREA, PR 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
.ODUCTIO 
Area 
30 81 
29 83 
29 97 
3129 
30 77 
3152 
32 28 
32 30 
3317 
33 82 
3413 
34 69 
35 69 
35 81 
36 46 
35 47 
35 25 
36 44 
36 97 
37 68 
37 59 
37 76 
36 69 
38 29 
37 89 
39 48 
38 51 
40 28 
40 48 
39 42 
4015 
40 71 
38 26 
4124 
41 16 
41 14 
41 17 
38 81 
4173 
4217 
42 69 
42 65 
4178 
42 54 
42 81 
42 84 
43 43 
43 45 
44 80 
4516 
44 71 
44 62 
40 41 
N AND YIELD OF RICE AN 
Trend Value 
30 25 
30 60 
30 96 
3131 
3166 
32 01 
32 36 
32 72 
33 07 
33 42 
33 77 
3413 
34 48 
34 83 
3518 
35 53 
35 89 
36 24 
36 59 
36 94 
37 30 
37 65 
38 00 
38 35 
38 70 
39 06 
39 41 
39 76 
4011 
40 46 
39 89 
40 06 
40 23 
40 40 
40 57 
40 74 
40 91 
4108 
4124 
4141 
42 55 
42 66 
42 78 
42 89 
43 00 
4311 
43 22 
43 33 
43 45 
43 56 
43 67 
43 78 
43 89 
Production 
20 58 
2130 
22 90 
28 21 
25 22 
27 56 
2904 
25 53 
30 85 
3168 
34 58 
35 66 
33 21 
37 00 
39 31 
30 59 
30 44 
37 61 
39 76 
40 43 
42 22 
43 07 
39 24 
44 05 
39 58 
48 74 
4192 
52 67 
53 77 
42 33 
53 63 
53 25 
4712 
6010 
58 34 
63 83 
60 56 
56 86 
70 49 
73 57 
74 29 
74 68 
72 86 
80 30 
8181 
76 98 
8174 
82 53 
86 08 
89 68 
84 98 
93 08 
75 72 
D THEIR TRE 
Trend Value 
22 41 
23 32 
24 23 
2515 
26 06 
26 97 
27 88 
28 79 
29 71 
30 62 
3153 
32 44 
33 35 
34 27 
3518 
36 09 
37 00 
37 92 
38 83 
39 74 
40 65 
4156 
42 48 
43 39 
44 30 
45 21 
4612 
47 04 
47 95 
48 86 
50 07 
52 23 
54 39 
56 54 
58 70 
60 85 
63 01 
6516 
67 32 
69 48 
74 83 
75 88 
76 93 
77 98 
79 03 
80 08 
8113 
8218 
83 24 
84 29 
85 34 
86 39 
87 44 
ND 
Yield 
668 00 
714 00 
764 00 
902 00 
820 00 
874 00 
900 00 
790 00 
930 00 
937 00 
1013 00 
1028 00 
93100 
1033 00 
1078 00 
862 00 
863 00 
1032 00 
1076 00 
1073 00 
1123 00 
114100 
1070 00 
115100 
1045 00 
1235 00 
1089 00 
1308 00 
132800 
1074 00 
1336 00 
1308 00 
1231 00 
1457 00 
1417 00 
1552 00 
1471 00 
1465 00 
1689 00 
1745 00 
1740 00 
1751 00 
1744 00 
1888 00 
191100 
1797 00 
1882 00 
1900 00 
1921 00 
1986 00 
1901 00 
2086 00 
1874 00 
Trend Value 
762 40 
77844 
794 49 
810 53 
826 58 
842 63 
858 67 
874 72 
890 77 
906 81 
922 86 
938 90 
954 95 
97100 
987 04 
1003 09 
101914 
103518 
1051 23 
1067 27 
1083 32 
1099 37 
111541 
113146 
1147 51 
1163 55 
1179 60 
1195 65 
121169 
1227 74 
1257 24 
1303 87 
1350 51 
139715 
1443 78 
1490 42 
1537 05 
1583 69 
1630 33 
1676 96 
1759 29 
1778 65 
1798 01 
181737 
1836 74 
185610 
1875 46 
1894 82 
191419 
1933 55 
1952 91 
1972 27 
1991 64 
Source Agricultural Siatistics at a Glance 2003 Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Deltii * Provisional Figure 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (RICE) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (RICE) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (RICE) 
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AREA PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF COARSE CEREALS AND TH 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956 57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998 99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Area 
37 67 
38 88 
42 45 
45 37 
43 92 
43 45 
42 02 
42 91 
44 66 
43 79 
44 96 
44 73 
44 29 
43 93 
44 35 
44 34 
45 09 
47 34 
46 24 
47 24 
45 95 
43 57 
42 21 
46 24 
4315 
43 80 
4194 
42 28 
42 23 
4136 
4178 
42 45 
40 43 
4171 
39 21 
39 47 
39 74 
36 55 
38 68 
37 69 
36 32 
33 42 
34 42 
32 82 
3217 
30 88 
3181 
30 83 
29 34 
10 , 29 34 
11 ; 30 33 
12 29 71 
13 1 26 37 
Trend Value 
42 95 
43 00 
43 05 
4310 
4315 
43 20 
43 25 
43 30 
43 35 
4340 
L 43 45 
43 50 
43 55 
43 60 
43 65 
43 70 
43 75 
43 80 
43 86 
43 91 
43 96 
44 01 
44 06 
44 11 
4416 
44 21 
44 26 
44 31 
44 36 
44 41 
4218 
4164 
41 11 
40 57 
40 04 
39 50 
38 97 
38 43 
37 90 
37 36 
35 02 
34 41 
33 80 
3319 
32 58 
3197 
3137 
30 76 
3015 
29 54 
28 93 
28 32 
27 71 
Production 
15 38 
16 09 
19 61 
22 97 
22 82 
19 49 
19 87 
2123 
2318 
22 87 
23 74 
23 22 
24 63 
23 72 
25 37 
2142 
24 05 
28 80 
2518 
27 29 
30 55 
24 60 
2314 
28 83 
2613 
30 41 
28 88 
30 02 
30 44 
26 97 
29 02 
3109 
27 75 
33 90 
31 17 
26 20 
26 83 
26 36 
3147 
34 76 
32 70 
25 99 
36 59 
30 82 
29 88 
29 03 
3410 
30 40 
3134 
30 33 
3108 
33 94 
26 22 
Trend Value 
18 71 
1910 
19 49 
19 88 
20 27 
20 66 
2105 
2144 
2183 
22 22 
22 61 
23 00 
23 39 
23 78 
2417 
24 56 
24 95 
25 34 
25 73 
2612 
26 51 
26 90 
27 29 
27 68 
28 07 
28 46 
28 85 
29 24 
29 63 
30 02 
29 28 
29 41 
29 53 
29 66 
29 79 
29 92 
30 05 
3018 
30 30 
30 43 
3156 
3146 
3136 
3126 
31 16 
3106 
30 96 
30 85 
30 75 
30 65 
30 55 
30 45 
30 35 
EIR TREN 
Yield 
408 00 
414 00 
462 00 
506 00 
520 00 
449 00 
473 00 
495 00 
519 00 
522 00 
528 00 
519 00 
556 00 
540 00 
514 00 
483 00 
533 00 
608 00 
545 00 
578 00 
665 00 
564 00 
548 00 
623 00 
606 00 
694 00 
689 00 
710 00 
72100 
652 00 
695 00 
733 00 
685 00 
813 00 
795 00 
654 00 
675 00 
72100 
814 00 
922 00 
900 00 
778 00 
1063 00 
939 00 
929 00 
940 00 
1072 00 
986 00 
1068 00 
1034 00 
1027 00 
1142 00 
9^5 00 
D 
Trend Value 
429 79 
438 41 
447 03 
455 65 
464 27 
472 89 
48152 
49014 
498 76 
507 38 
516 00 
524 62 
533 25 
54187 
550 49 
55911 
567 73 
576 35 
584 98 
593 60 
602 22 
610 84 
619 46 
628 08 
636 71 
645 33 
653 95 
662 57 
67119 
679 81 
690 47 
704 08 
717 68 
73129 
744 90 
758 50 
77211 
785 72 
799 32 
812 93 
89611 
91180 
927 48 
94317 
958 86 
974 54 
990 23 
1005 92 
1021 60 
1037 29 
1052 98 
1068 66 
1084 35 
Source Agricultural Statistics at a Glaf)ce 2003 Directorate of Economics and Statistics Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Delhi * Provisional Figure 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (COARSE CEREALS) 
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19] 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF PULSES AND THEIR" 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
19.09 
19.78 
19.84 
21.73 
21.91 
23.22 
23.32 
22.54 
24.31 
24.83 
23.56 
24.24 
24,27 
24.18 
23.88 
22.72 
22.12 
22.65 
21.26 
22.02 
22.54 
22.15 
20.92 
23.43 
22.03 
24.45 
22.98 
23.50 
23.66 
22.26 
22.46 
23.84 
22.83 
23.54 
22.74 
24.42 
23.16 
21.27 
23.15 
23.41 
24.66 
22,54 
22.36 
22.25 
23.03 
22.28 
22.45 
22.87 
23.50 
21.12 
20.35 
21.66 
21.12 
Trend Value 
21.93 
21.98 
22.03 
22.08 
22.13 
22.18 
22.23 
22.28 
22.33 
22.37 
22.42 
22.47 
22.52 
22.57 
22.62 
L 22.67 
22.72 
22.77 
22.82 
22.87 
22.92 
22.97 
23.02 
23.07 
23.12 
23.16 
23.21 
23.26 
23.31 
23.36 
23.18 
23.16 
23.14 
23.11 
23.09 
23.07 
23.05 
23.03 
23.01 
22.99 
23.49 
23.30 
23.10 
22.91 
22.71 
22.52 
22.32 
22.13 
21.93 
21.74 
21.54 
21.35 
21.15 
Production 
8.41 
8.42 
9.19 
10.62 
10.95 
11.04 
11.55 
9.56 
13.15 
11.80 
12.70 
11.76 
11.53 
10.07 
12.42 
9.94 
8.35 
12.10 
10.42 
11.69 
11.82 
11.09 
9.91 
10.01 
10.02 
13.04 
11.36 
11.97 
12.18 
8.57 
10.63 
11.51 
11.86 
12.89 
11.96 
13.36 
11.71 
10.96 
13.85 
12.86 
14.26 
12.02 
12.82 
13.30 
14.04 
12.31 
14.24 
12.98 
14.91 
13.42 
11.08 
13.19 
11.31 
Trend Value 
10.38 
10.41 
10.45 
10.48 
10.51 
10.55 
10.58 
10.61 
10.64 
10.68 
10.71 
10.74 
10.77 
10.81 
10.84 
10.87 
10.90 
10.94 
10.97 
11.00 
11.03 
11.07 
11.10 
11.13 
11.16 
11.20 
11.23 
11.26 
11.29 
11.33 
11.35 
11.53 
11.71 
11.89 
12.07 
12.25 
12.43 
12.61 
12.79 
12.97 
13.60 
13.51 
13.42 
13.33 
13.24 
13.16 
13.07 
12.98 
12.89 
12.80 
12.72 
12.63 
12.54 
FREND 
Yield 
441.00 
448.00 
463.00 
489.00 
500.00 
476.00 
495.00 
424.00 
541.00 
475.00 
539.00 
485.00 
475.00 
416.00 
520.00 
438.00 
377.00 
534.00 
490.00 
531.00 
524.00 
501.00 
474.00 
427.00 
455.00 
533.00 
494.00 
510.00 
515.00 
385.00 
473.00 
483.00 
519.00 
548.00 
526.00 
547.00 
506.00 
515.00 
598.00 
549.00 
578.00 
533.00 
573.00 
598.00 
610.00 
552.00 
635.00 
567.00 
634.00 
635.00 
544.00 
609.00 
536.00 
Trend Value 
474.52 
474.84 
475.16 
475.48 
475.80 
476.12 
476.44 
476.76 
477.08 
477.40 
477.72 
478.04 
478.37 
478.69 
479.01 
479.33 
479.65 
479.97 
480.29 
480.61 
480.93 
481.25 
481.57 
481.89 
482.21 
482.53 
482.85 
483.17 
483.49 
483.82 
489.20 
497.47 
505.73 
514.00 
522.27 
530.53 
538.80 
547.07 
555.33 
563.60 
578.79 
579.81 
580.84 
581.86 
582.88 
583.90 
584.92 
585.95 
586.97 
587.99 
589.01 
590.03 
591.05 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Delhi. * Provisional Figure. 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (PULSES) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (PULSES) 
-•—Yield 
Linear (Yield) 
y=8.2667x+480.93 
R2 = 0.4752 
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AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD 0 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
Source: Agriculk 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
iral Statistics 
Area 
5.88 
6.56 
6.36 
6.99 
7.55 
8.09 
8.02 
8.01 
7.96 
7.30 
7.61 
7.98 
7.73 
8.22 
8.37 
7.96 
7.84 
8.00 
7.60 
7.73 
7.61 
7.80 
7.68 
7.57 
7.56 
7.35 
6.89 
7.87 
8.12 
8.13 
7.82 
8.06 
7.87 
7.72 
7.38 
7.53 
6.95 
6.46 
7.34 
7.69 
7.44 
7.66 
7.54 
7.32 
7.87 
9.04 
9.12 
8.87 
9.34 
8.71 
8.53 
9.10 
7.48 
at a Giance, 
Trend Value 
7.24 
7.26 
7.29 
7.32 
7.34 
7.37 
7.39 
7.42 
7.44 
7.47 
7.50 
7.52 
7.55 
7.57 
7.60 
7.62 
7.65 
7.68 
7.70 
7.73 
7.75 
7.78 
7.80 
7.83 
7.86 
7.88 
7.91 
7.93 
7.96 
7.98 
7.90 
7.81 
7.72 
7.62 
7.53 
7.44 
7.34 
7.25 
7.15 
7.06 
7.70 
7.81 
7.91 
8.01 
8.11 
8.21 
8.31 
8.41 
8.51 
8.61 
8.71 
8.81 
8.91 
2003, Directorate 
F COTTON AND THEIR TREND 
Production 
3.04 
3.28 
3.34 
4.13 
4.45 
4.18 
4.92 
4.96 
4.88 
3.68 
5.60 
4.85 
5.54 
5.75 
6.01 
4.85 
5.27 
5.78 
5.45 
5.56 
4.76 
6.95 
5.74 
6.31 
7.16 
5.95 
5.84 
7.24 
7.96 
7.65 
7.01 
7.88 
7.53 
6,39 
8.51 
8.73 
6.91 
6.38 
8.74 
11.42 
9.84 
9.71 
11.40 
10.74 
11.89 
12.86 
14.23 
10.85 
12.29 
11.53 
9.52 
10.09 
9.31 
of Economics 
Trend Value 
3.56 
3.68 
3.81 
3.93 
4.06 
4.18 
4.31 
4.43 
4.56 
4.68 
4.81 
4.93 
5.06 
5.18 
5.31 
5.43 
5.56 
5.68 
5.81 . 
5.93 
6.06 
6.18 
6.31 
6.43 
6.56 
6.68 
6.81 
6.93 
7.06 
7.18 
6.81 
7.06 
7.32 
7.57 
7.82 
8.08 
8.33 
8.58 
8.84 
9.09 
11.35 
11.31 
11.26 
11.22 
11.18 
11.14 
11.10 
11.05 
11.01 
10.97 
10.93 
10.89 
10.85 
and Statistics, M 
Yield 
88.00 
85.00 
89.00 
100.00 
100.00 
88.00 
104.00 
105.00 
104.00 
86.00 
125.00 
103.00 
122.00 
119.00 
122.00 
104.00 
114.00 
123.00 
122.00 
122.00 
106.00 
151.00 
127.00 
142.00 
161.00 
138.00 
144.00 
157.00 
167.00 
160.00 
152.00 
166.00 
163.00 
141.00 
196.00 
197.00 
169.00 
168.00 
202.00 
252.00 
225.00 
216.00 
257.00 
249.00 
257.00 
242.00 
265.00 
208.00 
224.00 
225.00 
190.00 
189.00 
212.00 
nistry of Agri 
Trend Value 
83.51 
85.98 
88.44 
90.91 
93.38 
95.84 
98.31 
100.77 
103.24 
105.70 
108.17 
110.64 
113.10 
115.57 
118.03 
120.50 
122.97 
125.43 
127.90 
130.36 
132.83 
135.29 
137.76 
140.23 
142.69 
145.16 
147.62 
150.09 
152.56 
155.02 
146.18 
153.83 
161.48 
169.13 
176.78 
184.42 
192.07 
199.72 
207.37 
215.02 
249.14 
245.55 
241.97 
238.38 
234.79 
231.20 
227.62 
224.03 
220.44 
216.85 
213.26 
209.68 
206.09 
culture, 
New Delhi. * Provisional Figure. 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (COTTON) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (COTTON) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM YIELD TREND (COTTON) 
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AR 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
£A, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF SUGARCANE AND THEIR TREND 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
1.71 
1.94 
1.73 
1.41 
1.62 
1.85 
2.05 
2.07 
1.95 
2.14 
2.42 
2.46 
2.24 
2.25 
2.60 
2.84 
2.30 
2.05 
2.53 
2.75 
2.62 
2.39 
2.45 
2.75 
2.89 
2.76 
2.87 
3.15 
3.09 
2.61 
2.67 
3.19 
3.36 
3.11 
2.95 
2.85 
3.08 
3.28 
3.33 
3.44 
3.69 
3.84 
3.57 
3.42 
3.87 
4.15 
4,17 
3.93 
4.05 
4.22 
4.32 
4.40 
4.23 
Trend Value 
1.70 
1.74 
1.79 
1.83 
1.88 
1.92 
1.97 
2.01 
2.06 
2.10 
2.15 
2.19 
2.24 
2.28 
2.33 
2.37 
2.42 
2.46 
2.51 
2.55 
2.60 
2.64 
2.69 
2.73 
2.78 
2.82 
2.87 
2.91 
2.95 
3.00 
2.93 
2.97 
3.02 
3.06 
3.10 
3.15 
3.19 
3.24 
3.28 
3.33 
3.61 
3.67 
3.73 
3.80 
3.86 
3.93 
3.99 
4.05 
4.12 
4.18 
4.24 
4.31 
4.37 
Production 
57.05 
61.63 
51.00 
44.41 
58.74 
60.54 
69.05 
71.16 
73.36 
77.82 
110.00 
103.97 
91.91 
104.23 
121.91 
123.99 
92.83 
95.50 
124.68 
135.02 
126.37 
113.57 
124.87 
140.81 
144.29 
140.60 
153.01 
176.97 
151.66 
128.83 
154.25 
186.36 
189.51 
174.08 
170.32 
170.65 
186.09 
196.74 
203.04 
225.57 
241.05 
254.00 
228.03 
229.66 
275.54 
281.10 
277.56 
279.54 
288.72 
299.32 
295.96 
300.10 
278.56 
Trend Value 
49.78 
53.55 
57.31 
61.07 
64.83 
68.59 
72.35 
76.11 
79.88 
83.64 
87.40 
91.16 
94.92 
98.68 
102.45 
106.21 
109.97 
113.73 
117.49 
121.25 
125.01 
128.78 
132.54 
136.30 
140.06 
143.82 
147.58 
151.35 
155.11 
158.87 
162.99 
168.03 
173.07 
178.11 
183.14 
188.18 
193.22 
198.25 
203.29 
208.33 
239.79 
245.07 
250.35 
255.63 
260.91 
266.19 
271.47 
276.75 
282.03 
287.31 
292.59 
297.88 
303.16 
Yield 
33422.00 
31786.00 
29495.00 
31497.00 
36303.00 
32779.00 
33683.00 
34325.00 
37658.00 
36414.00 
45549.00 
42349.00 
40996.00 
46353.00 
46838.00 
43717.00 
40336.00 
40665.00 
49236.00 
49121.00 
48322.00 
47511.00 
50933.00 
51163.00 
49855.00 
50903.00 
53383.00 
56160.00 
49114.00 
49358.00 
57844.00 
58359.00 
56441.00 
55978.00 
57673.00 
59889.00 
60444.00 
60006.00 
60992.00 
65u12.00 
65395.00 
66069.00 
63843.00 
67120.00 
71254.00 
67787.00 
66496.00 
71134.00 
71203.00 
70935.00 
68577.00 
68154.00 
65870.00 
Trend Value 
31380.80 
32180.34 
32979.88 
33779.42 
34578.96 
35378.50 
36178.04 
36977.58 
37777.12 
38576.66 
39376.20 
40175.74 
40975.28 
41774.82 
42574.36 
43373.90 
44173.44 
44972.98 
45772.52 
46572.07 
47371.61 
48171.15 
48970.69 
49770.23 
50569.77 
51369.31 
52168.85 
52968.39 
53767.93 
54567.47 
56002.47 
56740.55 
57478.62 
58216.69 
58954.76 
59692.84 
60430.91 
61168.98 
61907.05 
62645.13 
66441.27 
66698.97 
66956.67 
67214.37 
67472.07 
67729.76 
67987.46 
68245.16 
68502.86 
68760.55 
69018.25 
69275.95 
69533.65 
Source: Agricultural Statisiics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Delhi. ' Provisional Figure. 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM AREA TREND (SUGARCANE) 
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PRE-ECONOMIC REFORM PRODUCTION TREND (SUGARCANE) 
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AREA, PRODUCTION AND YIELD OF OIL SEEDS AND THEIR TREND 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003* 
SI. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Area 
10.73 
11.69 
11.18 
10.99 
12.52 
12.09 
12.49 
12.66 
13.00 
13.95 
13.77 
14.77 
15.34 
14.82 
15.26 
15.25 
15.00 
15.67 
14.47 
14.81 
16.64 
17.27 
15.79 
16.90 
17.31 
16.92 
16.47 
17.17 
17.71 
16.94 
17.60 
18.91 
17.76 
18.69 
18.92 
19.02 
18.63 
20.13 
21.90 
22.80 
24.15 
25.89 
25.24 
26.90 
25.30 
25.96 
26.34 
26.12 
26.23 
24.28 
22.77 
22.78 
21.50 
Trend Value 
11.34 
11.57 
11.80 
12.03 
12.25 
12.48 
12.71 
12.94 
13.17 
13.40 
13.63 
13.85 
14.08 
14.31 
14.54 
14.77 
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853.00 
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Source; Agricultural Statisiics at a Glance 2003, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, 
New Delfii. * Provisional Figure. 
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